ETHNIC CONFLICTS

THEIR BIOLOGICAL ROOTS IN ETHNIC NEPOTISM



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Ethnic Conflicts

Their Biological Roots in Ethnic Nepotism

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To Anni, my beloved

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Preface

Different ethnic groups have tended to conflict since the beginning of human history, and the intensity of such conflicts does not seem to have decreased. The universality of ethnic conflict is an interesting problem. Why are ethnic conflicts so common across all civilizational boundaries and over time? I have explored this problem more than 20 years on the basis of an idea that because of the universality of ethnic conflict, we should seek its roots from our common human nature. I have argued that the evolutionary roots of ethnic conflict can be traced to our evolved disposition to ethnic nepotism; in other words, to our disposition to favor and align with relatives in conflict situations. This book represents my latest attempt to test the idea of ethnic nepotism by empirical evidence. I am attempting to explore to what extent a measure of ethnic nepotism (ethnic heterogeneity) is able to explain the great variation in the nature and extent of ethnic conflicts in the world. I want to emphasize that my intention is not to seek a complete explanation for the variation in the extent of ethnic conflicts; I focus on the explanatory power of ethnic nepotism. I try to explore to what extent and in which cases ethnic nepotism provides a satisfactory explanation for the variation in the measure of ethnic conflicts, but I pay attention also to the impact of some other factors.

The book is divided into eight chapters. The research problem and theoretical arguments are formulated and discussed in Chapter 1, in which some studies of ethnicity and ethnic conflict as well as of theoretical explanations are reviewed. In the end, a theory of ethnic nepotism is introduced and the basic hypothesis about the causal relationship between ethnic nepotism and ethnic conflict is

presented.

In Chapter 2, empirical variables needed to test the hypothesis about the crucial impact of ethnic nepotism on the extent and intensity of ethnic conflict will be defined. The definition of empirical variables makes it possible to transform the basic hypothesis into testable research hypotheses. They are formulated at the end of Chapter 2. Empirical data on the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts and on the level of ethnic heterogeneity are given in Appendixes 1 and 2.

In Chapter 3, the research hypotheses are tested by empirical evidence on dependent and explanatory variables. Correlation analysis is used to test the hypotheses, and the results are complemented by multiple correlation analysis. The purpose is to see to what extent the measure of ethnic nepotism and some alternative explanatory variables are able to explain the global variation in the measure of ethnic conflict.

The results of correlation analysis will be complemented by regression analysis carried out in Chapter 4. Regression analysis is used to disclose how well the average relationship between the measure of ethnic nepotism and the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts applies to single countries. The results show which countries are clustered around the regression line and which ones deviate clearly from the regression line and contradict the research hypothesis most clearly. Regression analyses of EEC on HDI-2010 and ID-2010 are used to illustrate the explanatory powers of human development and the level of democratization.

The results of regression analysis of EEC on EH for single countries will be discussed in chapters 5, 6, and 7. The purpose is to describe the nature of ethnic heterogeneity and of ethnic conflicts in each of the 176 countries in greater detail than in the appendixes 1 and 2. For this purpose, the 176 countries of this study are divided into three main categories on the basis of the residuals produced by the regression analysis. In Chapter 5, the

countries around the regression line are briefly discussed. These countries support the hypothesis most clearly. In Chapter 6, the countries with moderate positive or negative residuals are discussed, and in Chapter 7, the countries with large residuals are discussed. Attention will be paid to exceptional local factors which seem to be related to deviating cases. I attempt to find out what local or other particular factors might explain their significant deviations from the regression line.

In Chapter 8, the results of statistical analyses and country reviews are summarized and conclusions on the basis of the results of empirical analyses are made. The main conclusion will be that because the measure of ethnic nepotism used in this study explains more than half of the global variation in the extent of ethnic conflicts across all civilizational and developmental boundaries, and because the evolutionary roots of ethnic nepotism are in our common human nature, it would be unrealistic to expect the disappearance, or even a decrease, of ethnic conflict and violence from the world. On the other hand, because several countries deviate to positive or negative directions from the regression line, the escalation of ethnic conflicts into ethnic violence cannot be regarded to be inevitable. Various political failures have often been behind the escalation of ethnic violence, and, on the other hand, by appropriate policies and institutional arrangements it has been possible to prevent the eruption of ethnic violence even in some ethnically highly divided societies. Therefore, it is an exciting and important task for social scientists to explore what kinds of policies and institutions might be best suited to accommodate ethnic interest conflicts in particular countries and situations. The results of this study provide some hints about the means to accommodate ethnic interest conflicts.

Acknowledgements

I have been interested in ethnic groups and divisions in my studies since the 1960s, but the idea of this study originated from my discussions with Professor Juan J. Linz at Yale University in February 1986. We talked about the factors which might favor or hamper democratization in developing countries. He urged me to re-examine the effects of ethnic cleavages on the chances of democracy in connection with my comparative study of democratization. I am grateful for his suggestion.

The theoretical framework of this study is connected with my interest in the evolutionary roots of politics. I got the idea that it might be possible to find a universal explanation for ethnic conflicts from our common human behavioral predispositions. The sociobiological theory of kin selection presumes that we have an evolved behavioral predisposition to favor kin over non-kin. Pierre L. van den Berghe (1981) extended this behavioral disposition to large ethnic groups and introduced the concept of ethnic nepotism. I assumed that ethnic nepotism of ethnic groups might provide a universal explanation for the emergence of ethnic interest conflicts in all ethnically divided societies. I started my investigation by applying this idea to the study of democracy and ethnic problems in India and presented the first paper "Politics of Ethnic Nepotism" on this subject in 1988 at the 10th European Conference on Modern South Asian Studies in Venice in a panel convened by Diethelm Weidemann. I am grateful to him and other participants for their comments and encouragement. Managing Director S. K. Ghai (Sterling Publishers) urged me to extent my paper into a book on India. I am grateful to James W. Björkman, with whom I had a useful opportunity to talk on the preliminary plan of the book, and to Ronald Tercheck, who read the first version of the manuscript at the University of Maryland,

College Park, in 1989. I want to thank Ramashray Roy and D. L. Sheth (Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi), who helped me in 1989 to find new empirical data, and P. R. Rajgopal, who explained to me the problems of social violence in India. The book *Politics of Ethnic Nepotism: India as an Example* was published by Sterling Publishers in 1991 in New Delhi. Diethelm Weidemann published my Venice paper in a book edited by him in 1991.

Later in the 1990s I continued this research project and extended it to cover practically all countries of the world. The first paper, "Ethnic Conflicts Explained by Ethnic Nepotism," presented at a conference in Riga, 1992, included a preliminary plan of a new book. Later I had opportunities to report on the ideas and preliminary results of the new global study at the 12th European Conference on Modern South Asian Studies in Berlin, 1992; at the 18th Meeting of the European Sociobiological Society in Cambridge, 1995; at the XVIIth World Congress of the International Political Science Association in Seoul, 1997; at the 21st Annual Conference of the European Sociobiological Society in Moscow, 1998; and at the 18th Annual Meeting of the Association for Politics and Life Sciences in Boston, 1998. I want to thank the conveners, chairs, and participants of those panels for their comments, criticism, and advice. My special thanks are due to Juan J. Linz, Jean Blondel, Pierre L. van den Berghe, and J. Philippe Rushton, who read research plans or earlier versions of the book manuscript, for their support and encouragement. The book *Ethnic Conflicts Explained by Ethnic Nepotism* was published in 1999 by JAI PRESS, Stamford, Connecticut, in the *Research in Biopolitics* series. I am grateful to the editors of this series, Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson, for their useful suggestions and crucial help to get the book published. *Journal of Peace Research* published in 1999 an article on the same subject. I am deeply grateful to Editor Nils Petter Gleditsch and to referees for their advice and help. An article on the results of that study was published also in the book *The Darwinian Heritage*

and Sociobiology, edited by Johan M. G. van der Dennen, David Smillie, and Daniel R. Wilson in 1999, and another article in the *Handbook of Global Social Policy* (2001), edited by Stuart S. Nagel and Amy Robb.

I focused on the problem of democracy and ethnic conflict in conference papers presented at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (San Francisco) and at the 4th Pan-European International Relations Conference, University of Kent at Canterbury, in 2001, at the 18th European Conference on Modern South Asian Studies (Lund) in 2004, and at the 17th Biennial Meeting of the International Society for Human Ethology (Ghent) in 2004. I thank especially the discussants of these panels for their critical comments. An article on the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and welfare politics was published in the book *Welfare, Ethnicity, and Altruism* (2004), edited by Frank Kemp Salter. I want to thank Frank Salter for his valuable help and Stephen K. Sanderson for his critical comments and statistical recalculations.

I have worked with this new research project since 2005 and have attempted to improve my variables and data. I had an opportunity to give a lecture on the first version of this study at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO-University) in November 2005. I want to thank Professor Michail Ilyin for his useful comments. In 2006, I presented a paper on the preliminary results of this research project at the XVIII Biennial Conference of the International Society for Human Ethology (Detroit). I am particularly grateful to Frank Salter for his comments on that paper. Some results of an earlier version of this study were published in my book *Globaalit Ongelmat* (Global Problems) in 2008. I thank J. P. Roos (2008) and Jussi K. Niemelä (2008), who reviewed that book and presented noteworthy comments on ethnic nepotism and ethnic heterogeneity.

I am grateful for several travel grants and research grants connected with this research project during the past 25 years,

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May, 2012

Tatu Vanhanen

Chapter 1

Research Problem

1. Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict

2. Previous Studies and Explanations

3. On the Evolutionary Roots of Conflicts

4. Arguments to Justify a New Book on Ethnic Conflicts

Ethnic interest conflicts seem to be common in all ethnically heterogeneous countries of the world, but the nature of such conflicts varies greatly from peaceful competition between ethnic groups to violent clashes, civil wars, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. The problem is why ethnic diversity tends to generate ethnic interest conflicts across all cultural and civilizational boundaries. Various political, cultural, and other environmental factors have been used to explain particular ethnic conflicts, but they do not explain the universality and persistence of ethnic conflicts. The purpose of this book is to seek a common explanatory factor for ethnic conflicts, a factor which is able to explain, at least to some extent, the emergence of ethnic interest conflicts in practically all ethnically divided societies.

Ethnic diversity is characteristic for most countries of the world. According to UNDP's *Human Development Report*

2004 (pp. 27-28), two-thirds of countries have more than one ethnic or religious group making up at least 10 per cent of the population. Ethnic heterogeneity is highly significant especially in Asian, African, and Latin American countries, but also in Europe as a consequence of immigration from other parts of the world. Social and political structures reflect ethnic cleavages, and many important interest conflicts are connected with the conflicting interests of various ethnic groups. It has been noted that most political violence and wars in the contemporary world have been more or less ethnic by nature (cf. Rummel, 1994; Vanhanen, 1999a, 1999b; Sambanis, 2001, 2002; Weede, 2004; Reilly, 2006, p. 28; Wolff, 2006, pp. 9-24). John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (1996, p. v) remark that "ethnicity, far from fading away, has now become a central issue in the social and political life of every continent." Therefore, it would be important to understand the causes that lead ethnic groups to conflict with each other.

Ben Kiernan (2007) emphasizes that ethnic violence has probably been used throughout the history of modern humans, although empirical evidence from earlier periods is scarce. Frances Stewart (2008) notes that violent conflict within multiethnic and multireligious countries is a major problem in the world today, although not all multiethnic and multireligious societies are violent. A question is why a violent ethnic or religious conflict breaks out in some circumstances and not in others (p. 3). Researchers have formulated many kinds of theoretical explanations for ethnic conflict and violence, but it has been difficult for them to agree on any common explanation. My intention in this study is to explore to what extent a theory of ethnic nepotism could help to solve the problem of ethnic conflict and violence. For this purpose, it is first necessary to discuss the concepts of ethnicity and ethnic conflict, to refer to some previous studies and explanations, and then to formulate my own theoretical approach and to explain how the research will be carried out in practice.

1. Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict

Ethnicity has been conceptualized in different ways, but it has not been possible for researchers to agree on any common definition of ethnicity. As Henry E. Hale (2004, p. 458) notes: "Nothing close to a consensus has emerged about not only what ethnicity's effects are but also what it is in the first place." The main divide is between cultural definitions of ethnicity (constructivism) and primordial definitions which emphasize biological determinants of ethnicity. According to Arend Lijphart (1995, p. 855), primordialist theory assumes "that ethnic identity is an inherent characteristic and, if not permanently fixed, at least very difficult to change," whereas the cultural perspective is "that ethnicity is fluid and manipulable, and that it does not become politically salient unless and until politicians use it to mobilize political support." In the following, I refer to some researchers and studies which illustrate these two perspectives to conceptualize ethnicity and ethnic groups.

John Markakis (1993) argues that the common denominator of most available definitions of ethnic identity is culture, which means that ethnic groups are social constructs. They have a chameleon-like capacity to change. Ethnicity provides a disadvantaged group with a new mode for seeking political redress, and a privileged group can use it to protect its advantages. For Claes Corlin (1993), ethnic groups are cultural constructions and nothing else (see also Gurr, 1993a). Anthony Giddens (1995, pp. 252-253) says that many different characteristics may serve to distinguish ethnic groups, for example, language, history or ancestry, religion, and styles of dress or adornment. His claim that ethnic differences are "wholly learned" represents an extreme cultural interpretation of ethnicity. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2004) emphasizes the cultural nature of ethnic divisions and speaks of cultural diversity and cultural identity rather than ethnic diversity or ethnic identity (cf. Stewart,

2000). Richard Jenkins (2008) in his book *Rethinking Ethnicity* supports the idea of the social construction of ethnicity. For him, ethnicity is a matter of cultural differentiation. It is "no more fixed than the way of life of which it is part, or the situations in which it is produced and reproduced" (p. 169). He rejects totally any strongly primordialist view of ethnicity and emphasizes the plasticity in ethnic identification (pp. 46-50).

Donald L. Horowitz' (1985) concept of ethnicity embraces differences identified by color, language, religion, or some other attribute of common origin; it covers tribes, races, nationalities, and castes. He emphasizes that ethnicity is connected to birth and blood, although not absolutely so. It is difficult for an individual to change his/her ethnic identity. According to his principally primordial criteria of ethnicity, ethnic groups are more permanent than socio-cultural groups. The language of ethnicity is the language of kinship (pp. 17-22, 41-54, 78). Pierre L. van den Berghe (1981) says that ethnicity is defined in the last analysis by common descent. The core of an ethnic group is made up of people "who know themselves to be related to each other by a double network of ties of descent and marriage" (p. 24). He applies the ethological and sociobiological ideas of kin selection to the study of ethnic groups, but he emphasizes that ethnic boundaries are not immutable. Ethnicity can be manipulated but not manufactured. The fiction of kinship "has to be sufficiently credible for ethnic solidarity to be effective" (p. 27). David Goetze (2001) notes that ethnic groups "are often defined as groups of individuals that perceive themselves to be bound by common descent, common language, common religion, or other cultural features." He continues that the term "national group" may be used as a synonym for ethnic group "or may refer to ethnic groups that express political demands or share common territory" (p. 272). Myron Weiner (1992, p. 320) argues that "ethnicity" emphasizes "common origin and descent, and shared characteristics based on

language, race, religion, place of origin, culture, values of history, but not a state." Frank Salter (2003, p. 30) argues that "ethny" is "a preferable term to ´ethnic group´ because members of such a category usually do not form a group." He means by his term "ethny" a population sharing common descent.

The mixing of cultural and primordial elements is characteristic for many definitions of ethnic groups. Arend Lijphart (1995), for example, combines cultural and primordial characteristics of ethnicity. He says that an ethnic group "can be defined as a group of people who see themselves as a distinct cultural community; who often share a common language, religion, kinship, and/or physical characteristics (such as skin color); and who tend to harbor negative and hostile feelings toward members of other ethnic groups" (p. 853; see also Hale, 2004). Lijphart (p. 854) notes that nowadays the term *ethnic group* has become virtually synonymous with *communal group.* Anthony D. Smith (1987) speaks of the ethnic origins of nations and supports his argument by extensive historical evidence (cf. Connor, 1994). Benjamin Reilly notes that ethnicity is a notoriously slippery concept, "it can be seen both as an ascriptive phenomenon, based on socio-biological traits, such as race, tribe, and language - a position often characterized in the scholarly literature as ´primordialism´ - as well as an adaptive expression of more malleable or constructed identities formed in reaction to external pressures and incentives" (2006, p. 52).

Hutchinson and Smith (1996) discuss the primordialist and instrumentalist definitions of ethnicity. In the case of primordialism, they refer to a sociobiological proposal, "which regards genetic reproductive capacity as the basis, not only of families and clans, but of wider kinship-based groupings like *ethnies."* These groups are bonded through mechanisms of "nepotism" and "inclusive fitness" and by the myths of descent (p. 8). They come to the conclusion that given "the longevity and ubiquity of ethnic ties and sentiments throughout history, it

would be rash to make predictions about the early transcendence of ethnicity" (p. 14; see also Barth, 1996; Geertz, 1996; Schermerhorn, 1996, Fearon, 2006; Wolff, 2006). Errol A. Henderson's (1999a) definition of ethnic group includes both cultural and primordial elements. According to his definition, ethnic group is "A group of people sharing a distinctive and enduring collective identity based on common cultural traits such as ethnicity, language, religion, or race, and perceptions of common destiny" (p. 751).

It seems to me that primordial and sociobiological definitions of ethnicity are more reasonable than cultural ones. Ethnicity is based on common descent, although the creation of ethnic boundaries depends on situational and cultural factors, too. I agree with the primordialist interpretation of ethnicity because I think that most ethnic groups are basically extended kin groups. This does not mean that ethnic groups should be regarded as fixed and permanent. Because all humans are related to each other to some extent, it depends on local circumstances what types of ethnic boundaries become relevant in the competition for scarce resources. I think that one crucial characteristic of an ethnic group remains the same in all alternatives: the members of an ethnic group are, on the average, genetically more closely related to each other than to the members of other ethnic groups. This is a consequence of prevalent endogamous marriage patterns.

Next we come to the question concerning the types of ethnic divisions and ethnic groups. What types of groups should be regarded as ethnic groups? Many types of ethnic groups have been mentioned in cultural and primordial definitions of ethnicity and ethnic groups. The list covers culture, language, dialect, religion, creed, sect, rituals, race, tribe, nation, nationality, history, ancestry, descent, kinship patterns, phenotypical features, the style of dress or adornment, psychological community, caste, region, a sense of solidarity, class, and community and symbols (see Vanhanen,

1999a, p. 249). Because I am principally interested in significant ethnic cleavages, not in small differences, I prefer the primordialist conceptualization of ethnicity. I try to exclude purely cultural groups from the category of ethnic groups. The crucial criterion of an ethnic group is that its members can be assumed to be, on the average, genetically more related to each other than to the members of outside groups.

My argument is that ethnic cleavages divide the population into groups that are, to some extent, genetically different. Ethnic divisions are the more important, the greater the genetic distance between ethnic groups. If two groups seem to differ only slightly from each other genetically, they are not important ethnic groups from the perspective of this study, although they may be clearly different cultural groups. This concerns, for example, recently established religious groups and closely related linguistic (dialectical) groups. As a rough measure of genetic distance, we could use the period of time the two groups have been separated from each other in the sense that inter-group marriages have been rare. The longer the period of endogamous separation has been, the more the two groups have had time to differentiate from each other genetically. When endogamous populations occupy their own territories, they are geographically separated from each other. It constitutes a natural barrier to inter-group marriages. However, geographical barriers are not always needed to maintain endogamous populations; let us think, for example, of Hindus and Muslims in India, or tribal groups and different castes in India (see Vanhanen 1991, pp. 40-59; 1999a, p. 19). Using the criteria defined above, the list of ethnic groups includes most clearly racial groups, but also clearly different territorial linguistic groups, tribal groups, castes, old and stabilized religious groups (communal groups), and national groups based on common identity (territory, language, and/or religion).

The ethnic divisions based on race are genetically the deepest ones because they may be tens of thousands of years old. Linguistic divisions are often thousands of years, or at

least hundreds of years old. Dialectical divisions may be more recent, and I do not take them into account. Old religious cleavages are at least hundreds of years old. Tribal divisions may be thousands of years old, but they are more uncertain and vague than linguistic divisions. However, quite often tribal divisions coincide with linguistic ones. Indian castes are also thousands, or at least hundreds of years old, although it should be noted that caste classifications are vague. National groups are often more recent ones. Major racial cleavages are characterized by clear genetic distances, whereas the extent of genetic distance decreases in the cases of linguistic, religious, tribal and national divisions, and the significance of cultural differences increases. Cultural differences characterize religious groups more than genetic distances, except in the cases in which religious and some other ethnic divisions are overlapping. Old endogamous religious groups (for example Hindus and Muslims in India, or Sunni and Shia Muslims in Iraq) can be assumed to have become to some extent genetically distinguished from each other. Quite often ethnic and cultural cleavages coincide to some extent.

The term ethnic group used in this study covers all types of distinct groups based on some determinants of ethnicity and it excludes purely cultural groups. The term is applied not only to racial groups but also to linguistic, religious (communal), tribal, national, and caste groups. According to my interpretation, ethnicity is always based on common descent, but the creation of ethnic boundaries depends also on situational and cultural factors, especially so in the case of relatively small ethnic differences.

It is also necessary to define the concept of "ethnic conflict." What does it mean? According to David Levinson (1994, p. 62), "Ethnic conflict means violent conflict among groups who differ from one another in terms of culture, religion, physical features, or language." He connects ethnic conflict with violence among ethnic groups, but he admits that

there are also nonviolent ethnic conflicts. It often "takes the form of political, economic, or cultural repression of ethnic minorities." H. D. Forbes (1997, p. 14) notes that "A pattern of social discrimination involving little or no violence may be the most important manifestation of ethnic conflict." So there are many types of ethnic conflicts from peaceful conflicts to violent ones. Horowitz (1985) illustrates the various expressions of ethnic conflict by mentioning that "In country after country, political parties and trade unions are organized ethnically" (p. 3). The competition for scarce resources leads to ethnic conflicts in ethnically divided societies. Henderson (1999a) argues that ethnic, or interethnic, conflict "refers to disputes between contending groups who identify themselves primarily on the basis of ethnic criteria and who make group claims to resources on the basis of their collective rights" (p. 751). Stefan Wolff (2006, pp. 5-6) emphasizes that "the stakes in ethnic conflicts are extremely diverse, ranging from legitimate political, social, cultural, and economic grievances of disadvanced ethnic groups to predatory agendas of states and small cartels of elites, to so-called national security interests, to name but a few." Dov Ronen (1997, p. xiv) points out that ethnic conflict "emerges from clashing interests concerning the distribution of (tangible or intangible) goods." According to Gursel G. Ismayilov (2011), "Ethnic conflicts can be defined as conflicts between ethnic groups in multi-ethnic states, which have been going on some time, which may appear to be unsolvable to the parties caught up in them". He continues that "many ethnic conflicts result in a significant loss of life, a serious denial of basic human rights and considerable material destruction, some escalating into interethnic or internal war."

In this study, the concept of "ethnic conflict" covers a continuum of various interest conflicts between ethnic groups from more or less peaceful competition for scarce resources to ethnic demonstrations and violent conflicts in various forms. I emphasize that ethnic conflicts constitute a continuum and that it is difficult to separate peaceful conflicts from violent ones. In

practice, peaceful and violent forms of conflicts are often mixed. Ethnic conflicts are expressed in many forms. The discrimination and repression of some ethnic groups, the establishment of interest organizations and political parties along ethnic lines, as well as violent clashes between ethnic groups or between some ethnic groups and the government indicate the existence of ethnic conflicts. However, the significance and intensity of ethnic conflicts may vary considerably depending on the share of the population involved in ethnic conflicts and on the forms of ethnic conflict.

2. Previous Studies and Explanations

Ethnic conflicts have been described, measured, and explained in many previous studies. However, the fact is that the number of studies in which theoretical arguments have been tested by extensive empirical evidence is quite limited. In most empirical studies, the attention is limited to some particular countries or regions. Besides, many studies have focused on describing the history and nature of ethnic groups and conflicts more than explaining them by some theory. Extensive global studies in which hypotheses are tested by empirical evidence are even fewer. In this section, I refer briefly to some studies of ethnic conflict. They illustrate the methods and arguments used in such studies and provide comparison points for my own study.

Let us start with James Chowning Davies (1971), who noted that violence among men goes back to the beginnings of human history. He emphasized the need to seek the causes of violence and assumed primarily that the causes should be sought from the nature of man. I agree with Davies that human nature matters and that it should be taken into account.

Ted Robert Gurr (1971) used the principles of the frustration-aggression theory to explain political violence. He argued that "men who are frustrated have an innate disposition

to do violence to its source in proportion to the intensity of their frustration" (p. 37). It may be so, but his theory does not explain why so many violent conflicts take place along ethnic lines. Gurr's later study (1993a) on minorities at risk covers 233 politicized communal groups that had experienced economic or political discrimination and had taken political action in support of collective interests at some time between 1945 and 1989. Gurr separated five types of politicized ethnic groups: (1) ethnonationalists, (2) indigenous peoples, (3) ethnoclasses, (4) militant sects, and (5) communal contenders, including disadvantaged and advantaged communal contenders. Such a categorization clarifies the heterogeneity of ethnic groups. The study is based on very extensive empirical evidence. All composite indicators are built up from judgmentally coded or categorical data.

Gurr's (1993b) statistical analysis represents one of the first and most comprehensive global reviews of communal conflicts ever made. It indicates how inequalities and discrimination are related to communal grievances that instigate the establishment of ethnic organizations and foment communal protests and rebellions. The purpose was to explore the conditions under which communal groups mobilize for political action to assert and protect group interests. According to his arguments, the "model's most basic premise is that protest and rebellion by communal groups are jointly motivated by deep-seated grievances about group status *and* by the situationally determined pursuit of political interests, as formulated by group leaders and political entrepreneurs" (pp. 166-167). The results of statistical analysis show that the group's prior mobilization for political action was consistently the strongest determinant of magnitudes of communal protest (33.4%) and rebellion (45.5%) in the 1980s. Gurr notes that these results are "consistent with conflict theories and emphasize the importance of group mobilization, but fail to address the most interesting theoretical question, which is why groups mobilize in the first place" (p. 188). Finally, he noted that communal conflict, especially

rebellion, has increased more or less steadily since the 1950s in most world regions, and that the upward trends are almost sure to continue during the1990s (cf. Cederman et al., 2011).

University of Maryland's *Minorities At Risk* project continues. It monitors and analyzes the status and conflicts of politically-active communal groups in all countries with a current population of at least 500,000. It provides and maintains information in a standardized form on more than 283 groups. Data are available for researchers through the MAR project's website (see http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/). James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin (2011) review some problems of this project and suggest various improvements.

Horowitz' (1985) study on ethnic groups in conflict covers severely divided societies in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. He notes that it was thought after World War II that "the industrialized countries had outgrown political affiliation based on ethnicity." Consequently, the field of ethnic relations became a backwater of the social sciences, and "ethnic conflict was often treated as if it were a manifestation of something else: the persistence of traditionalism, the stresses of modernization, or class conflict masquerading in the guise of ethnic identity" (p. 13). The fact, however, is that ethnic conflict is a recurrent and worldwide phenomenon and that, in divided societies, ethnic conflict is at the center of politics. His comparative study provides plenty of information on ethnic conflicts, and the aim of his study – to explore systematically and comparatively the politics of ethnic group conflict in severely divided societies and to seek a theoretical explanation for ethnic conflicts – is approximately the same as in this study. Horowitz (pp. 141-147) formulates a theory of ethnic conflict which emphasizes the importance of group allegiances and comparisons. In interactions between groups, favoritism toward ingroups and discrimination against outgroups are demonstrated. This tendency can lead to conflicts between groups, especially so in the cases of ethnic groups because they are for their members

more important than casual groups. Ethnic groups do not compete merely in one task or one game but in lifelong games, which makes the competition between them urgent and central. Horowitz illustrates his arguments by numerous examples, but he does not attempt to test his theory by systematic statistical evidence.

Smith's (1987, pp. 220-225) theoretical argument is that cultural pluralism and ethnic nationalism cause inter-ethnic tension and ethnic conflicts both between states and within states and that we should expect continual inter-ethnic conflicts in our world of very uneven political and economic resources. So he predicts that ethnic conflicts will increase more probably than decrease. Walker Connor (1994) uses the concept of "ethnonationalism" to explain the emergence of ethnic conflicts in many parts of the world (see also Glickman, 1995; Forbes, 1997; Harff and Gurr, 2004).

Kumar Rupesinghe (1988) notes that the "mere existence of ethnicity is certainly no precondition for conflicts" (p. 41) and he argues that there is no single explanatory variable or a single mono-causal explanation for ethnic conflict. He thinks that it would be difficult to produce any general theory of ethnic conflict. These are interesting arguments from the perspective of this study for the reason that my intention is to formulate a general theory of ethnic conflict (see also Rupesinghe and Tishkov, 1996).

Rodolfo Stavenhagen (1988) suspects that ethnic conflict as such does not exist: "What does exist is social, political and economic conflict between groups of people who identify each other in ethnic terms; color, race, religion, language, national origin." However, he does not explain why such conflicts take place so often along ethnic lines, not along other social, political or economic lines. In a later book (Stavenhagen, 1996), he recognizes the existence of several hundred ethnic conflicts on all continents and comes to the conclusion that "ethnic conflicts will increase in number and intensity before they will wane and be replaced by other kinds of conflict" (pp. 302-303). I suspect

that they will not wane even in the future.

Laszlo F. Thomay (1993) explores race (ethnic) relations in several countries in different parts of the world in his study *The Natural Law of Race Relations* and comes to the conclusion that ethnic conflicts are inevitable in all societies in which the racial (ethnic) minority exceeds a certain proportion of the total population. "People of different races, nationalities, languages or cultures can not live peacefully and harmoniously within the confines of the same state if the minority exceeds a certain proportion of the total population" (p. 118) and "The larger and more noticeably different a minority is, the more relations between majority and minority deteriorate" (p. 119). These regularities constitute the Natural Law governing race relations. He notes on the nature of this Natural Law that being "a law of nature, it cannot be changed or manipulated, no matter how hard we try" (p. 142).

Giddens (1995, pp. 251-282) argues that ethnic prejudices are based on learned stereotypical thinking and on psychological mechanism of displacement. According to his sociological interpretation of ethnic hostilities and conflicts, sociological concepts of ethnocentrism, group closure, and resource allocation help us to understand factors underlying many forms of ethnic conflict. He also claims that ethnic conflicts belong to the legacy of colonialism. Stewart (2000) argues that the factor which differentiates the violent from peaceful relations in culturally divided countries is the existence of severe horizontal inequalities between culturally (ethnically) defined groups (cf. Stewart et al., 2008).

Forbes (1997) has attempted to test the contact hypothesis, according to which contacts between ethnic groups reduce prejudice and improve intergroup relations, but the results are not unambiguous. Some studies have supported the hypothesis, some others have contradicted it. The hypothesis seems to be valid at the level of family contacts, but not at the level of groups. He emphasizes the significance of real ethnic or cultural

differences as a cause of intergroup conflict. The model's basic rule is "that the greater the contact between groups and the greater the differences between them, the greater the conflict" (pp. 203-204).

Minority Rights Group International (MRG, London) has carried out a very extensive survey of ethnic conflicts around the world. They have produced more than 100 reports on the problems of oppressed groups in all parts of the world. Their reports are not theoretical nor comparative analyses of ethnic conflicts, but they include valuable factual information on ethnic divisions and conflicts. Their global report *World Directory of Minorities* (1997) covers all countries of the world and provides an excellent review of ethnic groups and ethnic conflicts. The MRG's project continues. Their online *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous People* (WDM) provides continually updated data on ethnic divisions and conflicts (see http://www.minorityrights.org/directory).

Michael E. Brown (2001) examines the causes of internal conflict presented in research literature and comes to the conclusion that the "search for a single factor or set of factors that explains everything is comparable to the search for the Holy Grail – noble, but futile" (p. 4). He identifies four main clusters of factors that make some places more predisposed to violence than others: structural factors (weak states, intra-state security concerns and ethnic geography), political factors (discriminatory political institutions, exclusionary national ideologies, inter-group politics, and elite politics), economic/social structures (economic problems, discriminatory economic systems, and economic development and modernization), and cultural/perceptual factors (patterns of cultural discrimination and problematic group histories) (p. 5). He illustrates the impact of these factors by examples, but he does not attempt to test the hypotheses by statistical evidence.

Håvard Hegre, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch (2001) have carried out an extensive statistical analysis in which they measure the relationship between the

level of democracy and civil war. Democratic peace theory suggests that the spread of democracy will promote a decline in interstate warfare. They wanted to explore whether democratization also leads to civil peace. They found some support for the hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped curve between democracy and domestic violence. It means that intermediate regimes are much more prone to civil war than stark autocracies or institutionally consistent democracies. So their conclusion is that the "most reliable path to stable domestic peace in the long run is to democratize as much as possible" (p. 44), although democratization seems to produce violence in the short run. They assume that in the long run most states, possibly all, may reach a democratic civil peace (for democratic peace theory, see Maoz and Russett, 1993; Russett, 1997; Ward and Gleditsch, 1998; Gleditsch, 1999; Barkawi and Lafey, 2001).

Fearon and Laitin (2003) have made another extensive statistical analysis on the ethnicity and civil war. Their analysis covers the period 1945 to 1999 in the 161 countries that had a population of at least a million in 1990. Their central argument is that the main factors determining the "variation in civil violence in this period are not ethnic or religious differences or broadly held grievances but, rather, conditions that favor *insurgency"* (p. 75). They hypothesize that "financially, organizationally, and politically weak central governments render insurgency more feasible and attractive due to weak local policing or inept and corrupt counterinsurgency practices" (pp. 75-76). The results of their analysis are relevant from the perspective of this study. They emphasize that the conditions that favor insurgency "are better predictors of which countries are at risk for civil war than are indicators of ethnic and religious diversity or measures of grievances such as economic inequality, lack of democracy or civil liberties, or state discrimination against minority religions and languages" (p. 88).

Monica Duffy Toft (2003) connects ethnic violence to geographical factors in her book *The Geography of Ethnic*

Violence. She explores why some ethnic conflicts turn violent, but not others, and argues that her theory of indivisible territory provides an answer. It is based on the idea that when both sides in a conflict regard control over a disputed territory as indivisible, violence is likely. She differentiates between four settlement patterns of ethnic groups: (1) concentrated majorities, (2) concentrated minorities, (3) urbanites, and (4) dispersed groups. Concentrated ethnic majorities are more likely to regard their territory indivisible than urbanites or dispersed groups. She tested her hypotheses by global evidence derived from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data set and found that empirical evidence supports her hypotheses. The global analysis is complemented by four case studies covering Tatarstan and Chechnya in Russia and Abkhazia and Ajaria in Georgia. I think that Toft's theory of indivisible territory is highly relevant. It may help to explain why some ethnic conflicts turn violent and others do not. The settlement pattern of ethnic groups may have a crucial role in explaining ethnic violence (for the importance of territory, see also Malmberg, 1980).

Wolff's (2006) study *Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective* is really global in the sense that he discusses most of the contemporary ethnic conflicts around the world. He emphasizes the significance and persistence of ethnic conflicts and pays attention to the fact that the degree of violence varies greatly. All ethnic conflicts have not turned violent. There have been means to manage and settle ethnic conflicts. However, he does not combine his worldwide observations into any general theory on the causes of ethnic conflicts or on the strategies to resolve them without violence. He leaves open the question "to what extent ethnic conflicts are actually about ethnicity and to what extent ethnicity is merely a convenient common denominator to organize conflict groups in the struggle over resources, land, or power" (p. 6). He comes to the conclusion that ethnic conflicts will continue in the foreseeable future, but forecasting "future trends with any reasonable degree of precision seems a futile exercise" (p. 188).

In most of these theoretical explanations, the emergence of ethnic conflict is related to various cultural and environmental factors. Henderson (1999a), for example, concludes: "Interethnic conflict has been largely explained by psychological, economic, and political models of conflict in the scholarly literature" (p. 755). A big problem with cultural explanations is that it is difficult to test them by empirical evidence because hypotheses are not clearly stated, because the number of variables is large, or because it is not clear how the hypothetical concepts could be operationalized. Levinson (1994, pp. 67-68) notes that as yet there is no complete answer to the question of cause and, because there are different types of ethnic conflict and various situations in which they occur, the question may ultimately require several answers. He refers to various situational factors but also to the possibility that the roots of ethnic conflict may be in human biological evolution (see also UNDP 2004, pp. 1-3).

Those who prefer primordialist conceptualization of ethnicity seek explanations for ethnicity and ethnic conflict from biological factors. Van den Berghe (1981) refers to the sociobiological explanation of nepotism and argues that ethnic sentiments have evolved as an extension of nepotism, from the propensity to favor kin over non-kin. He argues that the closer the relationship, the stronger the preferential behavior. He uses the term "ethnic nepotism" to describe such mutual aid networks based on kinship. According to his argumentation, the permanent significance of ethnic boundaries in all types of societies is based on the fact that the ethnic group is "the primordial social group, the extended kin group, selected through millions of years to maximize the individual inclusive fitness of its members through the operation of nepotism" (p. 252). For primordial and sociobiological explanations, see also Rushton, 1986, 1995; Reynolds et al., 1987; van der Dennen, 1987; Goetze, 2001, pp. 273-276; Salter, 2002, 2003; MacDonald, 2004; Thayer, 2004).

Evolutionary ideas and biological factors have been used in several studies to explain ethnicity and ethnic conflicts. Reynolds, Falger and Vine (1987) pay attention to ethnocentrism, which leads to discrimination based on cultural differences. They would like to know whether the cultural in-group / out-group phenomenon "can be linked back in terms of evolutionary continuity to the preference for relatives over strangers that we find in animals, and for which we have a solid genetic explanation at the sociobiological level" (p. xviii). Johan M. G. van der Dennen (1987) reviews the extensive literature dealing with ethnocentrism and in-group / out-group differentiation and notes that ethnocentrism and canonical variants (nationalism, parochialism, patriotism and so on) may still be considered dormant characteristics of the human species. In another book of the European Sociobiological Society, *Sociobiology and Conflict,* edited by van der Dennen and Falger (1990), inclusive fitness theory is used to explain competitive behavior and violent conflict, although their book is not especially concerned with ethnic conflicts.

Anne Katrin Flohr (1994) has presented strong theoretical arguments for the thesis that ethnocentrism and xenophobia have biosocial foundations. She notes that explanations provided by traditional social sciences for ethnocentrism and xenophobia are insufficient. Situational factors cannot explain the universality of ethnocentrism. Her conclusion is that ethnocentrism is based on evolved behavioral disposition and that it is related to nepotism. I agree with this argument.

Ethnic Conflict and Indoctrination, edited by Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt and Frank K. Salter (1998) includes several articles in which evolutionary roots of war and violence are examined from the perspective of human disposition to indoctrination. The editors note that humans are susceptive to indoctrination for ideologies which lead to intergroup hostility (p. 4). Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1998) argues that the "indoctrinability of our species seems to be a special learning disposition to form an affective attachment to symbols and values characterizing the quasi-

familial we-group" (pp. 37-38). Consequently, humans follow the flag like an experimentally imprinted duckling. Ethnocentrism and tribalism are universal phenomena rooted in primordial familial dispositions, but peaceful “coexistence of different ethnic groups is certainly possible if none of the groups need fear the domination of others, more generally if none finds itself in a situation of interethnic competition." He thinks that this "is best achieved when each group owns its own land and enjoys sovereignty over its own affairs as in the case of Switzerland" (pp. 49-50). These are important observations.

The evolutionary interpretation of ethnicity and ethnic conflict has been traced to the sociobiological theory of inclusive fitness or kin selection. According to William Hamilton's inclusive fitness theory, it is genetically rational to behave altruistically toward relatives because one shares more genes (shared heredity) with his/her relatives than with outsiders. This evolved behavior pattern explains nepotism. Ethnic nepotism is an extended form of family nepotism because ethnic groups can be regarded as extended kin groups (for this theory, see Hamilton, 1964; Wilson, 1975; Dawkins, 1976; Alexander, 1980). Richard Dawkins' (1976) "selfish genes" behave nepotistically by supporting relatives. "Such genes," says van den Berghe (1981, p. 20), explaining Dawkins theory, "as predispose their carrying organisms to behave nepotistically will be selected for, because, by favoring nepotism, they enhance their own replication. Nepotistic organisms foster the fitness of relatives who have a high probability of carrying the same gene or genes for nepotism."

J. Philippe Rushton's (1995, 2005) genetic similarity theory explains why it is relatively easy for people to recognize ethnic relatives. His idea is that people prefer genetic similarity in social partners. He notes that the pull of genetic similarity does not stop at family and friends (see also Rushton, 1998). Rushton refers to Salter, who pays attention to genetic distances between populations and comes to the conclusion that

two "English people become the equivalent of 3/8 cousin by comparison with people from the Near East; 1/2 cousin by comparison with people from India; half-sibs by comparison with people from China or East Africa; and like full-sibs (or children) compared with people from South Africa." In general, as "genetic distances between populations become larger, the kinship coefficient between random co-ethnics within a population increases." Consequently, ethnic nepotism is virtually a proxy for family nepotism (Rushton, 2005, p. 499). Salter (2003, p. 67) notes that ethnies "are indeed super families as van den Berghe argued" and that large "ethnic genetic interests make public charity and self-sacrificial heroism directed towards one's own ethnic group potentially adaptive." He continues that the "genetic distance between English and Bantu is so great that, on the face of it, competition between them would make within-group altruism among random English (or among random Bantu) almost as adaptive as parent-child altruism, if the altruism were in the service of that competition." It is plausible to assume that all human beings share the evolved behavioral disposition to nepotism and to ethnic nepotism and that it is the more important, the greater the genetic distance between ethnic groups.

3. On the Evolutionary Roots of Conflicts

My attention is focused on ethnic conflicts in this study, but they are not the only conflicts in human societies. There are many other types of conflicts from the level of individuals to the levels of national and international systems. Therefore it is reasonable to ask whether there is any common theoretical explanation for the emergence of innumerable conflicts of all kinds in human societies. My argument is that the Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection provides an ultimate theoretical explanation for the eruption and persistence of all kinds of interest conflicts in human

societies. According to the evolutionary theory, all organisms have to struggle for survival because we live in a world of scarcity in which all species are able to produce much more progeny than can be supported by the available resources. The permanent discrepancy between the number of individuals and the means of existence makes the struggle for survival inevitable and omnipresent (cf. Darwin, 1981(1859); Dobzhansky et al., 1977, pp. 96-99; Mayr, 1982, pp. 479-480). According to Mayr's first inference, "Since more individuals are produced than can be supported by available resources but the population size remains stable, it means that there must be a fierce struggle for existence among the individuals of a population, resulting in the survival of only a part, often a very small part, of the progeny of each generation" (Mayr, 1982, p. 480). The Darwinian theory explains the inevitability of the struggle for existence in all parts of nature and it applies also to human societies and conflicts. We should understand that the inevitable and continual struggle for scarce resources leads to many kinds of conflicts in human societies, including ethnic conflicts. Ethnic nepotism does not explain the origin of conflicts, but it explains why so many interest conflicts in human societies take place between ethnic groups. Briefly stated, the origin of all interest conflicts is in the inevitable struggle for scarce resources, but ethnic nepotism explains why many of those conflicts become canalized along ethnic lines in ethnically heterogeneous societies.

I have previously published two books on ethnic conflicts, in which I explored to what extent it is possible to explain the emergence of ethnic conflict by the theory of ethnic nepotism (Vanhanen, 1991, 1999a, 1999b). I argued that it is possible to derive a cross-culturally valid ultimate explanation for ethnic conflict from an evolutionary interpretation of politics and from the theory of kin selection. My theoretical argumentation started from the idea that

politics is everywhere concerned with the struggle for scarce resources. This central and universal theme of politics is derived from the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection. I argued that politics is one of the forums of this struggle. The evolutionary roots of politics lie in the necessity to solve conflicts for scarce resources by some means. We should try to understand that universal competition in human societies is an inevitable consequence of the fact that we live in the world of scarcity and that we are programmed to further our survival by all available means. The Darwinian theory explains why it must be so. Thus it provides an ultimate evolutionary explanation for the necessity and universality of competition and interest conflicts in human societies (see Vanhanen, 1991, pp. 24-27; 1999a, p. 12; 2004, pp. 88-90).

At this point, I want to emphasize that ethnic conflict is an ancient phenomenon in human societies. It is not a recent and temporary phenomenon limited to the contemporary world. Kiernan (2007) refers in his extensive historical study to some prehistorians who suspect that ancestors of modern humans exterminated Europe's archaic Neanderthal population. In other words, ethnic violence has probably been used throughout the history of modern humans, although empirical evidence from earlier periods is scarce. Kiernan refers only briefly to the history of genocide and extermination in ancient world, mainly to Sparta and Rome, and focuses on some examples since the fifteenth century. He starts from the Spanish conquest of the New World in 1492-1600. It was connected with extensive genocides and genocidal massacres of indigenous populations throughout the Caribbean and Central and South America, although the drastic decimation of Amerindian populations was principally due to diseases which Europeans brought. Genocidal massacres were common also in East Asia in 1400-1600 and in Southeast Asia between 1590 and 1800. Settler colonialism has been characterized by genocides in different parts of the world. He refers to the English conquest of Ireland in 1565-1603 and to colonial North America in 1600-1776,

where colonists gradually occupied the territories of indigenous populations and exterminated indigenous people, not only males but also women and children. The same policy of genocidal massacres continued in the United States. His other examples cover genocidal violence in nineteenth-century Australia and settler genocides in Africa, 1830-1910. Genocides and genocidal massacres continued in the twentieth century. Kiernan refers to the Armenian genocide carried out by the Young Turk regime in Turkey, to the Nazi government's genocide of Jews and mass murder of millions of Polish and Russian people during the World War II, to genocides in East Asia carried out by Japan's army, to the terror and mass murders in the Soviet Union and in Mao's China, and finally to recent genocides in Bangladesh, Guatemala, Cambodia, Rwanda, Indonesia, Iraq, Bosnia, and Darfur, and also to Al-Qaeda's global genocidal massacres.

The history of genocides implies that all nations have been more or less equally capable of carrying out genocides and ethnic cleansings in appropriate circumstances. Kiernan notes that the phenomenon transcends political labels: "Genocide has been associated with expanding colonialism, shrinking empires, religious communalism, atheist dictatorships, unfettered capitalism, National Socialism, Communist revolution, post-Communist nationalism, National Security militarism, and Islamist terror" (p. 37). It is remarkable that nearly all genocides have been directed against other racial or other ethnic groups. This fact and the universality of ethnic violence throughout the known human history implies that the roots of this behavior pattern may be in our common human nature. Kiernan does not refer to human nature. He tries to explain the ideological preoccupations of the perpetrators of genocide, extermination and genocidal massacres by racism, expansionism, agrarianism and antiquity (pp. 38, 605), but it seems to me that a more ultimate explanation can be traced to the continual struggle for existence and to our evolved disposition to ethnic nepotism. The

struggle for the control of land and territory follows from the inevitable struggle for existence and scarce resources, and ethnic nepotism explains why the contenders are so often different ethnic groups.

Steven Pinker (2011) points out in his extensive historical analysis that brutal violence calculated by the number of killings per 100,000 people per year has declined dramatically as a consequence of the civilizing process. The twentieth century was not the bloodiest in history. He does not refer to ethnic violence, but it is quite probable that the relative extent of ethnic violence has also declined dramatically, although we do not have any exact statistical evidence on the extent of ethnic violence in the past centuries. It is probable that the civilizing process has reduced ethnic violence and replaced violent conflicts by more or less peaceful ethnic interest conflicts. Edward O. Wilson (2012) notes that war and genocide have been universal and eternal, but since "the end of the second World War, violent conflict between states has declined drastically... But civil wars, insurgencies, and state- sponsored terrorism continue unabated" (pp, 65-66).

So my theoretical explanation for the significance of ethnicity and ethnic groups is based on an evolutionary argumentation. Because we are bound to a ceaseless competition and struggle for scarce resources in politics and in many other forums of life and because we have an evolved tendency to nepotism and ethnic nepotism, many interest conflicts become canalized along ethnic lines in ethnically divided societies. It is natural for the members of an ethnic group to support each other in political interest conflicts. Thus ethnic nepotism provides the ultimate theoretical explanation for the significance of ethnicity and ethnic conflict. Because of its evolutionary roots, our behavioral predisposition to ethnic nepotism is shared by all human populations, although it can play a significant role only in ethnically divided societies and in relations between ethnically different nations. Thus my basic hypothesis is that *the more deeply a population is ethnically*

divided, the more interest conflicts become canalized along ethnic lines.

The argument that our evolved behavioral predisposition to ethnic nepotism is shared by all human populations led me to hypothesize that we can expect ethnic interest conflicts in all ethnically divided societies, although the nature and intensity of such conflicts may vary greatly. The conflicts may vary from peaceful competition by legal means to utmost violence. The variation depends not only on the significance of an interest conflict but also on the available means to solve conflicts. There are intervening factors, which may increase or decrease the intensity of conflicts. Intervening factors include various cultural and situational factors, including political institutions and political leadership. The role of political institutions is especially interesting for the reason that, in principle, it is easier to change political institutions than many other intervening factors. Depending on their nature, political institutions can help to accommodate ethnic interest conflicts or to deepen them. Here we come to the role of democracy in ethnic interest conflicts and to the impact of other environmental factors.

4. Arguments to Justify a New Book on Ethnic Conflicts

The above review of theoretical arguments and studies indicates that ethnicity and ethnic conflicts have already been studied extensively from many perspectives. Besides, I myself have previously published two books and some articles on this subject. My latest article "Ethnic Conflict and Violence in Heterogeneous Societies" was published in Spring 2012 (Vanhanen, 2012). Therefore, it is reasonable to ask why to make a new book on the same subject? Do I have anything new and important to say? Yes, I have some weighty arguments to justify the writing of this new book.

My first argument is theoretical. Previous attempts to

explain ethnic conflicts by merely various cultural and environmental factors have not yet produced any testable theoretical explanation for ethnic conflicts. I think that a common theoretical explanation for ethnic conflicts should be sought from some common characteristics of human nature, principally from our universal disposition to favor kin over non-kin. This theoretical explanation has been available since 1981 when van den Berghe published his book *The Ethnic Phenomenon* and briefly referred to ethnic nepotism. For some reason, researchers have not taken it into account. It seems to me that they have wanted to avoid any genetic explanation. I started to study ethnic conflicts when I realized that ethnic nepotism rooted in human nature might be the common factor behind all ethnic conflicts. I wanted to explore to what extent ethnic nepotism measured by ethnic heterogeneity is related to the extent and intensity of ethnic conflicts around the world. Thus my central argument is that the idea of ethnic nepotism provides the common theoretical explanation for the universality and persistence of ethnic conflicts in the world. It is true that I have already presented this argument in my previous studies, but because the idea on the crucial impact of ethnic nepotism is still unknown for most researchers, or it has not yet convinced them, it is reasonable to repeat this argument and to test it by new evidence.

Second, I use the same theory of ethnic nepotism as in my previous studies, but the empirical variables have been thoroughly reformulated. The level of ethnic heterogeneity (EH) will be used to measure the potential significance of ethnic nepotism, and the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (EEC) will be used to measure the degree of ethnic conflicts from minor incidents to extensive ethnic violence. Both variables are based on new and much more extensive empirical evidence than the variables of my previous studies.

Third, all data on explanatory and dependent variables are updated. In my previous study (Vanhanen 1999a, 1999b), data and estimations of ethnic conflicts were based on events during

the period 1990-1996. Now they are based on events during the period 2003-2011. Data on ethnic heterogeneity are based on the latest available data.

Fourth, in addition to the level of ethnic heterogeneity (EH), some attention will be paid to alternative environmental factors which may explain a part of the variation in the scale of ethnic conflicts (EEC) independently from the degree of ethnic heterogeneity. The impact of some alternative explanatory variables is explored by statistical analysis. The purpose is to check to what extent they are able to explain some part of ethnic conflicts independently from my principal explanatory factor (EH).

Fifth, on the basis of empirical observations, my intention is to present some suggestions on institutional and other strategies which might help to mitigate ethnic interest conflicts and to prevent their escalation into violent ones. It does not seem to be possible to remove ethnic conflicts from the world, but it may be possible to prevent the escalation of ethnic conflicts into violence in single cases by appropriate institutional or other reforms.

Briefly stated, the central objective of this study is to further the scientific study of ethnic conflict by exploring to what extent the roots of ethnic conflicts can be traced to evolved characteristics of human nature. We should learn to understand that all human populations across all cultural and civilizational boundaries share the same behavioral disposition to ethnic nepotism, which leads people to align themselves along ethnic lines in many conflict situations. It may be difficult for many scholars to accept this message on the genetic roots of ethnic conflicts, but I try to show by this study that it would be worthwhile to take this message into account.

The study covers 176 independent countries whose population in 2010 was over 200,000 inhabitants. The hypotheses on the impact of explanatory variables on the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts will be tested by statistical

analysis, principally by correlation and regression analyses in the sample of 176 countries. The results of regression analysis will be discussed at the level of single countries in order to find out how well ethnic nepotism measured by ethnic heterogeneity explains the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts in single countries and which countries contradict the hypothesis by deviating significantly from the regression line. The examination of large positive and negative deviations may disclose what kinds of exceptional local factors have caused some countries to deviate from the average relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts.

Chapter 2

Variables and Research Hypotheses

1. The Estimated Scale of Ethnic Conflicts (EEC)

2. Ethnic Heterogeneity (EH)

3. Alternative Explanatory Factors

4. Research Hypotheses

5. Units of Analysis

According to the theory of ethnic nepotism discussed in Chapter 1, ethnic conflict is a consequence of the persistent need to struggle for scarce resources and of our evolved disposition to ethnic nepotism. In ethnically divided societies, many struggles for scarce resources tend to become canalized along ethnic lines. Because of ethnic nepotism, people tend to align themselves in conflict situations with their ethnic relatives more easily than with outsiders. The more a population is ethnically divided, the more alignments in such struggles tend to take place along ethnic lines. In other words, the more the genetic distance between competing ethnic groups grows, the more conflict tends to take place along ethnic lines (cf. Salter, 2003, 2004). If contenders are unable to agree on the sharing of competed resources by peaceful means, they may resort to violence as the final means to solve the disputes. Consequently, it is reasonable to hypothesize that there

must be a positive correlation between the degree of ethnic diversity and the extent and intensity of ethnic conflict. *The more deeply a country's population is ethnically divided, the more interest conflicts become canalized along ethnic lines.*

This central hypothesis derived from the theory of ethnic nepotism can be tested by empirical evidence by substituting the hypothetical concepts by operationally defined variables. We should be able to measure the degree of ethnic nepotism and the relative significance of ethnic conflicts. In my previous study (Vanhanen 1999a), I formulated an Index of Ethnic Heterogeneity (EH) to indicate the strength of ethnic nepotism and a Scale of Institutionalized Ethnic Conflicts and a Scale of Violent Ethnic Conflicts to measure the extent and intensity of ethnic conflicts. These two variables were combined into an Index of Ethnic Conflict. The results of empirical analysis showed that the Index of Ethnic Heterogeneity was very strongly correlated with the Scale of Institutionalized Ethnic Conflict (0.857), moderately with the Scale of Violent Ethnic Conflicts (0.467), and strongly with the combined Index of Ethnic Conflict (0.726) in the group of 148 countries in 1990-1996 (Vanhanen, 1999a, p. 55; cf. Vanhanen, 1999b; 2012). For the purposes of this study, I restructured the measure of ethnic heterogeneity (EH), which will be used as the principal explanatory variable, as well as the measure of ethnic conflict in order to improve these indicators. New data were gathered on the dependent and explanatory variables.

The central hypothesis is based on the assumption that other relevant circumstances remain the same. However, in the real world, this is not necessarily true. There is significant variation in environmental circumstances, which variation may reduce the correlation between the measures of ethnic heterogeneity and of ethnic conflict. The question is what those other relevant factors might be. Many kinds of factors will certainly affect the emergence of ethnic conflict. I do not have any definite perception on the nature and significance of those other factors,

but I am going to take into account some of them as alternative explanatory factors. Earlier studies of ethnic conflict include references to different factors that may be causally related to ethnic conflict. Unfortunately it is not possible to operationalize many of them. I focus on some factors which can be measured by empirical variables.

First, it is reasonable to assume that it is easier for ethnic conflicts to escalate into violent ones in poor countries than in socioeconomically more highly developed countries, in which it may be easier to satisfy the needs of different social groups. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that *the level of socioeconomic development is negatively correlated with the extent of ethnic conflict.* Indicators like per capita income and Human Development Index (HDI) can be used to measure variation in the level of socioeconomic development (cf. Thomay, 2011, pp. 23-24).

Second, on the basis of the democratic peace theory (see Russett, 1997; Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997; Gleditsch, 1999), it is reasonable to assume that the level of ethnic conflict should be lower in democratic countries than in nondemocracies. Nils Petter Gleditsch (1999) notes that "since civil war and other domestic violence is now the dominant form of armed conflict, we should also ask whether *there is a democratic peace at the intrastate level"* (p. 644). He refers to two opposite arguments. On the one hand, the idea of democracy as a "method of nonviolence" leads to the expectation that the more democratic a country, the less domestic violence. On the other hand, the theory of resource mobilization argues that the more democratic a regime, the more conflict it will experience for the reason that openness in a political system encourages political activity of all kinds. According to this theory, a "certain degree of conflict may be a price that democracies have to pay for the individual freedom that they permit" (p. 650). Consequently, this leads us to expect more domestic violence, including ethnic violence, with increasing democracy. Gleditsch regards these two perspectives as complementary rather than competing. He refers

to Edward Muller and Erich Weede (1990), who concluded that "domestic violence is likely to be low under very strict authoritarian rule, but also in highly democratic countries" (p. 650). According to this inverted U-hypothesis, we can expect that the relationship between democracy and peace is curvilinear. Håvard Hegre et al. (2001) tested the inverted U-hypothesis and found out that the inverted U-curve defines best the relationship between democracy and civil war. Regimes that score in the middle range on democracy-autocracy index have a significantly higher probability of civil war than either democracies or autocracies. They came to the conclusion that the "most reliable path to stable domestic peace in the long run is to democratize as much as possible" (p. 44; cf. Henderson, 1999b, pp. 282-283; Ellingsen, 2000; Mousseau, 2003; Rosato, 2003; Davenport, 2004; Walter, 2004; Rasler and Thompson, 2005; Beissinger, 2008). The study of Hegre et al. (2001) concerns civil war, not violent ethnic conflict, but because ethnic groups are involved in most civil wars, it is plausible to extend their hypothesis to cover violent ethnic conflict, too. Thus the most reliable path to stable ethnic peace in the long run is to democratize as much as possible. Consequently, *the level of democratization is expected to correlate negatively with the extent of ethnic violence.* This hypothesis does not presuppose a curvilinear relationship between democracy and ethnic peace, but it would be easy to see from a correlation plot whether the relationship is curvilinear or not. In other words, whether the empirical evidence of this study supports or contradicts the inverted U-hypothesis.

All the hypotheses formulated above are testable and falsifiable. They can be tested by empirical evidence by substituting the hypothetical concepts with empirical variables. In these hypotheses, the measure of ethnic conflict is the dependent variable, which is assumed to be causally related to explanatory variables, to the level of ethnic heterogeneity (EH) and to the alternative and complementary explanatory variables. The problem is how to define the variables and how to get necessary

empirical data on them. In this chapter, I define the variables which will be used in statistical analyses.

1. The Estimated Scale of Ethnic Conflicts (EEC)

In my previous study of ethnic conflict and ethnic nepotism (Vanhanen, 1999a, 1999b), I used a scale of violent ethnic conflict, whose scores vary between zero and 100, to measure the extent and significance of violent ethnic conflict. Another scale was used to measure the significance of institutionalized ethnic conflict. The two scales were combined into an Index of Ethnic Conflicts (EC) by adding the scores of the two basic scales. Data on ethnic conflicts were collected from many sources, and the scale scores were estimated on the basis of available information. Data concerned principally the period 1990-1996. In a more recent study (Vanhanen, 2012), the scales of institutionalized ethnic interest conflict (IC) and of ethnic violence (EV) are based on data from the period 2003-2008.

In this study, I will use only one estimated scale to measure the significance of ethnic conflict. As emphasized in Chapter 1, ethnic conflicts from peaceful interest conflicts to violent struggles constitute a continuum without any clear borderline between peaceful and violent conflicts. In fact, peaceful and violent strategies are quite often used side by side in ethnic conflicts. In the same country, some ethnic conflicts are institutionalized and peaceful and some others more or less violent, but the relative significance of peaceful and violent conflicts may vary considerably from case to case and over time. Consequently, I decided to formulate an estimated scale of ethnic conflicts which combines peaceful and violent aspects of conflicts into the same scale.

However, before the construction of the scale of ethnic conflicts, it is necessary to discuss the problem how to separate ethnic conflict from other types of social and political conflicts. How to make this differentiation? The difference between ethnic

and other types of conflicts is certainly not always self-evident. In many cases, elements of ethnic and other types of conflicts are mixed, and it depends on the classificator's interpretation how to classify a particular conflict. My guiding principle is that a particular conflict can be classified as an ethnic conflict if ethnic elements have a clearly visible role in the conflict. In ethnic conflicts, the principal contenders are ethnic groups, or members of ethnic groups, and conflicts seem to reflect ethnic animosities. Let us review some definitions of ethnic conflict.

Horowitz (1985) notes that in divided societies ethnic conflict is at the center of politics. Virtually all political events have ethnic consequences. He refers to many types of violent ethnic conflicts, but he also points out that there are many less dramatic manifestations of ethnic conflict. For example, there may be movements to expropriate ethnically different traders or to expel long-resident workers of foreign origin, and armed forces are frequently fractionalized along ethnic lines. Levinson (1994) emphasizes that although attention is always drawn to the bloodiest and most protracted conflicts, we should not ignore many nonviolent conflicts.

Stavenhagen (1996) defines "an ethnic conflict as a protracted social and political confrontation between contenders who define themselves and each other in ethnic terms; that is, when criteria such as national origin, religion, race, language and other markers of cultural identity are used to distinguish the opposing parties" (p. 284). He stresses that an "ethnic conflict is a continuous form of collective action between ethnic groups over ethnic issues, and involves a certain degree of organization" (p. 136). I think that these definitions characterize ethnic conflicts quite well. In another connection, Stavenhagen (1988) notes that when different ethnic groups or ethnies live side by side within a given society, "the likelihood of conflict is always present" (p. 18).

Hutchinson and Smith (1996) connect ethnic conflict also with economic inequalities between ethnic groups. They note

that quite obviously, "the perennial struggle for scarce resources exacerbates cultural differences; when economic inequalities are superimposed on ranked ethnic groups, severe conflict often results." They continue that there are also "international conflicts triggered by ethnic differences: conflicts between national states which are caused or exacerbated by ethnic movements of secession and irredentism" (pp. 3-4; for horizontal inequalities and conflict, see Stewart, 2008). Gurr and Harff (1994, p. 6) point out that nearly 80 per cent of the politicized ethnic groups identified in 1990 lived with the consequences of historical or contemporary economic discrimination or political discrimination or both. Indigenous peoples, in particular, have suffered from the consequences of discrimination, forced assimilation, enslavement, displacement, and genocide.

Mark R. Beissinger (2001, p. 850) differentiates between violent and nonviolent conflicts. According to his definition, "violence can be defined as the intentional exercise of physical force with the aim of inflicting injury on persons or causing damage to property." Of course, it is also necessary to differentiate between ethnic and non-ethnic violence.

Fearon (2006) notes that many "different sorts of violent events may be referred as ´ethnic,´ from bar fights to hate crimes to riots to civil wars. Generally speaking, a violent attack might be described as ´ethnic´ if either (a) it is motivated by animosity towards ethnic others; (b) the victims are chosen by ethnic criteria; or (c) the attack is made in the name of an ethnic group" (p. 5). This means that in the category of ethnic violence we should take into account also many kinds of violent events carried out by individuals motivated by ethnicity.

The definitions of ethnic conflict reviewed above provide criteria to separate ethnic conflict from other types of conflicts. In many cases, however, interpretations are needed because the borderlines between ethnic and non-ethnic as well as between violent and nonviolent ethnic conflicts are not self-evident. The same conflict may have both ethnic and non-ethnic aspects, and in the cases of ethnic demonstrations, riots, and repression, the

difference between nonviolent and violent conflict may become obscure.

A problem is how to measure or estimate the relative significance of ethnic conflicts. In fact, only few researchers have attempted to measure the extent of ethnic conflicts. Gurr (1993a) is one of them. He constructed a scale for nonviolent protest, whose scores are based on the most widespread and intense event reported during the five-year periods from 1945-1949 to 1985-1989. The scale for nonviolent protest is as follows: 0 = none reported, 1 = verbal opposition, 2 = political organizing activity on a substantial scale, 3 = a few demonstrations, strikes, rallies, total participation in the hundreds or low thousands, 4 = a number of demonstrations, strikes, rallies, total participation in the 10,000 range or higher, 5 = similar events, total participation over 100,000, and 6 = other, specified (p. 95). Gurr (1993a, pp. 93-98) constructed another scale to indicate the levels of violent protest and rebellion. The scale for violent protest: 0 = none reported, 1 = scattered acts of sabotage, symbolic destruction of property, 2 = limited rioting, 3 = substantial rioting, 4 = serious and widespread rioting, 5 = local rebellions, armed attempts to seize power in a locality, and 6 = other, specified. His scale for rebellion: 0 = none reported, 1 = political banditry, sporadic terrorism, unsuccessful coups by or on behalf of the group, 2 = campaigns of terrorism, successful coups, 3 = small-scale guerrilla activity, 4 = large-scale guerrilla activity, 5 = protracted civil war, fought by military units with base areas, 6 = other, specified, 7 = group members are involved in civil or revolutionary war that is not specifically or mainly concerned with group issues, and 8 = group members are involved in international warfare that is not specifically or mainly concerned with group issues. Gurr's scales are not appropriate for the purposes of this study, but they provide useful hints about the construction of scales.

I try to estimate the relative significance of ethnic conflicts in a country by using a scale whose scores vary from 1 to 5.

Unfortunately there is not any direct indicator that could be used to measure the relative significance of ethnic conflicts. I have to estimate a scale category for each country on the basis of available information and to combine information about institutionalized ethnic conflicts with information about violent forms of ethnic conflict. The extent and significance of ethnic conflicts varies from zero or only minor incidents to cases in which violent ethnic conflicts dominate in politics. In the scale, the purpose is to take into account both various forms of institutionalized and peaceful ethnic conflicts and violent conflicts from small incidents at individual and local levels to violent clashes and ethnic civil wars in which thousands and even millions of people have been killed.

Many kinds of information will be used in the estimations of ethnic conflicts. I shall use the existence of ethnic parties and other organizations, including military organizations, significant ethnic inequalities in governmental institutions, ethnic demonstrations and riots, and persistent forms of ethnic repression and discrimination as indicators of institutionalized and more or less peaceful ethnic interest conflicts. The use of these indicators is based on the assumption that the establishment of ethnic organizations and the exercise of ethnic discrimination indicate the existence of ethnic tension and interest conflicts. There would be no need for people to organize themselves along ethnic lines if there were no ethnic tension or interest conflicts. Institutionalized interest conflicts may take place peacefully at the forums of politics and through elections, but ethnic organizations can resort to coercive means, too.

It is also reasonable to assume that significant ethnic inequalities in governmental institutions indicate the existence of institutionalized ethnic conflicts. If one ethnic group dominates in political decision making institutions, and some other ethnic groups are excluded or highly underrepresented, it is justified to speak of institutionalized ethnic conflicts. The same concerns discrimination and

repression of ethnic groups. Ethnic tension between discriminating and discriminated ethnic groups is inevitable, and it may lead to occasional outbursts of anger and ethnic violence (cf. Stewart, 2008).

It is possible to roughly estimate the significance of ethnic parties from the combined percentage of ethnic parties of the total number of votes cast in parliamentary or presidential elections. It measures the extent to which electoral competition has become organized along ethnic lines. A serious problem with this method is that it is often unclear which parties should be regarded as ethnic parties. In practice, many parties have both ethnic and non-ethnic characteristics. In many cases it is relatively easy to find out which ethnic groups are significantly underrepresented in political institutions, but again there are numerous borderline cases. The same concerns the discrimination and repression of some ethnic groups. Hegemonic control of an ethnic minority or of an ethnic majority group represents an institutionalized form of ethnic inequality and ethnic conflict. In addition to ethnic parties, I try to take into account other types of ethnic organizations, including economic and cultural interest organizations and possible underground political parties and military and guerrilla organizations.

The extent and significance of ethnic violence varies as much as the forms of institutional and peaceful ethnic conflicts. There is not any direct indicator that could be used to measure the relative significance of ethnic conflicts in which participants resort to various forms of coercion and violence. The extent and relative significance of such conflicts has to be estimated on the grounds of available information. In practice, the scope of violent ethnic conflict varies from demonstrations, riots, strikes, and destruction of property to attacks on persons, violent clashes between ethnic groups, or between an ethnic group and the government forces, arrests, killing of people, rebellion, terrorism, forceful deportation of

people, ethnic guerrilla war, separatist war, ethnic civil war, ethnic cleansing, and genocide.

I use a five-level scale to measure the relative significance of ethnic conflicts in single countries. The estimated scale scores vary from 1 (the lack of ethnic conflicts, or only minor ethnic conflicts) to 5 (the highest level of ethnic violence). The limitation of scales to five is intended to decrease estimation errors. It is probably easier to locate a country correctly into a five-level scale than into a ten-level scale. The same criteria will be applied to all countries in my estimations. Each country gets an estimated score that is intended to indicate the relative significance of ethnic conflicts in the nine year period of comparison (2003-2011). The higher the score, the higher the estimated degree of ethnic conflicts. These estimations are only rough approximations, but the small number of categories can be assumed to reduce measurement errors. The following criteria will be used in these estimations:

1 = No information on ethnic violence, or only minor incidents at individual and local levels; only minor ethnic parties or interest organizations.

2 = Some significant ethnic violence at local level; significant political parties or interest groups organized along ethnic lines; institutionalized ethnic discrimination.

3 = Violent ethnic conflicts, or separatist strivings, in some parts of the country; important parties or interest groups organized along ethnic lines; serious discrimination of subjugated ethnic groups.

4 = Civil wars, ethnic rebellions, terrorism, or separatist wars in significant parts of the country; ethnic parties and/or interest groups dominate in politics; large ethnic groups are systematically discriminated and repressed, ethnic refugees.

5 = Violent ethnic conflicts and civil wars dominate in politics; ethnic cleansings, or genocides.

It should be noted that in these criteria institutionalized ethnic conflicts and violent conflicts occur side by side, but the impact of institutionalized and peaceful conflicts decreases at the fourth level of scale and the impact of violent conflicts increases. Finally, at the fifth level violent conflicts dominate. To get a certain score, a country does not need to satisfy all criteria. One criterion is enough. Consequently, until the fourth level the scores of some countries may be principally based on the significance of institutionalized ethnic conflicts, whereas the scores of some other countries may be principally based on the extent of ethnic violence.

Further, it should be noted that in the estimations the relative size of the population concerned and the geographical area of the country are also taken into account. If ethnic conflicts cover only a small part of the country's total population, or if they are limited to a relatively small geographical area of the country, the scale score for the country will be lower than for a country in which similar conflicts concern a significant part of the population or a significant part of the country's geographical area. This is especially important in the case of violent ethnic conflicts. For example, in countries like China and Russia ethnic violence has concerned relatively small parts of the population.

The estimated score of ethnic conflicts for a country is usually based on the most serious form of ethnic conflicts during the period 2003-2011. The estimated score does not presuppose that the level of ethnic conflict remained the same over the whole period, but the duration of conflict is taken into account in such a way that the same level of conflict which lasted only a short period may get a lower score than a conflict which continued over many years.

Empirical data on ethnic conflicts have been derived from many sources. There is no authoritative single source for this

purpose for the simple reason that very few scholars have previously attempted to construct this kind of scale and collect data for it. The estimated scale scores for 176 countries of this study over the period 2003-2011 are given in Appendix 1.

The principal sources of information include *Keesing's Record of World Events* (2003-2011); Minority Rights Group International, *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples* (2011); Arthur S. Banks et al. (2007), *Political Handbook of the World 2007; Freedom in the World* (2004-2010); *The World Guide 2007; Minorities at Risk* (2012); *World Conflict List* - dKosopedia (2007; Bippi, "Wars, conflicts international and intra-national crises," 2012). In addition to these global sources, various regional source books and country monographs and articles were used. In several cases, I gathered information also from the internet. Because the scale scores are rough estimates based on several sources, it is not usually possible to trace them to any single source. However, references to ethnic violence reported in *Keesing's Record of World Events* (2003-2011) are reported in the country reviews because the number of such references indicates something on the extent and significance of violent ethnic conflicts in single countries. The lack of such references can be interpreted to mean that the country has avoided serious ethnic violence in the period 2003-2011.

In Appendix 1, the nature of estimated scales of ethnic conflicts (EEC) is briefly described, and an estimated score is given for each country. It is reasonable to assume that the scale differentiates correctly between the countries with scores 1 and 5, whereas there may be more estimation errors in scores from 2 to 4. I would like to urge readers to make their own estimations and to think over in which points my estimations might be more or less erroneous.

2. Ethnic Heterogeneity (EH)

Researchers have developed various indicators to measure ethnic diversity, heterogeneity, or fragmentation of populations.

The first and the most extensively used measure is the ethnolinguistic fragmentation variable formulated by Soviet scholars in the early 1960s. Their data on ethnolinguistic fragmentation were published in the *Atlas Narodov Mira* in 1964. This variable (ELF) reflects the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population belong to different groups. The values of their variable vary from 0 to 1. The more heterogeneous the population is, the higher the value of this variable. Their data are based principally on linguistic distinctions, which may obscure other aspects of ethnicity like racial origin and skin color (cf. Alesina et al., 2003, pp. 156, 158-159). William Easterly and Ross Levine's (1997) analysis of Africa's growth tragedy is one of the many studies in which ethnic fragmentation has been measured by a similar ethnolinguistic fragmentation index. They found that Africa's high level of ethnic fragmentation explains a significant part of growth rates. Fearon and Laitin (2003) also used the ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) index based on data from *Atlas Narodov Mira* as well as a measure of religious fractionalization (analogous to the ELF) to explain the probability of insurgency and civil war (see also Reilly, 2006, pp. 55-60).

Douglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor (1970) constructed a measure of fragmentation, which can be used to measure the level of ethnic fragmentation as well as other types of political fragmentations. It produces values from 0 to 1. Carsten Anckar, Mårten Eriksson, and Jutta Leskinen (2002) refer to Rae and Taylor's method and they formulated measures of ethnic, linguistic, and religious fragmentation, which cover practically all countries of the world. Their index values close to 0 indicate that the level of fragmentation is low, whereas values close to 1 denote a high level of fragmentation. They combined the three separate measures into the total level of fragmentation. It was done by taking into account only the dimension, ethnicity or language, which returns the highest value of fragmentation and adding this value to the value of religious fragmentation.

Laszlo F. Thomay (1993) deciphered three primary common characteristics which make people different. The first is a *visual difference*, i.e. a difference in color. The second is an *audible difference,* namely the language spoken. In addition, dissimilarities in *culture* between two groups, including *religious* differences, are important. His argument is that these three characteristics - visual, language and cultural-religious differences - "are the causes of discrimination and oppression of any identifiable group" (p. 22). He emphasizes that *visibility* is the strongest of the three primary characteristics. It "is the most stubborn cause of poor inter-community relations" (pp. 99-102).

Alberto Alesina et al. (2003) provide new measures of ethnic, linguistic, and religious fragmentation for about 190 countries. They attempted to improve the quality of the ethnolinguistic fragmentation index based on the *Atlas Narodov Mira*, which is too much focused on linguistic divisions, by constructing "a new measure of ethnic fragmentation based on a broader classification of groups, taking into account not only language but also other cleavages such as racial characteristics" (p. 157). So they constructed three new indices, one based on a broad measure of ethnicity, one based strictly on language, and one based on religion. Their measure of ethnicity involves a combination of racial and linguistic characteristics. Their primary source was the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. They compiled a separate variable for linguistic fractionalization in isolation of any racial or physical characteristics and also a separate variable for religious fractionalization. The values of their three variables vary from 0 to 1, or from a low level of fractionalization to a high level.

I have used a different method to measure ethnic heterogeneity in my studies of ethnic conflict. In my book *Politics of Ethnic Nepotism* (1991), I measured ethnic pluralism by an Index of Ethnic Homogeneity, which was based on the percentage of the largest homogeneous ethnic group. The lower the percentage of the largest ethnic group is, the higher the degree of ethnic pluralism. In my 1999 study (Vanhanen, 1999a, 1999b), I used an Index of Ethnic Heterogeneity (EH) to measure the

extent and significance of ethnic divisions. That index was based on the measurement of three types of ethnic groups: (1) ethnic groups based on racial differences, (2) ethnic groups based on linguistic, national, and tribal differences, and (3) ethnic groups based on stabilized old religious communities. In each dimension of ethnic division, the level of ethnic heterogeneity was measured by the percentage of the largest ethnic group of the country's total population. Together the three percentages were assumed to measure the relative degree of ethnic homogeneity, and the inverse percentage was assumed to measure the degree of ethnic heterogeneity. The three inverse percentages were combined into an Index of Ethnic Heterogeneity (EH) by calculating the arithmetic mean of the three percentages. My argument was that the three dimensions of ethnic heterogeneity may strengthen each other and that, therefore, it was justified to take all of them into account and to combine them into an index.

In this study, as indicated above, I will use only one variable – Ethnic Heterogeneity (EH) - to measure the potential significance of ethnic nepotism. EH is based on the most significant racial, national, linguistic, tribal, or religious cleavage in a country. The percentage of the largest ethnic group is used to indicate the degree of ethnic homogeneity and its inversed percentage the level of ethnic heterogeneity (EH). Consequently, the measure is based in some cases on racial divisions and in some other cases on national, linguistic, tribal, or religious divisions. The problem was to decide which type of ethnic cleavage is best suited to measure the level of ethnic heterogeneity in a country. In some cases two or three ethnic cleavages are more or less overlapping, which made it easier to select an appropriate measure of ethnic heterogeneity. Besides, in many cases only one or two of these five types of ethnic divisions are really important. Let us first examine the nature and importance of these ethnic divisions, which are all assumed to separate, at least to some extent, genetically different groups from each other.

Racial divisions

It was noted in Chapter 1 that ethnic divisions are the more important, the greater the genetic distance between ethnic groups. It was emphasized that ethnic divisions based on racial differences are genetically the deepest ones because they may be tens of thousands of years old. Therefore, it is important to take racial groups into account in the countries in which the population is racially divided into clearly different groups. The problem is how to classify racial groups. Researchers have not achieved any consensus on the best way to classify racial groups, and some of them deny the existence of races or do not regard racial classifications as useful (for the debate on race, see, for example, King, 1981; Lewontin, 1982; Itzkoff, 1987; Lynn, 1991, 2006; Jones, 1994; Sowell, 1994; Cavalli-Sforza and Cavalli-Sforza, 1995; Rushton, 1995; Sarich and Miele, 2005; Jenkins, 2008).

Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza and Francesco Cavalli-Sforza (1995) argue that the "idea of race in the human species serves no purpose" because "there are always nuances deriving from continual migration across and within the borders of every nation, which make clear distinctions impossible" (pp. 229, 237). The same anti-race arguments are presented in Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1996), *The History and Geography of Human Genes*. However, much of the book seems to contradict these anti-race assertions. The results of their study show that the greatest genetic distances are between the major geographical populations that approximately correspond to the traditional racial groups (see Salter, 2003, Lynn, 2006). It is true that races grade into one another, which makes easy distinctions impossible, but it does not nullify the fact that according to their own measurement results, genetic distances between the major traditional races are much larger than between any other ethnic groups or geographical populations. Therefore, I think that racial divisions indicate the deepest ethnic cleavages and that it is justified to take them into account in the measurement of ethnic heterogeneity (cf. Thomay, 1993, whose *visual difference* refers principally to racial differences).

In my previous study (Vanhanen, 1999a), racial categories were limited to the three major racial groups, Negroids (Africans), Caucasoids, and Mongoloids, although I also referred to some subcategories of these major racial groups. In this new study, I use Richard Lynn's (2006) classification into seven major racial groups. His classification is based on the clustering of populations according to genetic distances between populations measured by Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1996). The seven major "clusters" or races are: Europeans, sub-Saharan Africans, South Asians and North Africans, Southeast Asians, Pacific Islanders, East Asians, and Native American Indians. In some cases, alternative names of racial categories are used, including white, black, and East Indian. Racially mixed population groups (mestizo, mulatto) are problematic. In some countries, especially in Latin America, racially mixed constitute the largest group.

From the perspective of ethnic nepotism, racial differences are highly relevant. The greatest genetic distances are certainly between the main geographical populations or racial groups, whose core members have been genetically separated from each other for tens of thousands of years, or at least thousands of years. Consequently, I think that racial differences represent the most important dimension of ethnic cleavages. In most cases it has been relatively easy to determine how a country's population should be classified into the major racial categories. Europeans constitute the dominant racial group in the countries of Europe and North America as well as in Australia, New Zealand, and some Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay). Sub-Saharan Africans constitute the largest group in all countries of sub-Saharan Africa and in most Caribbean island states. South Asians and North Africans dominate in the countries of North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. Southeast Asians constitute the largest racial group in the countries of Southeast Asia from Burma (Myanmar) to the Philippines. Pacific Islanders dominate in the small island states of the Pacific (Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon

Islands, and Vanuatu). East Asians dominate in the countries of East Asia (China, Japan, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, and Taiwan) and in Singapore. The largest Native American populations are in Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Peru. Countries with large mixed populations have been most problematic. The group of such countries includes most Latin American countries as well as Comoros, Madagascar, and Maldives. However, racial divisions have been taken into account only in the countries in which they represent the most important type of ethnic division. In racially relatively homogeneous countries, other types of ethnic divisions are more important than racial ones. The largest racial group constitutes 90 per cent or more of the population in nearly 150 countries of this study. The deepest racial cleavages exist in countries like Belize, Chad, Guyana, Sudan, Suriname, and Trinidad & Tobago, in which the largest racial group constitutes approximately 50 per cent or less than 50 per cent of the population.

National, linguistic, tribal, and religious divisions divide the largest racial group into smaller ethnic groups, but in some cases they are more or less overlapping with racial divisions. National, linguistic, tribal, and old religious ethnic groups are much more recent than major racial groups. Consequently, the genetic distances between linguistic, national, and tribal groups are much smaller than between major racial groups (cf. Salter, 2003, pp. 59-75). The core members of these groups can be assumed to have been genetically separated from each other for thousands or at least hundreds of years.

National divisions

In many countries, especially in racially relatively homogeneous countries, national groups seem to be the most important ethnic groups. National and linguistic cleavages are often overlapping in European countries in particular. But what are nations? Hugh Seton-Watson (1977) argues that "a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed

one" (p. 15). This definition separates nations from other types of communities. He makes a distinction between the old nations that have existed several centuries and the nations that have emerged as a consequence of national movements since the French Revolution. National consciousness is usually based on a common language, sometimes also on a religion. Smith (1987) emphasizes that modern nations are relatively new, but their roots can be traced to much older ethnic communities that existed before national consciousness and national movements. His argument is that "nations require ethnic cores if they are to survive." I think that this is a crucial point. National groups are ethnic groups. He points out that in plural societies it is difficult to find ethnic cores. For that reason "African states are likely to face serious problems in trying to create ´territorial nations´ without the benefit of ethnic cores and a common historical mythology" (p. 212). Van den Berghe (1981) notes that a real nation-state is a rare entity, but, "rare though it is, it seems to be seductively attractive as a basis of political organization" (p. 62). It is seductively attractive because nation-state is legitimized by kin selection or ethnic kinship.

Linguistic divisions

Linguistic divisions may be older than national and tribal divisions, but I have regarded a linguistic group as the largest ethnic group in relatively few cases for the reason that national and tribal divisions are often overlapping with linguistic ones. Major linguistic families seem to coincide with geographical races and the emergence of geographical sub-races, but later linguistic differentiation led to the division of racial groups into many clearly different linguistic groups that now constitute separate ethnic groups.

Steve Jones (1992) illustrates the correspondence between genes and languages by comparing the trees of genetic relationships and of the major language families. Cavalli-Sforza and Cavalli-Sforza (1995, pp. 164-202) also emphasize that there

is a close relationship between biological and linguistic evolution. They define languages as different when they are mutually incomprehensible, and they assume that fifteen hundred years is ample time in which to lose mutual comprehension. According to their arguments, the correspondence between linguistic families and the genetic tree of the world's major populations is close. Van den Berghe (1981, pp. 34-35) stresses that language is inextricably linked with ethnicity and that language is the supreme test of ethnicity. It defines ethnic boundaries more commonly than race.

Tribal divisions

Tribal groups can be regarded as ethnic groups in the same sense as linguistic and national groups because they are usually more or less endogamous communities and because each tribe has usually its own language. Therefore the members of a tribe are more closely related to each other than to members of other tribal groups. However, tribal groups differing only slightly from each other should not be taken into account as separate ethnic groups. As Cavalli-Sforza's et al. (1996) study indicates, genetic distances between neighboring tribal populations are usually very small. Consequently, ethnic nepotism based on tribal groups is probably much weaker than ethnic nepotism based on more clearly genetically distinct ethnic groups. Of course, there are also tribes that differ significantly from each other. Tribal cleavages are taken into account principally in the case of most sub-Saharan African countries. Unfortunately all statistical data on tribal groups of African countries are only rough estimations, and in many cases available data differ significantly from source to source. Therefore my data on the largest tribal groups in sub-Saharan Africa may include considerable errors in some cases.

The comparative handbooks of Black Africa edited by Donald G. Morrison et al. (1972, 1989) include a lot of data on tribal divisions in sub-Saharan African countries. However, they do not speak on tribal groups but on ethnic units and clusters, which seem to be based on tribal and linguistic divisions. In this

study, the concept of "tribe" covers all ethnic groups that are described as tribes in major sources. I want to emphasize that because the major linguistic and tribal divisions coincide more or less in most sub-Saharan African countries, it does not make much difference whether they are called tribal or linguistic divisions. On the other hand, because of the significant tribal and linguistic cleavages, the populations of most sub-Saharan African countries do not constitute ethnically homogeneous national groups, although their populations are racially highly homogeneous.

Old religious divisions

In some countries, in which religious cleavages seem to be more important than national, linguistic, or tribal divisions, the largest religious community is regarded as the largest ethnic group. Only old and stabilized religious communities are taken into account. They can be regarded as distinct ethnic groups because they have remained more or less endogamous groups over long periods of time (cf. Thomay's (1993) religious-cultural differences). On this ground, all relatively recent religious divisions have been excluded. Relatively recent religious communities have not yet had enough time to constitute clearly separate ethnic groups, although they already may be important cultural groups. The largest religious group has been used to represent the largest ethnic group only in nine countries: Bangladesh (the cleavage between Muslims and Hindus), Bhutan (the national and religious cleavage between native Bhutanese groups and Nepalis), Bosnia & Herzegovina (the deep cleavage between Muslim, Catholic, and Orthodox communities, or between Bosniak, Croat, and Serb national groups), Comoros (Sunni Muslims), Egypt (the cleavage between Muslims and Copts), Iraq (the basic cleavage between the Shia and Sunni Muslims), Israel (the cleavage between Jews and Muslims), and Lebanon (the cleavage between Muslims and Christians).

The data on the largest ethnic group as well as on the inverse percentage (EH) in 176 countries are given in Appendix 2. For example, Afghanistan's largest ethnic group is Pashtun (42%), and its inverse percentage (58) indicates the level of ethnic heterogeneity (EH). It should be noted that the inverse percentage of the largest tribal group is divided by 2 in the cases of most sub-Saharan African countries (and the Philippines) because genetic distances between tribal groups can be assumed to be much smaller than between racial and other ethnic groups. For example, Angola's largest tribal group is Ovimbundu (37%) and the inverse percentage is 63, but when it is divided by 2, the value of EH is 32. In Appendix 2, the countries in which the inverse percentage of the largest tribal group is divided by 2 are marked by one asterisk. On the other hand, the inverse percentage of the largest ethnic group is multiplied by 2 in the cases (Israel and Sri Lanka) in which racial or national, linguistic, and religious divisions coincide almost completely. Ethnic divisions are assumed to be in such countries much deeper than usual. In Appendix 2, these countries are marked by two asterisks.

All data on the largest ethnic groups given in Appendix 2 are documented. In most cases, data are from *The CIA World Handbook 2011* and from Freedom House's *Freedom in the World 2006.* Other sources used in Appendix 2 include *Philip's Encyclopedic World Atlas,* 2000, *The World Guide,* 2007, Wikipedia's *Ethnic groups in Asia, Ethnic groups in Europe,* and *Ethnic groups in Latin America.* More or less similar data on ethnic groups are presented in several other sources, including Minority Rights Group's *World Directory of Minorities,* 1997, and *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples*, 2011; G. T. Kurian, *Encyclopedia of the Third World* (1987); Banks et al., *Political Handbook of the World 2007* (2007); Cordell and Wolff (2004); *The Europa World Year Book* (2010); Husain, 2006; Godwin, 2007; Edge, 2008; Exxun, Ethnic groups, Languages, Religions, <http://www.exxun.com/>; Morrison et al., *Black Africa*

(1972, 1989); "Africa in 2008: 53 Country Profiles," *The Africa Report,* January-March 2008.

The largest ethnic group given in Appendix 2 is not in all cases self-evident. First, it was necessary to decide what type of ethnic division is taken into account (racial/ethnic, national, linguistic, tribal, or religious). In some cases different interpretations on the importance of various ethnic cleavages would be quite possible. Second, because data on the same ethnic group given in different sources may differ from each other to some extent, sometimes significantly, it was necessary to decide what data is taken into account. The selection of ethnic divisions and ethnic groups is based on my own judgment. It is for readers to evaluate to what extent my selections have been reasonable. I think that most data on the largest ethnic groups given and documented in Appendix 2 can be regarded to be fairly reliable.

3. Alternative Explanatory Factors

The level of ethnic heterogeneity (EH) will be used as the principal explanatory variable, which is intended to test the explanatory power of ethnic nepotism. The measures of ethnic fragmentation presented in the studies of Anckar et al. (2002) and Alesina et al. (2003) can be used as additional and alternative measures of ethnic heterogeneity. Further, as stated in the first chapter, I want to check EH's relative explanatory power by correlating the measure of ethnic conflicts (EEC) also with some environmental explanatory variables. My intention is to use as alternative environmental explanatory variables PPP gross national income (GNI) per capita 2008 and Human Development Index (HDI) 2010, which indicate differences in the level of socioeconomic development; and the Index of Democratization (ID-2010) and Freedom House's combined rankings of political rights and civil liberties (FH-2010), which measure the level of democratization. The purpose is to see to

what extent these alternative explanatory variables are correlated with EEC and how much they are able to explain of the variation in EEC independently from EH.

Alternative measures of ethnic heterogeneity

The measures of ethnic fragmentation presented in the studies of Anckar et al. (2002) and Alesina et al. (2003) will be used as alternative variables to measure ethnic heterogeneity and the potential impact of ethnic nepotism. They measure ethnic, linguistic, and religious fragmentation of national populations. They are principally the same aspects of ethnicity which have been taken into account in my measure of ethnic heterogeneity (EH), although EH is based on linguistic and religious groups only in few cases. Consequently, Anckar's ethnic, linguistic, and religious variables and Alesina's ethnic, language, and religious variables will be used as alternative explanatory variables. They measure the variation in the three main components of ethnic heterogeneity. Anckar's "total" variable combining the three components of ethnic fragmentation is excluded from statistical analysis. Empirical data on these six measures of ethnic fragmentation cover nearly all countries of this study.

PPP gross national income (GNI) per capita 2008

There are different variables that have been used to measure per capita income. I selected PPP (purchasing power parity) gross national income (GNI) per capita 2008 for this purpose. For 164 countries of this study, data on this variable are available from the World Bank's publication *World Development Report 2010,* tables 1 and 6. This publication does not provide data for 12 other countries. Per capita data for the missing countries were derived from *The CIA World Factbook 2011* (GDP per capita, PPP, 2008): Afghanistan 800; Bahamas 31,600, Bahrain 37,800, Barbados 19,200, Cuba 9,600, Iraq 3,500, North Korea 1,800, Qatar 112,300, Somalia 600, Taiwan 32,100, the United Arab Emirates 45,200, and Zimbabwe 200. I think that data on per capita income are relatively reliable, although they are based on

estimations in many cases. This indicator of per capita income measures variation in the level of socioeconomic development from one perspective. It is reasonable to assume that GNI/PPP-08 is correlated negatively with EEC. In other words, when the level of per capita income rises, the scale of ethnic conflicts should decrease.

Human Development Index (HDI) 2009

UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI) is another variable that measures variation in the level of socioeconomic development. It is a summary measure of human development. It measures the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: "living a long and healthy life (measured by life expectancy), being educated (measured by adult literacy and enrolment at the primary, secondary and tertiary level) and having a decent standard of living (measured by purchasing power parity, PPP, income)" (*Human Development Report 2006*, p. 263).

Data on Human Development Index are from UNDP's *Human Development Report 2010* (Table 1) and they concern the year 2010. Data cover 164 countries. I estimated the HDI values for the missing 12 countries principally on the basis of HDI values in neighboring countries: Bhutan .500, Cuba .500, Eritrea .350, Iraq .500, North Korea .400, Lebanon .600, Oman .500, St. Lucia .650, Samoa .600, Somalia .300, Taiwan .850, and Vanuatu .650. Data on HDI can be regarded to be highly reliable. It is assumed that HDI correlates negatively with EEC. In other words, when the level of human development rises, the scale of ethnic conflicts is expected to decrease.

Index of Democratization (ID) 2010

I shall use my Index of Democratization (ID) to measure the level of democratization in the 176 countries of this study. My measure of democracy takes into account two crucial dimensions of democracy: the degree of competition and the degree of participation (cf. Dahl 1971). The Competition variable indicates

the percentage share of the smaller parties (100 minus the share of the largest party) of the votes or of the seats in parliament and/or in executive elections. The Participation variable indicates the percentage of the total population who voted in the same election(s), but this variable has been complemented by taking into account the impact of referendums on participation. Referendums are taken into account for the reason that the number and significance of referendums is increasing in many countries. The impact of referendums is added to the Participation variable in such a way that each national referendum increases Participation by five percentage points and each state/provincial referendum by one percentage point for the year when the referendum was held. The upper limit for the contribution of referendums is 30 percentage points for a year. Besides, the upper limit for the Participation variable is 70. The same upper limit is applied to the Competition variable. These cut-offs in the two basic variables are intended to reduce the effect of extreme cases and also the effect of differences in electoral and party systems on the values of these measures of democracy. The two basic measures of democracy are combined into an Index of Democratization (ID) by multiplying Competition and Participation and by dividing the outcome by 100. Because of multiplication, ID gets high values only if the values of both basic variables are high. These measures of democracy are defined and discussed in greater detail in my previous studies (see Vanhanen, 2003, pp. 56-64; 2009, pp. 36-39).

Empirical data on my measure of democracy cover the period 1810-2010. Data are presented and documented in my dataset *FSD1289 Measures of Democracy, 1810-2010* maintained by the Finnish Social Science Data Archive, University of Tampere. In this study, I use data on ID from the year 2010 to test the hypothesis. It is assumed that ID is negatively correlated with the scale of ethnic conflicts (EEC). The data cover all 176 countries.

Freedom House's scores of political rights and civil liberties (FH) 2010

Freedom House has measured the level of freedom in the world since 1973 by estimating the extent of political rights and civil liberties in all countries of the world. Both categories "contain numerical ratings between 1 and 7 for each country or territory, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. The status designation of Free, Partly Free, or Not Free, which is determined by the combination of the political rights and civil liberties ratings, indicates the general state of freedom in a country or territory" (*Freedom in the World 2004,* p.14). The combined Freedom House ratings of political rights and civil liberties have been used in numerous studies as measures of democracy. The combined ratings vary from 2 to 14, with 2 representing the highest level of democracy and 14 the extreme lack of democracy.

In this study, I will use Freedom House ratings as an alternative measure of democracy. Data concern the situation in the end of the year 2010, and they are derived from *Freedom in the World 2011.* The combined Freedom House ratings (FH-2010) are assumed to be positively correlated with the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (EEC). The data on FH-2010 cover all 176 countries of this study.

4. Research Hypotheses

The operationalization of dependent and explanatory variables makes it possible to transform the original hypotheses into testable research hypotheses, which can then be tested by correlation analysis. The principal hypothesis on the impact of ethnic nepotism measured by ethnic heterogeneity on the extent and intensity of ethnic conflicts can now be given in the following form:

1. The higher the level of ethnic heterogeneity (EH) is, the

higher the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (EEC).

The correlation between EH and EEC is expected to be clearly positive. Negative or zero correlations would falsify the hypothesis. So this hypothesis is falsifiable. Empirical evidence on variables can be used to show to what extent it is true or wrong.

An additional hypothesis on the impact of Anckar's and Alesina's six measures of ethnic fragmentation can be given in the form:

2. The higher the level of ethnic heterogeneity on the basis of Anckar's and Alesina's measures of ethnic, linguistic, and religious fragmentation is, the higher the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (EEC).

All correlations should be clearly positive as in the case of EH. Negative or zero correlations would falsify the hypothesis.

In the same way it is possible to test the hypotheses on the impact of the four alternative environmental explanatory variables on the extent and intensity of ethnic conflicts. We can reformulate the alternative hypotheses into the following forms:

3. The higher the values of PPP/GNI-08, HDI-2010, and ID-2010 are, the lower the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (EEC).

4. The higher the value of FH-2010 is, the higher the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (EEC).

Correlations are expected to be negative in the cases of PPP/GNI-08, HDI-2010, and ID-2010 and positive in the case of FH-2010. I do not expect any strong correlations, but hypothesized correlations should be clear. A weak or opposite correlation would falsify the hypothesis.

The relative significance of the principal explanatory variable (EH) and the alternative explanatory variables can be measured

by the method of multiple regression analysis. The results will show to what extent the four alternative explanatory variables are able to increase the explained part of variation in EEC independently from EH. Because the theory of ethnic nepotism presupposes that the level of ethnic heterogeneity (EH) is the most important explanatory factor, I have to assume that the ability of the four alternative variables to explain variation in EEC independently from EH is quite limited.

5. Units of Analysis

Contemporary independent countries will be used as units of observation. The analysis covers 176 countries whose population was at least 200,000 inhabitants in 2010. The group of 176 countries includes 175 independent countries and Taiwan. The small countries whose populations are below 200,000 inhabitants are excluded principally for the reason that it is more difficult to get reliable information about them than about bigger countries. Besides, they may be more dependent on external powers in their policies and institutions than bigger countries. For the same reason colonies and self-governing territories are excluded from this study.

Chapter 3

Hypotheses Tested

1. Intercorrelations of EH and Other Explanatory Variables

2. The Test of Hypotheses

3. Multiple Correlation Analysis

4. Discussion

The four research hypotheses formulated in Chapter 2 will be tested by empirical evidence in this chapter. Because data on all variables are in interval or ratio scales, the hypotheses can be tested by correlation and regression analyses. The results of statistical analyses show to what extent empirical evidence supports or contradicts the hypotheses.

1. Intercorrelations of EH and Other Explanatory Variables

Let us start by examining the intercorrelations of EH and the alternative explanatory variables. The data on ethnic fragmentation provided in Anckar's et al. (2002) and Alesina's et al. (2003) studies make it possible to check to what extent my data on EH are overlapping with those other variables of ethnic

fragmentation and to what extent they differ from each other. Anckar's and Alesina's fragmentation variables can be regarded as alternative measures of ethnic heterogeneity and ethnic nepotism. The intercorrelations of Anckar's and Alesina's variables and my EH are given in Table 3.1. However, because Anckar's and Alesina's datasets do not provide data on all 176 countries of this study, this correlation analysis is limited to the group of 162 countries for which data are complete. Their datasets do not provide any data on East Timor, Montenegro and Serbia, and in the cases of Bahrain, Cape Verde, Cuba, El Salvador, Haiti, Maldives, Oman, Rwanda, St, Lucia, Sao Tome & Principe and Yemen data are missing from one or more variables. Therefore these 14 countries are excluded from this analysis.

Table 3.1. The intercorrelations of Anckar's three and Alesina's three fragmentation variables and EH in the group of 162 countries

Variable	Anckar ethnic	Anckar linguistic	Anckar religious	Alesina ethnic	Alesina language	Alesina religion	EH
Anckar ethnic	1.000	.693	.041	.796	.748	.260	.644
Anckar linguistic		1.000	.103	.637	.934	.280	.500
Anckar religious			1.000	.101	.108	.039	.036
Alesina ethnic				1.000	.693	.174	.691
Alesina language					1.000	.284	.533
Alesina religion						1.000	.165
EH							1.000

It is interesting to see that Anckar's and Alesina's measures of ethnic fragmentation are strongly correlated (0.796) and that they are relatively strongly correlated also with my measure of

ethnic heterogeneity (0.644 and 0.691). These three variables measure the same phenomenon, although classifications of ethnic fragmentation and heterogeneity differ significantly from each other in several cases. Anckar's linguistic and Alesina's language variables are extremely strongly (0.934) correlated with each other and moderately also with my EH, whereas their religion variables are almost completely independent from each other, and their correlations with EH are also near zero. The intercorrelations given in Table 3.1 show that Anckar's and Alesina's measures of ethnic and linguistic fragmentation are moderately or strongly correlated with each other and with EH, whereas their measures of religious fragmentation are almost completely independent from the other variables.

The intercorrelations of EH and the four alternative environmental explanatory variables are given in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2. The intercorrelations of EH and the four alternative environmental explanatory variables in the group of 176 countries

Variable	EH	PPP/GNI-08	HDI-2010	ID-2010	FH-2010
EH	1.000	-.086	-.232	-.166	.206
PPP/GNI-08		1.000	.717	.374	.378
HDI-2010			1.000	.609	-.581
ID-2010				1.000	-.798
FH-2010					1.000

It is remarkable that the level of ethnic heterogeneity (EH) seems to be almost independent from per capita income, the level of human development, and from the two measures of democracy. All correlations between EH and these four alternative

environmental explanatory variables are weak and near zero. The intercorrelations of the four alternative explanatory variables are moderate or strong. The strongest correlation is between ID-2010 and FH-2010 (-0.798). It indicates that they measure the same phenomenon, the level of democracy, although from different perspectives. PPP/GNI-08 and HDI-2010 are also strongly correlated (0.717). The other intercorrelations are moderate.

It will be interesting to see how strongly these four variables are correlated with the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (EEC). Because the theory of ethnic nepotism presupposes that ethnic nepotism measured by ethnic heterogeneity (EH) provides the strongest explanation for the variation in the extent and intensity of ethnic conflicts, the correlation between EH and EEC should be much stronger than correlations between the four alternative explanatory variables and EEC.

2. The Test of Hypotheses

The four research hypotheses formulated in Chapter 2 can be tested by correlating the seven measures of ethnic heterogeneity and fragmentation (EH, Anckar's ethnic, linguistic, and religious, and Alesina's ethnic, language, and religious variables) and the four alternative environmental explanatory variables (PPP/GNI-08, HDI-2010, ID-2010, and FH-2010) with the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (EEC). The results of correlation analysis show whether the explanatory variables are correlated with EEC as hypothesized and how strongly they are correlated. Correlations are given in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3. Correlations between 11 explanatory variables and EEC in various groups of countries

Explanatory variable	N	EEC
Level of ethnic heterogeneity (EH)	176	.812
Anckar's ethnic fragmentation	172	.526
Anckar's linguistic fragmentation	170	.465
Anckar's religious fragmentation	173	-.009
Alesina's ethnic fragmentation	171	.599
Alseina's linguistic fragmentation	165	.506
Alesina's religious fragmentation	173	.130
PPP/GNI per capita 2008	176	-.253
Human Development Index (HDI) 2010	176	-.395
Index of Democratization (ID) 2010	176	-.225
Freedom House Ratings (FH) 2010	176	.330

The results of correlation analysis support all four research hypotheses to some extent, except in the case of religious fragmentation. According to the first hypothesis, the level of ethnic conflicts (EEC) is expected to rise with the level of ethnic heterogeneity (EH). Empirical evidence supports this hypothesis strongly. EH explains statistically 66 per cent of the variation in the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (EEC). Thus the results support the first hypothesis about the positive correlation between ethnic heterogeneity and EEC strongly, although 34 per

cent of the variation in EEC remains unexplained. The unexplained part of variation is due to some other factors and probably also to measurement errors.

According to the second hypothesis, EEC should be positively correlated with the six variables of ethnic fragmentation. The correlations given in Table 3.3 support this hypothesis moderately in the cases of variables measuring ethnic and linguistic fragmentation, but not in the case of religious fragmentation. Anckar's and Alesina's ethnic and linguistic variables explain from 22 to 36 per cent of the variation in EEC, which means that their explanatory power is much weaker than the explanatory power of EH. The results falsify the hypothesis in the case of religious fragmentation. Correlations are zero or near zero (-0.009 and 0.130).

According to the third research hypothesis, correlations between EEC and PPP/GNI-08, HDI-2010, and ID-2010 should be clearly negative. In fact, they are only slightly negative. PPP/GNI-08 explain more than 5 per cent of the variation in EEC. These results show that per capita income, the level of human development, and the level of democratization are weak explanatory variables compared to EH, although they are negatively related to EEC as hypothesized. According to the fourth research hypothesis, EEC is expected to be positively correlated with the Freedom House combined ratings of political rights and civil liberties (FH-2010). The results of correlation analysis support this hypothesis slightly (0.330). FH-2010 explains statistically 11 per cent of the variation in EEC.

I would like to argue that the weak correlation between per capita income and EEC can be traced to the fact that ethnic nepotism remains as a part of human nature in both rich and poor countries. Therefore ethnic conflicts tend to emerge nearly as frequently in both rich and poor countries. However, PPP/GNI-08 is not completely insignificant as an explanatory variable. It may hamper, to some extent, the escalation of ethnic interest conflicts into open violence. Human Development Index (HDI-2010) is

more strongly correlated with EEC than per capita income. It implies that when the level of HDI rises, the level of ethnic conflicts tends to decrease. It may have some impact on the level of ethnic conflicts independently from the degree of ethnic heterogeneity.

The fact that EEC is nearly independent from the level of democratization contradicts the democratic civil peace hypothesis. Because ethnic nepotism is a part of human nature, it affects the extent of ethnic conflicts both in democracies and non-democracies. Besides, the two measures of democracy are almost independent also from the level of ethnic heterogeneity (correlations -0.166 and 0.206, Table 3.2). Democratization seems to be possible both in ethnically homogeneous and in ethnically divided societies. This result is encouraging from the perspective of democratization. Ethnic heterogeneity does not constitute an insurmountable obstacle for democratization (cf. Reilly, 2006, p. 63). In fact, many ethnically highly heterogeneous countries are democracies. The problem is how to adapt democratic institutions to the requirements of ethnicity and ethnic nepotism.

M. Steven Fish and Robin S. Brooks (2004) pay attention to the often repeated claim that ethnic diversity hinders open politics and democratization. They note that many eminent political scientists have seen diverse societies as disadvantaged when it comes to democratization and they continue: "Yet closer inspection reveals surprisingly scanty evidence that diversity counterveils open politics" (p. 155). Brian D. Shoup (2011) rejects also the perception of many social scientists that ethnic fragmentation constitutes an obstacle to democracy. The results of my study support their arguments; ethnic heterogeneity is only slightly correlated with the level of democracy (cf. Fish and Kroenig, 2006).

The analysis of simple correlations shows that the level of ethnic heterogeneity (EH) explains much more of the variation in the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (EEC) than Anckar's and Alesina's indices of ethnic fragmentation or the four alternative

environmental explanatory variables. It is justified to conclude that empirical evidence supports strongly the first research hypotheses and moderately the second hypothesis but only slightly the third and fourth hypotheses. Ethnic nepotism measured by ethnic heterogeneity seems to be an overwhelmingly better explanatory factor than the four additional explanatory factors taken into account in this analysis. This conclusion, however, does not exclude the possibility that there are some other factors which are able to explain in single cases as much or more of the variation in ethnic conflict than ethnic heterogeneity. Further, simple correlations do not tell us to what extent the explanations provided by these variables are overlapping and to what extent they are independent from the impacts of other variables. Open question is also how much more these variables taken together would be able to explain of the variation in EEC than any of them separately. I try to answer to these questions in the next section.

3. Multiple Correlation Analysis

Because EH and Anckar's and Alesina's indicators of ethnic fragmentation as well as the four additional explanatory variables explain some part of the variation in the dependent variable (EEC), it would be interesting to know how much combinations of them are able to explain of the variation in EEC and how much they explain independently from EH. In other words, what is the relative significance of EH and the other explanatory variables? Multiple correlation analyses provide answers to these questions. The results of multiple correlation analyses in which various combinations of EH and Anckar's and Alesina's ethnic and linguistic fragmentation variables and the four environmental variables are used to explain the variation in EEC are given in Table 3.4.

Table 3.4. The results of multiple correlation analyses in which EH and various combinations of other explanatory variables are used to explain variation in EEC in various groups of countries

Explanatory variables	N	EEC
EH and Anckar's ethnic and linguistic variables	169	.814
EH and Alesina's ethnic and language variables	165	.816
EH and Anckar's and Alesina's four variables	162	.822
EH and PPP/GNI-08	176	.833
EH and HDI-2010	176	.839
EH and ID-2010	176	.817
EH and FH-2010	176	.829
EH, PPP/GNI-08, HDI-2010, ID-2010 AND FH-2010	176	.850

The results of multiple correlation analyses show that the eight other explanatory variables combined with EH increase the explained part of variation in EEC to some extent. Table 3.3 shows that the correlation between EH and EEC is 0.812 and the explained part of variation 66 per cent. Anckar's ethnic and linguistic fragmentation variables increase the explained part of variation in EEC by less than one percentage point and Alesina's ethnic and language variables by one percentage point. When all four fragmentation variables are combined with EH, the multiple correlation rises to 0.822 and the explained part of variation to 68 per cent. The explanations provided by these four fragmentation variables are almost completely overlapping with the explanation provided by EH.

PPP/GNI-08 increases the explained part of variation in EEC

by three percentage points, HDI-2010 by four percentage points, ID-2010 by one and FH-2010 by two percentage points. When all four environmental variables are combined with EH, the multiple correlation rises to 0.850 and the explained part of variation rises to 72 per cent. It means that taken together PPP/GNI-08, HDI-2010, ID-2010, and FH-2010 explain six percentage points of the variation in EEC independently from EH. In other words, most of the explanations provided by these four alternative explanatory variables are overlapping with the explanation provided by EH. The level of ethnic heterogeneity is an overwhelming explanatory variable compared to the small impacts of the four alternative explanatory variables.

4. Discussion

The four research hypotheses formulated in Chapter 2 were tested by empirical evidence in this chapter. The purpose was to see to what degree empirical evidence supports my central theoretical argument, according to which ethnic nepotism as measured by ethnic heterogeneity (EH) explains more of the variation in the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (EEC) than any alternative explanatory factor. This theoretical argument is derived from the assumption that ethnic nepotism, which is based on ethnic kinship, is an evolved characteristic of human nature and that it is shared by all human populations. As a consequence of ethnic nepotism, people tend to align themselves along ethnic lines in many types of interest conflicts, which are inevitable in the continual struggle for scarce resources. Therefore it is reasonable to expect that various interest conflicts often become transformed into ethnic conflicts in ethnically divided societies more or less independently from other social, political, cultural, and economic conditions. Sometimes, but not always and not inevitably, those conflicts turn into violent ones.

The results of correlation analysis support the central

hypothesis strongly. The level of ethnic heterogeneity (EH) explains 66 per cent of the variation in the scale of ethnic conflicts. According to my interpretation, EH is the causal factor in this relationship for the reason that ethnic divisions have existed long before the emergence of contemporary ethnic conflicts. Is this interpretation correct?

One could argue that the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and ethnic conflict is in some way artificial or self-evident because ethnic conflicts could not erupt without the existence of ethnic heterogeneity. In other words, that eruption of ethnic conflicts in ethnically divided societies is natural and that it does not require any special explanation. The purpose is to say that the explanation of ethnic conflict in an ethnically heterogeneous country by ethnic heterogeneity is based on circular reasoning and that the question is not one of any real causal relationship.

Of course, ethnic conflicts would not be possible in ethnically fully homogeneous countries. Ethnic heterogeneity is needed for the eruption of ethnic conflict, but my counter-argument is that there is no self-evident necessity for interest conflicts to become canalized along ethnic lines in ethnically divided societies. In principle, they could be based on any other division of people into different groups, for example, on class, professional, economic, educational, geographical, or cultural divisions. In fact, many interest conflicts in ethnically homogeneous and heterogeneous societies are based on these and numerous other divisions. People can align themselves for the inevitable competition for scarce resources on the basis of many different interest cleavages even in ethnically highly divided societies without any self-evident need to resort to ethnic divisions. However, the results of this study indicate that in practically all ethnically heterogeneous countries some important interest conflicts take place along ethnic cleavages. The problem is why?

My purpose is to say that there must be some special reason

for people to organize themselves for interest conflicts along ethnic lines. Why are they not satisfied to organize themselves along some other interest cleavages, why are they also finding it necessary to become organized along ethnic lines, especially so in ethnically highly divided societies? Furthermore, why are ethnic interest conflicts not limited only to some ethnically heterogeneous countries, why are they common in practically all ethnically divided countries? I think that the universality of ethnic interest conflict must be due to some background factor which is shared by all human populations, and which is not limited to some cultural or geographical regions of the world. It is reasonable to argue that such a common background factor must be in human nature. My argument is that ethnic nepotism based on ethnic kinship as explained in Chapter 1 is such a common background factor. Because of our tendency to ethnic nepotism, people feel in many situations that they have to cooperate with co-ethnies in order to further their common ethnic interests and that their common ethnic interest may be as important or more important than economic, professional or some other interests. Consequently, the argument about the causal relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and ethnic conflict is not based on circular reasoning. This relationship is not automatic. Ethnic nepotism rooted in human nature is the causal factor which gets people to organize themselves and to conflict along ethnic lines. Even very small ethnic cleavages seem to be enough to cause the establishment of ethnic organizations. On the other hand, if such a common background factor does not exist, it would be reasonable to expect the existence of ethnically deeply divided societies without any institutionalized ethnic conflicts. However, such ethnically deeply divided societies do not exist. Empirical evidence indicates that some ethnic interest conflicts have erupted in all ethnically heterogeneous societies. It would be difficult to explain the universality of ethnic interest conflict without a common explanatory factor.

My point is that the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity

and ethnic conflict is causal and that the degree of ethnic heterogeneity constitutes the causal factor in this relationship. Because ethnic cleavages have certainly existed before the emergence of contemporary ethnic interest conflicts, it would be difficult to show that contemporary ethnic interest conflicts have caused ethnic heterogeneity rather than vice versa. Besides, the history of genocide and extermination indicates that there have been violent ethnic conflicts since the beginning of the historical period of human species (see Kiernan, 2007).

A difficult problem was to construct a measure of ethnic heterogeneity for the purposes of this study. I did not consider previous indices of ethnic, linguistic, and religious fragmentation and fractionalization appropriate for this study because I wanted to formulate a measure which takes into account genetic distances between ethnic groups, and also to take into account the most important ethnic groups no matter whether they are based on racial, national, linguistic, tribal, or old religious cleavages. Consequently, my measure of ethnic heterogeneity is in several cases based on racial divisions, but in many cases also on other types of ethnic cleavages; national, linguistic, tribal, or religious cleavages. The crucial point is that ethnic cleavages are assumed to reflect genetic distances between ethnic groups.

One could argue that although EH is correlated with EEC, it does not need to mean that there is any causal relationship between them. Correlations as such do not indicate causal relationship. It is necessary to explain why a relationship is assumed to be a causal one. I have tried to show by my theoretical arguments about the significance of ethnic nepotism that it causes people to organize themselves along ethnic lines in ethnically divided societies and that the extent of ethnic heterogeneity can be regarded to measure the potential strength of ethnic nepotism. The universality of ethnic interest conflict is explained by this common disposition in human nature. Because the evolution of ethnic nepotism based on ethnic kinship is a much older phenomenon than later ethnic cleavages and

contemporary ethnic conflicts, the question cannot be on circular reasoning. The hypothesized causal factor exists independently from particular forms of ethnic heterogeneity or of ethnic conflict.

Empirical evidence shows that the measures of ethnic nepotism and of ethnic conflict correlate with each other as hypothesized, but another question is whether these correlations are spurious; due to the impact of some other variables which explain their relationship. Besides, it would be necessary to know whether there are some other factors, independent from the measures of ethnic nepotism, which might be able to explain as much or more of the variation in ethnic conflict as my measures of ethnic nepotism. I tried to check the impact of other factors by taking into account four alternative environmental explanatory variables. The analysis of their relationship to the measures of ethnic nepotism and of ethnic conflict provides partial answers to these questions, but not complete and final answers because it is always possible that there are relevant factors which are not taken into account in my analysis, or which are unknown for me.

The results of correlation analyses support slightly the third and fourth research hypotheses on the negative or positive relationships between the alternative explanatory variables and EEC. These correlations are crucially weaker than the correlation between EH and EEC. It is clear that any of these variables cannot show the correlations between the measures of ethnic nepotism and of ethnic conflict to be spurious. They are as weakly correlated with EH as with EEC (see tables 3.2 and 3.3).

It was noted that the correlation between GNI-PPP-08 and EEC is not higher than -0.253 (Table 3.3). This means that the level of economic development cannot provide any significant explanation for the extent of ethnic conflicts and that the rise in the level of economic development would not necessarily lead to the disappearance of, or even to decrease, ethnic conflicts. The disposition to ethnic nepotism remains in human nature at all

levels of economic development. HDI-2010 explains more of the variation in ethnic conflicts (correlation -0.395) than per capita income. The rising level of HDI seems to hamper ethnic conflicts more effectively than per capita income, but HDI's explanatory power (16%) remains small compared to EH.

The two measures of democracy are correlated with EEC more weakly than PPP/GNI-08 and HDI-2010 (see Table 3.3). When the level of democratization rises, the level of ethnic conflicts tends to decrease as hypothesized, but the hampering impact of democratization on ethnic conflict is very small. Thus the small correlations support the democratic civil peace hypothesis only slightly. However, the level of democratization or the nature of democratic institutions may be significant in some particular situations. It is reasonable to assume that if democratic institutions are adapted to the requirements of ethnicity in the sense that all significant ethnic groups can pursue their interests through democratic institutions and use them to solve their interest conflicts, the risk of ethnic violence decreases. From this perspective, the outbreak of ethnic violence indicates political and institutional failure. In ethnically heterogeneous autocracies, the lack of democratic institutions and the failure of hegemonic control may lead to outbreaks of ethnic violence. In ethnically heterogeneous democracies, the insufficient adaptation of democratic institutions may lead to ethnic violence. I would like to argue that ethnic violence can be avoided even in ethnically highly divided democracies if their institutions are sufficiently adapted to satisfy the reasonable requirements of all significant ethnic groups (cf. Shoup, 2011). If democratic institutions were appropriately adapted to the requirements of ethnicity in all ethnically divided democratic countries, we could expect a considerably stronger negative correlation between democracy and ethnic conflicts. However, it would be unrealistic to expect a really strong correlation for the simple reason that nondemocratic systems based on the strong hegemony of one ethnic group may also be able to avoid ethnic

violence.

The multiple correlation analysis was used to disclose to what extent the four alternative environmental explanatory variables, when added to EH, can increase the explained part of variation in the level of ethnic conflicts (EEC). It was found that the four alternative variables are able to increase the explained part of variation only marginally and that the explanations provided by them are for the most part overlapping with the explanations provided by EH. The level of ethnic heterogeneity remains as the most powerful explanatory variable. It is nearly independent from the level of socioeconomic development and from the level of democratization. I leave it for other researchers to find out whether there is any other explanatory factor(s) which could explain as much or more of the variation in the measures of ethnic conflicts than my measure of ethnic nepotism.

Richard Lynn and Tatu Vanhanen (2002, 2006, 2012) have showed in their studies that global differences in many kinds of human conditions are moderately or strongly correlated with the average intelligence of nations (national IQ). Nations with higher intelligence have usually been able to produce better human conditions than less intelligent nations. Therefore, one could assume that the extent of ethnic conflicts is somewhat lower in high national IQ countries than in low national IQ countries. Is it so? Does the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts depend on national IQ to any significant extent? The correlation between national IQ (Lynn and Vanhanen, 2012, Table 2.1) and EEC is indeed negative as hypothesized in this group of 176 countries, but it is not higher than -0.290, which means that national IQ explains only 8 per cent of the variation in EEC. It is remarkable that the level of ethnic heterogeneity (EH) is also almost independent from national IQ (-0.238). When EH and national IQ are used together to explain variation in EEC, the multiple correlation rises to 0.818 and the explained part of variation to 67 per cent, which is one percentage point more than what EH explains. In other words, the explanation provided by national IQ is almost completely

overlapping with the explanation provided by EH. It is evident that differences in the average intelligence of nations do not provide any significant explanation for the national variation in the estimated scales of ethnic conflicts (EEC). The level of ethnic nepotism measured by ethnic heterogeneity (EH) is also almost independent from the level of national IQ.

Because 34 per cent of the variation in EEC remained unexplained by EH, and because the other explanatory variables were able to increase the explained part of variation in EEC only marginally, it is useful to explore the relationship between EH and EEC at the level of single countries on the basis of regression analysis. The results of regression analysis may provide hints about the impact of some local and other explanatory factors.

Chapter 4

Regression Analysis

1. Regression of EEC on EH

2. Countries Classified by the Size of Residuals

3. Regression of EEC on HDI-2010

4. Regression of EEC on ID-2010

Regression analysis is used to indicate how well the average relationship between an explanatory variable and a dependent variable applies to single countries and which countries deviate most from the average relationship (regression line). Regression analysis could be carried out on the basis of all correlations given in Table 3.3, but because EH is the most significant explanatory variable, the regression analysis is focused on the regression of EEC on EH in the group of 176 countries. However, regressions of EEC on HDI-2010 and on ID-2010 will be used to illustrate the weak explanatory powers of these measures of socioeconomic development and of democratization.

1. Regression of EEC on EH

We can see from Table 3.3 that EEC and EH are strongly

correlated with each other as hypothesized. The explained part of variation in EEC rises to 66 per cent. According to my interpretation, our evolved behavioral predisposition to ethnic nepotism provides the best theoretical explanation for this relationship. In conflict situations, people tend to align themselves with other members of their own ethnic group (relatives). Consequently, the more a population is ethnically divided, the more interest conflicts tend to become canalized along ethnic lines. The estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (EEC) is intended to measure the relative significance of ethnic interest conflicts in various societies from minor conflicts to violent ethnic conflicts, civil wars, and genocides. Figure 4.1 summarizes the results of the regression analysis of EEC on EH in the group of 176 countries, and detailed results for single countries are given in Table 4.1.



Figure 4.1. The results of regression analysis of EEC on EH in the group of 176 countries

Figure 4.1 illustrates the strong relationship between EH and EEC. Relatively few countries deviate greatly from the regression line. Some of the most deviating countries are named in the figure. In the countries above the regression line, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is higher than expected on the basis of the average relationship between EH and EEC, and in the countries below the regression line it is lower than expected. It would be useful to know why some countries deviate so much from the regression line and contradict the first research hypothesis. In the countries around the regression line, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is more or less in balance with the degree of ethnic heterogeneity. Such countries support strongly the hypothesis on the positive relationship between the level of ethnic heterogeneity (EH) and the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (EEC).

Table 4.1. The results of regression analysis of EEC on EH for single countries in the group of 176 countries

	Country	**EH**	**EEC**	**Residual EEC**	**Fitted EEC**
1	Afghanistan	58	5	1.1	3.9
2	Albania	5	1	-0.3	1.3
3	Algeria	17	2	0.1	1.9
4	Angola	32	3	0.4	2.6
5	Argentina	4	1	-0.2	1.2
6	Armenia	2	1	-0.1	1.1
7	Australia	8	1	-0.4	1.4
8	Austria	8	1	-0.4	1.4

	Country	EH	EEC	Residual EEC	Fitted EEC
9	Azerbaijan	9	1	-0.5	1.5
10	Bahamas	15	1	-0.8	1.8
11	Bahrain	37	3	0.1	2.9
12	Bangladesh	10	2	0.5	1.5
13	Barbados	7	1	0.4	1.4
14	Belarus	7	1	-0.4	1.4
15	Belgium	42	3	-0.1	3.1
16	Belize	51	2	-1.6	3.6
17	Benin	31	2	0.6	2.6
18	Bhutan	25	2	-0.3	2.3
19	Bolivia	45	3	-0.3	3.3
20	Bosnia and Herzegovina	52	4	0.4	3.6
21	Botswana	5	1	-0.3	1.3
22	Brazil	46	3	-0.3	3.3
23	Brunei	33	2	-0.7	2.7
24	Bulgaria	16	2	0.2	1.8
25	Burkina Faso	26	2	-0.3	2.3
26	Burma (Myanmar)	32	4	1.4	2.6
27	Burundi	15	3	1.2	1.8
28	Cambodia	10	2	0.5	1.5
29	Cameroon	35	3	0.2	2.8

	Country	EH	EEC	Residual EEC	Fitted EEC
30	Canada	34	2	-0.7	2.7
31	Cape Verde	1	1	-0.1	1.1
32	Central African Rep.	34	3	0.3	2.7
33	Chad	54	4	0.3	3.7
34	Chile	8	2	0.6	1.4
35	China	8	2	0.6	1.4
36	Colombia	27	2	-0.4	2.4
37	Comoros	2	1	-0.1	1.1
38	Congo, Democratic R.	41	4	.9	3.1
39	Congo, Republic of	26	3	0.7	2.3
40	Costa Rica	3	1	-0.2	1.2
41	Côte d'Ivoire	29	4	1.5	2.5
42	Croatia	10	2	0.5	1.5
43	Cuba	10	1	-0.6	1.6
44	Cyprus	1	1	-0.1	1.1
45	Czech Republic	6	1	-0.3	1.3
46	Denmark	5	1	-0.3	1.3
47	Djibouti	20	2	0	2.0
48	Dominican Republic	11	2	0.4	1.6
49	East Timor	17	3	1.1	1.9
50	Ecuador	44	3	-0.2	3.2

	Country	EH	EEC	Residual EEC	Fitted EEC
51	Egypt	10	2	0.5	1.5
52	El Salvador	8	1	-0.4	1.4
53	Equatorial Guinea	7	1	-0.4	1.4
54	Eritrea	25	2	-0.3	2.3
55	Estonia	32	2	-0.6	2.6
56	Ethiopia	34	3	0.3	2.7
57	Fiji	43	3	-0.2	3.2
58	Finland	7	1	-0.4	1.4
59	France	9	2	0.5	1.5
60	Gabon	25	1	1.3	2.3
61	Gambia	29	2	-0.5	2.5
62	Georgia	16	3	1.2	1.8
63	Germany	9	1	-0.5	1.5
64	Ghana	28	2	-0.4	2.4
65	Greece	7	1	-0.4	1.4
66	Guatemala	47	3	-0.4	3.4
67	Guinea	30	3	0.5	2.5
68	Guinea-Bissau	35	2	-0.8	2.8
69	Guyana	50	3	-0.5	3.5
70	Haiti	5	1	-0.3	1.3
71	Honduras	13	2	0.3	1.7

	Country	EH	EEC	Residual EEC	Fitted EEC
72	Hungary	8	2	0.6	1.4
73	Iceland	4	1	-0.2	1.2
74	India	59	4	0	4.0
75	Indonesia	59	4	0	4.0
76	Iran	49	3	-0.5	3.5
77	Iraq	40	5	2.0	3.0
78	Ireland	5	1	-0.3	1.3
79	Israel	48	4	0.6	3.4
80	Italia	6	1	-0.3	1.3
81	Jamaica	9	1	-0.5	1.5
82	Japan	2	1	-0.1	1.1
83	Jordan	2	1	0.1	1.1
84	Kazakhstan	37	3	.1	2.9
85	Kenya	39	4	1.0	3.0
86	Korea, North	1	1	-0.1	1.1
87	Korea, South	1	1	-0.1	1.1
88	Kuwait	20	2	0	2.0
89	Kyrgyzstan	35	3	0.2	2.8
90	Laos	32	2	-0.6	2.6
91	Latvia	42	2	-1.1	3.1
92	Lebanon	40	3	0	3.0

	Country	EH	EEC	Residual EEC	Fitted EEC
93	Lesotho	1	1	-0.1	1.1
94	Liberia	41	3	-0.1	3.1
95	Libya	10	2	0.5	1.5
96	Lithuania	17	1	-0.9	1.9
97	Luxembourg	6	1	-0.3	1.3
98	Macedonia	36	3	0.2	2.8
99	Madagascar	37	2	-0.9	2.9
100	Malawi	21	2	-0.1	2.1
101	Malaysia	50	3	-0.5	3.5
102	Maldives	0	1	0	1.0
103	Mali	25	3	0.7	2.3
104	Malta	4	1	-0.2	1.2
105	Mauritania	30	3	0.5	2.5
106	Mauritius	32	2	0.6	2.6
107	Mexico	15	2	0.2	1.8
108	Moldova	22	2	-0.1	2.1
109	Mongolia	5	1	-0.3	1.3
110	Montenegro	25	2	-0.3	2.3
111	Morocco	1	1	-0.1	1.1
112	Mozambique	27	2	-0.4	2.4
113	Namibia	25	2	-0.3	2.3

	Country	EH	EEC	Residual EEC	Fitted EEC
114	Nepal	47	4	0.6	3.4
115	Netherlands	14	2	0.3	1.7
116	New Zealand	26	2	-0.3	2.3
117	Nicaragua	8	1	-0.4	1.4
118	Niger	23	3	0.8	2.2
119	Nigeria	36	4	1.2	2.8
120	Norway	6	1	-0.3	1.3
121	Oman	26	2	-0.3	2.3
122	Pakistan	55	4	0.2	3.8
123	Panama	31	2	-0.6	2.6
124	Papua New Guinea	15	2	0.2	1.8
125	Paraguay	5	1	-0.3	1.3
126	Peru	54	3	-0.7	3.7
127	Philippines	36	3	0.2	2.8
128	Poland	3	1	-0.2	1.2
129	Portugal	8	1	-0.4	1.4
130	Qatar	60	3	-1.0	4.0
131	Romania	10	2	.5	1.5
132	Russia	20	3	1.0	2.0
133	Rwanda	16	3	2	1.8
134	St. Lucia	6	1	-0.3	1.3

	Country	EH	EEC	Residual EEC	Fitted EEC
135	Samoa (Western)	7	1	-0.4	1.4
136	Sao Tome and Principe	1	1	-0.1	1.1
137	Saudi Arabia	10	2	0.5	1.5
138	Senegal	29	3	0.5	2.5
139	Serbia	17	2	0.1	1.9
140	Sierra Leone	35	3	0.2	2.8
141	Singapore	23	2	-0.2	2.2
142	Slovakia	14	2	0.3	1.7
143	Slovenia	17	1	-0.9	1.9
144	Solomon Islands	6	1	-0.3	1.3
145	Somalia	40	5	2.0	3.0
146	South Africa	21	3	0.9	2.1
147	Spain	26	2	-0.3	2.3
148	Sri Lanka	52	5	1.4	3.6
149	Sudan	61	5	0.9	4.1
150	Suriname	63	3	-1.2	4.2
151	Swaziland	3	1	-0.2	1.2
152	Sweden	12	1	0.6	1.6
153	Switzerland	21	2	-0.1	2.1
154	Syria	10	2	0.5	1.5
155	Taiwan	16	2	0.2	1.8

	Country	EH	EEC	Residual EEC	Fitted EEC
156	Tajikistan	20	2	0	2.0
157	Tanzania	12	2	0.4	1.6
158	Thailand	25	3	0.7	2.3
159	Togo	29	3	0.5	2.5
160	Trinidad and Tobago	60	3	-1.0	4.0
161	Tunisia	2	1	-0.1	1.1
162	Turkey	25	3	0.7	2.3
163	Turkmenistan	15	1	-0.8	1.8
164	Uganda	42	3	-0.1	3.1
165	Ukraine	22	2	-0.1	2.1
166	United Arab Emirates	58	2	-1.9	3.9
167	United Kingdom	15	2	0.2	1.8
168	United States	20	2	0	2.0
169	Uruguay	4	1	-0.2	1.2
170	Uzbekistan	20	2	0	2.0
171	Vanuatu	2	1	-0.1	1.1
172	Venezuela	7	1	-0.4	1.4
173	Vietnam	14	2	0.3	1.7
174	Yemen	4	1	-0.2	1.2
175	Zambia	32	2	-0.6	2.6
176	Zimbabwe	9	2	0.5	1.5

2. Countries Classified by the Size of Residuals

Table 4.1 complements Figure 4.1 by providing detailed data on the results of the regression analysis of EEC on EH for single countries. We can separate the countries with positive residuals from the countries with negative residuals and large outliers from smaller ones. One standard deviation of residual EEC is ±0.6. Let us classify all countries for which the EEC residual is smaller than ±0.7 into the category of small and moderate deviations. Consequently, the category of large deviations will comprise the countries for which the EEC residual is ±0.7 or higher. This criterion separates the most deviant countries from the countries which are closer to the regression line. Using the size of residual as the criterion, we can classify the 176 countries into three main categories: (1) countries around the regression line (residuals ± 0.4 or smaller), N = 105, (2) countries with moderate positive or negative residuals (residual ±0.5 or ±0.6), N =34, and (3) countries with large positive or negative residuals (residual ±0.7 or higher), N = 37).

The 105 countries of the first category can be divided into two subcategories: (1) ethnically nearly homogeneous countries for which EH is below 10 and EEC 1 (N = 47) and (2) ethnically heterogeneous countries for which EEC is 2 or higher (N = 58). Further, the second category of countries with moderate positive or negative residuals can be divided into two subcategories: (1) countries with moderate positive residuals (N = 18) and (2) countries with moderate negative residuals (N =16). Finally, the third category of countries with large positive or negative residuals can be divided into two subcategories: (1) countries with large positive residuals (N = 21) and (2) countries with large negative residuals (N = 16).

In the next three chapters, I will review the results of

the regression analysis and the nature of ethnic cleavages and ethnic conflicts at the level of single countries in these three categories of countries. The country reviews complement the information on the largest ethnic groups and the levels of ethnic heterogeneity given in Appendix 2 as well as information on the estimated scales of ethnic conflicts and on the nature of ethnic conflicts given in Appendix 1. In each country review, my intention is to explain what type of ethnic division was regarded to be the most important one in that country and to refer to the size of the largest and of some other ethnic groups. In many countries, there are different kinds of significant ethnic divisions. Therefore it was necessary to select one division and exclude the others in the calculation of the level of ethnic heterogeneity. It is for readers to evaluate to what extent the selections of the most important ethnic division and of the largest ethnic group have been appropriate. Further, I refer to various data on ethnic conflicts which were used in the estimations of the scales of ethnic conflicts. In several cases I thought it relevant to refer briefly to the historical background of ethnic conflicts and violence. The fact is that the extent of violent conflicts has varied considerably in many countries. The information provided in country reviews helps readers to evaluate to what extent the estimated scales of ethnic conflicts are appropriate and in harmony with the criteria of ethnic conflicts defined in Chapter 2.

3. Regression of EEC on HDI-2010

In Chapter 2, it was hypothesized that the level of socioeconomic development is negatively correlated with the extent of ethnic conflict because it is reasonable to assume that in socioeconomically highly developed countries it may be easier to satisfy the needs of different ethnic groups than in less developed countries. This hypothesis was tested by using GNI-PPP-08 and

HDI-2010 variables to indicate the level of socioeconomic development. The results of correlation analysis (Chapter 3) show that these two variables are negatively correlated with EEC as hypothesized, but correlations are so weak that GNI-PPP-08 does not explain more than 6 per cent and HDI-2010 16 per cent of the variation in EEC. In other words, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (EEC) varies almost independently from the measures of socioeconomic development. The results of the regression analysis of EEC on HDI-2010 summarized in Figure 4.2 illustrate the weak explanatory power of HDI-2010.



Figure 4.2. The results of regression analysis of EEC on HDI-2010 in the group of 176 countries

Figure 4.2 illustrates the slight negative relationship between HDI-2010 and EEC (-0.395). In the countries above the regression line, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is higher than expected on the basis of the regression equation, and in the

countries below the regression line it is lower than expected. Some of the most highly deviating countries are named in the figure. We can see from Figure 4.2 that low scores of EEC are more frequent at high levels of HDI (above 0.8) than at low levels (below 0.4), but the scale of EEC seems to be independent from HDI at the middle levels of HDI (from 0.4 to 0.8). In other words, it would be nearly impossible to predict the scale of EEC on the basis of the value of HDI. There are countries with high and low levels of ethnic conflicts at all levels of human development. According to my interpretation, the weak relationship between the level of human development (HDI) and the level of ethnic conflicts (EEC) is a consequence of the fact that all human populations share the same evolved disposition to ethnic nepotism. Therefore ethnic conflicts emerge in ethnically divided societies at all levels of socioeconomic development.

4. Regression of EEC on ID-2010

In Chapter 2, I referred to the democratic peace theory, according to which the most reliable path to stable ethnic peace in the long run is to democratize as much as possible because democracy is a "method of nonviolence". Consequently, the level of democratization is expected to correlate negatively with the extent of ethnic violence. The inverted U-hypothesis represents another version of democratic peace theory. It presupposes that the relationship between democracy and peace is curvilinear. Violence is expected to be low under very strict authoritarian rule, but also in highly democratic countries. Two measures of democracy, ID-2010 and FH-2010, were used to test these hypotheses by empirical evidence. The results of correlation analysis show that the relationship between the level of democracy and the level of ethnic conflicts is slightly negative as hypothesized, but ID-2010 does not explain more than 5 per cent of the variation in EEC. In the case of FH-2010, the explained

part of variation is 11 per cent. However, the average linear relationship between variables does not disclose whether the actual relationship is curvilinear as the inverted U-hypothesis presupposes or not. The results of regression analysis disclose whether the relationship is curvilinear or not. The results of the regression analysis of EEC on ID-2010 summarized in Figure 4.3 illustrate the extremely weak correlation between democracy and EEC and help to see whether the relationship is curvilinear.



Figure 4.3. The results of regression analysis of EEC on ID-2010 in the group of 176 countries

Figure 4.3 illustrates the very weak negative relationship between ID-2010 and EEC (-0.225). In the countries above the regression line, the scale of ethnic conflicts (EEC) is higher than

expected on the basis of the regression equation, and in the countries below the regression line it is lower than expected. Some of the most deviating countries are named in the figure. Figure 4.3 shows that it would be impossible to predict the level of EEC on the basis of ID-2010 with any certainty. Low and high EEC levels are nearly as possible at all levels of democratization. However, the results can be interpreted to support the inverted U-hypothesis, although only slightly. At the highest level of ID (above 30), there are only few countries for which EEC rises to the level of 3 or higher. At the middle levels of democratization (ID from 5 to 30), there are more countries at the highest levels of EEC than at the lowest and highest levels of ID. This difference indicates that it has been possible to prevent or decrease ethnic violence both in autocratic political systems and in highly democratic systems more than at the middle levels of democratization. However, this support for the inverted U-hypothesis is based on only a few cases.

Chapter 5

Countries Around the Regression Line

1. Ethnically Nearly Homogeneous Countries Around the Regression Line

2. Ethnically Heterogeneous Countries Close to the Regression Line

The first hypothesis was tested by correlation analysis (Chapter 3), and regression analysis (Chapter 4) was used to indicate how well the average relationship between EH and EEC applies to single countries. The purpose was to see for which countries the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (EEC) is more or less in balance with the level of ethnic heterogeneity and for which countries it is much higher or lower than expected on the basis of the regression of EEC on EH. On the basis of the size of residuals, the 176 countries were divided into three main categories: (1) countries around the regression line (residuals ± 0.4 or smaller), N = 105, (2) moderate positive or negative deviations (residuals ±0.5 or ±0.6), N =34, and (3) countries with large positive or negative residuals (residuals ±0.7 or higher), N = 37.

The 105 countries of the first category are divided into two subcategories: (1) ethnically nearly homogeneous countries for which EH is below 10 and EEC 1 (N = 47) and (2) ethnically

heterogeneous countries around the regression line for which EH is 10 or higher (N = 58). These two subcategories of countries will be reviewed in this chapter. Each country will be discussed separately in alphabetical order. Country reviews are intended to complement the information given in Appendixes 1 and 2. In each country review, I refer to the largest ethnic group and its percentage of the total population and try to explain why the calculation of the level of ethnic heterogeneity is based on this ethnic division. In Appendix 2, the inverse percentage of the largest ethnic group indicates the level of ethnic heterogeneity (EH). Further, I describe the nature of institutionalized ethnic conflicts and refer to possible ethnic violence in the period 2003-2011 in greater detail than in Appendix 1. The purpose is to indicate what kinds of data my estimated scales of ethnic conflicts (EEC) are based on. On the basis of these country reviews, readers of this study can evaluate whether the selected ethnic divisions and estimated scales of ethnic conflicts are appropriate or misleading.

1. Ethnically Nearly Homogeneous Countries Around the Regression Line

The first subcategory of nearly homogeneous countries around the regression line includes the following 47 countries: Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Barbados, Belarus, Botswana, Cape Verde, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, Greece, Haiti, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, North Korea, South Korea, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, Mongolia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, St. Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome & Principe, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Tunisia, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela and Yemen. For all these countries, residuals are ±0.4 or smaller and EH below 10.

Although these countries are ethnically nearly homogeneous and without significant ethnic conflicts, it does not mean that they are without any ethnic conflicts. Even small ethnic divisions seem to be enough to cause some conflicts along ethnic lines and the establishment of ethnically based parties and interest organizations.

Albania. The most significant ethnic cleavage in Albania is between the Albanian majority (95%) and the Greek minority (3%). Greeks in the south have complained about political marginalization, but there is no information on any significant ethnic violence (see Minorities at risk (MAR), 2012; Keesing's 2010, p. 50000). The Roma/Gypsies group is the most discriminated ethnic minority. The relations between the Muslim majority (70%) and the Catholic (20%) and Orthodox (10%) minorities have remained peaceful. It should be noted that data on Albania's ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities are only rough approximations (see Minority Rights Group International, *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples*, 2011 = WDM-2011).

Argentina is inhabited by the large white majority (96%) and small indigenous and Asian minority groups (4%). The indigenous peoples have their own interest organizations. The conflict continues between the state and indigenous peoples over the ownership of land. The Mapuche people inhabiting the western area of the country have sometimes demanded autonomy and self-government in order to unite with the Mapuche of Chile (see WDM-1997; WDM-2011; Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2010* (FH-2010), p. 40; MAR- 2012.)

Armenia is ethnically a highly homogeneous country (Armenian 98%). Small ethnic minorities include principally Kurds and Russians. Kurds are Muslims and they have not been satisfied with their position in the country. In 1988-94 there was a violent conflict with Azerbaijan over the control of the mainly Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. Armenian troops occupied the enclave, but the conflict with Azerbaijan still continues. As a consequence of the conflict, virtually all Azeri

people were expelled from Armenia to Azerbaijan, and Armenians had to emigrate from Azerbaijan to Armenia. In the period 2003-2011 ethnic relations in Armenia remained peaceful (see WDM-2011; Keesing's 2003-2011).

Australia. The most significant ethnic cleavage in Australia is between the white majority (92%) and Asian immigrants (7%) and aborigines (1%). Australia's history of ethnic relations tells of multiple deliberate killings and genocidal massacres during the European colonization after 1788 (Kiernan, 2007, pp. 250-309), but in the period 2003-2011 ethnic relations were generally peaceful. However, there were minor ethnic clashes with aborigines, Asian immigrants, and Indian students in different parts of the country. Aborigines are still discriminated (see Keesing's 2004, pp. 45853, 46318, 46371; 2005, p. 46984; 2006, pp. 47265, 47469; 2009, p. 49266; 2010, p. 49638; FH-2010, pp. 45-47; MAR- 2012). Because there were only minor ethnic clashes in the period 2003-2011, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 1.

Austria. Austrians and Germans constitute a large majority (92%) of the population. Ethnic minorities include former Yugoslavs, Central and Eastern Europeans, Turks, Roma/Gypsies, and non-European immigrants. The success of the anti-immigration Freedom Party reflects the existence of ethnic tension (see *Freedom in the World 2010,* p. 49 = FH-2010). There have been minor incidents between Austrians and immigrants.

In Barbados the most important ethnic cleavage is between the black majority (93%) and small minorities of whites, mixed and East Indians. There is not any information on ethnic violence (Keesing's 2003-2011), but the recent immigration of East Indians from Guyana and Trinidad & Tobago has produced rising ethnic tension and anti-immigration sentiments (see WDM-2011).

Belarus. The relations between Belarusians and Russians are so close that I combined them into the same ethnic group (93%). The rate of mixed ethnicity marriages is high (MAR- 2012).

Russian has almost completely replaced the Belarusian language in public life and media. Poles (4%) and Ukrainians (2%) constitute the largest ethnic minority groups. Poles have their own interest organization, the Union of Belarusian Poles, and there has been ethnic tension between Belarusians and Poles (see Keesing's 2005, p. 46788). Roma people are discriminated (see WDM-2011; FH-2010, p. 72).

Botswana is dominated by Tswana people (90%). The political party (Botswana Democratic Party) representing this tribal majority group has continually been in power since the country's independence in 1966. Other tribal groups are small. Democratic institutions have functioned throughout the period of independence, which has certainly supported ethnic peace. There is no information about ethnic violence in Botswana (see WDM-2011; Keesing's 2003-2011).

Cape Verde. Creole (71%) and African (28%) people differ only slightly from each other. I combined them into the same ethnic group (99%). Europeans (1%) constitute an ethnic minority. There is no information on ethnic conflicts between these groups, but recent immigrants from Guinea-Bissau and from some other African countries demonstrated in 2005 and clashed with police and the military. They complained that the government had failed to provide adequate protection to them after the murder of one immigrant from Guinea-Bissau (see WDM-2011; FH-2010, pp.129-130).

Comoros is inhabited by ethnically mixed people without any clearly defined ethnic groups, but there is a religious cleavage between Muslims (98%) and Catholics (2%) as well as between Sunni and Shia Muslims. There is no information on significant ethnic clashes (Keesing's 2003-2011), but there is tension between Sunni and Shia Muslims, and non-Muslims have been subject to restrictions, detentions, and harassment (see FH-2010, p. 157).

Costa Rica is dominated by the large majority of whites and mestizos (97%). Small ethnic minority groups include blacks and Amerindians. Afro-Costa Ricans and indigenous people

have been traditionally discriminated and excluded from full participation in political life. Indigenous groups have their own interest organizations. They have complained that the government has not adequately protected indigenous land rights. Recent immigrant workers from Nicaragua have caused anti-Nicaraguan sentiment and ethnic tension. Nicaraguan immigrants are discriminated (see WDM-1997; WDM-2011; FH-2010, p. 169).

Cyprus. The Greek sector of Cyprus is ethnically highly homogeneous. The Greek Cypriots constitute 99 per cent of the population (Held, 1994, p. 234). Almost all Turkish Cypriots have moved to the Turkish sector. The remaining Turkish Cypriots are to some extent discriminated. The small Maronite community in Cyprus complains that the government has not protected the Maronite language (see WDM-2011). There is no information on ethnic violence (see Keesing's 2003-2011).

Czech Republic. Czechs (90%) and Moravians (4%) constitute the largest and dominating ethnic group. National minority groups include Slovaks, Poles, Germans, Roma and several other small national groups. Contemporary ethnic conflicts are limited to Roma who continue to face discrimination. They have also been subject to violence. Roma people have their own interest organizations (see WDM-1997, WDM-2011; FH-2010, p. 187; MAR- 2012; Keesing's 2009, pp. 49007, 49221).

Denmark is an ethnically highly homogeneous country (Danes and other Europeans 95%). Muslim immigrants constitute the most significant ethnic minority group. Muslims have their own interest organizations. There have been minor violent clashes with Muslim immigrants (see Keesing's 2005, p. 46792; 2006, pp. 47427, 47472, 47591; 2007, p. 48153; 2010, p. 50038; FH-2010, pp. 189-190).

El Salvador is an ethnically homogeneous country when mestizos and whites are combined into the same dominant group (92%). After 500 years of oppression, some Amerindian groups still try to defend their remaining land and culture. It has been

difficult for them to organize themselves. WDM-2011 notes: "Discrimination against the indigenous population is an informal yet widespread social practice." There is no information on serious ethnic violence (see Keesing's 2003-2011).

Equatorial Guinea. The Fang (86%) seem to constitute the largest tribal group. The only ethnic conflicts have been between the dominating Fangs, who live chiefly in the mainland province of Río Muni, and Bubi people, who are inhabitants of Bioko Island. Bubis face continued harassment from the military. They have attempted to defend their land rights in Bioko (see WDM-2011; FH-2011, p. 219).

Finland. The Finnish majority comprises 93 per cent of the population and the Swedish- speaking minority 5 per cent. The Swedish minority had until the end of the 19th century dominant position in politics and economy. When the process of democratization started in the latter half of the 19th century, the ethnic conflict between the Finnish majority and the Swedish-speaking minority intensified, but was ultimately solved on the basis of complete parity. Both languages are official languages, and the Swedish minority is represented in democratic institutions through their own political party (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 411-412). Non-European immigrants constitute new ethnic minority groups. There is no information on serious ethnic violence (see Keesing's 2003-2011).

Greece is an ethnically homogeneous country (Greek 93%) without any serious ethnic conflicts, but there are ethnic minorities of Albanians, Macedonians, Roma/Gypsies, Turks and Pomaks. Albanian migrants to Greece have been subject to popular hostility. The Macedonian minority has its own organizations and parties. The Roma minority is most seriously discriminated in Greece (see WDM-1997, WDM-2011; MAR-2012). There have been minor clashes with illegal African immigrants and Muslims (see Keesing's 2009, p. 49220). According to FH-2010 (p. 262), racial intolerance is still pervasive in society.

In Haiti, the black majority comprises 95 per cent of the

population and the small mulatto and white ethnic minorities 5 per cent. In fact, the small light-skinned elite has traditionally controlled most of Haiti's economy and political life. There is no information on violent ethnic conflicts from the period 2003-2011, although the country has suffered continually from political violence (see Keesing's 2003-2011; D'Agostino, 2003, pp. 119-121). Haiti's history as an independent country started from ethnic violence. When black revolutionaries declared Haiti's independence in 1804, "both rich and poor whites had been killed or fled Saint Domingue, leaving a small mulatto elite, some of whom had been educated and wealthy under the French, to struggle for power with the black leaders of the hundreds of thousands of former slaves" (Winn, 2006, p. 294).

Iceland is an ethnically highly homogeneous country (Icelanders 96%) without any information on serious ethnic conflicts (see Keesing's 2003-2011). There are some immigrants from foreign countries, but no indigenous ethnic minority group. According to WDM-2011, Muslim immigrants have been the subject of physical and verbal harassment.

Ireland is an ethnically nearly homogeneous country of Irish and other whites (96%). There are small ethnic minorities of Asian and black immigrants. There have been complaints that racial violence has risen with the increase of new minorities, but there is no information on serious ethnic violence (see WDM-2011; Keesing's 2003-2011).

Italy has many ethnic minority groups including Sardinians, Friulians, South Tyrolean German-speakers, Slovenes, and non-European immigrants, but Italians constitute a great majority (96%). Indigenous ethnic minorities are well organized, and there is no information about violent ethnic clashes with them, whereas new ethnic minorities of immigrants, including one million Muslims, have caused many problems. Anti-Muslim sentiments have increased, and occasional racist attacks against members of new minorities have increased. There has been some racial violence between Italians and African immigrants and

violent clashes between the Roma communities and Italians in different parts of the country (see Keesing's 2005, p. 46950, 2006, p. 47424; 2008, pp. 48698, 48706, 48798; 2010, pp. 49643, 49703; 2011, p. 50666). The fact that, because of its geographical position, Italy is a major entry point for non-European immigrants trying to reach Europe may be a local factor which explains the increasing tension between Italians and non-European immigrants (see FH-2010, p. 335). Because violent ethnic clashes have occurred only at individual and local levels, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 1.

Japan is an ethnically highly homogeneous country (Japanese 98%). There are Korean and Chinese minorities, the small indigenous group of Ainu people, and new migrants from various Chinese minorities. Religious minority groups are larger, but they are ethnically Japanese. Koreans have complained of social discrimination, and new immigrants are vulnerable to exploitation, prejudice and discrimination (see WDM-2011; FH-2010, p. 341). There is no information on any serious ethnic clashes (see Keesing's 2003-2011).

Jordan is an ethnically highly homogeneous country when Jordanian Arabs and Palestinians in Jordan are combined into the same category of Arabs (98%). Palestinians constitute more than half of Jordan's population, but they are not yet fully equal with indigenous Jordanians. They are grossly underrepresented in governmental institutions (MAR-2012). Circassians and Armenians are ethnic minority groups. Besides, there is a significant religious minority of Christians (6-10%), but they are the same Arabs. Ethnic and religious minorities are well organized. There is no special information on ethnic conflicts (Keesing's 2003-2011).

Korea, North, is an ethnically almost homogeneous country (Koreans over 99%). There is only a small Chinese minority, and there is no information on ethnic clashes (Keesing's 2003-2011).

Korea, South, is ethnically as homogeneous as North Korea, but the number of foreign immigrants is a little higher.

The Chinese minority is still subjected to discrimination, but otherwise there is no special information on ethnic conflicts (see WDM-2011), although "the country's few ethnic minorities face legal and societal discrimination" (FH-2010, p. 609).

Lesotho is an ethnically homogeneous country inhabited by Sotho people (99%). There are very small European, Asian, and Xhosa-speaking minorities. Tensions "between Basotho and the small Chinese business community have led to minor incidents of violence" (FH-2010, p. 381).

Luxembourg's population's ethnic composition is problematic. Luxembourgers constitute only 63 percent of the population, but I have combined Luxembourgers and European immigrants, who are not citizens, into the same category of Europeans (94%) because they belong to the same racial group. The rest of the population is principally non-European immigrants, including Muslims. According to WDM-2011, "Luxembourg has been criticized for discriminatory practices which affect minorities" (see also FH-2010, p. 395).

Maldives's people are of mixed Indo-Aryan, Dravidian and Arab descent. I combined them into the common group of mixed South Asians (100%). There may be some ethnic divisions within this combined group, but unfortunately we do not have any data on such groups. There is no information about ethnic conflicts in Maldives (Keesing's 2003-2011).

Malta is also an ethnically highly homogeneous country (Maltese 96%). There are small British, Italian, and non-European ethnic minority groups. According to WDM-2011, "Since 2002 there has been a rise in racism and extreme-right politics fuelled by fears of the impact of asylum seekers, whose numbers increased dramatically from 24 in 2000 to 1,686 in 2002." Muslims have been discriminated.

Mongolia is the home country of Mongols (95%). Kazakhs constitute the only significant non-Mongolian ethnic group concentrated mainly in the northwest corner of the country. Kazakhs are Muslims. There is no special information about

ethnic conflicts between Mongols and Kazakhs (Keesing's 2003-2011).

Morocco's Arabs and Berbers are combined into the same group (99%) because they are extensively mixed with each other. "Most Arab Moroccans would be better described as Arabized Berbers" (Minorities at risk, 2012 = MAR-2012). There is no information about ethnic conflicts between Arabs and Berbers, although Berbers have their own organizations and political parties and they continue to have a strong group identity. Western Sahara, which has been occupied by Morocco since 1975, is excluded from this analysis. Indigenous Saharawis, who are of mixed Berber, Arab and black African descent, have continued their fight against the Moroccan occupiers (see Keesing's 2003, p. 45626; 2005, p. 46717; 2008, p. 48611).

Nicaragua. Mestizos and whites constitute a large majority (92%) of the population. Indigenous peoples comprise 7 per cent of the population. There have been minor ethnic clashes between the government forces and indigenous people, who try to protect their rights and traditional lands, but otherwise ethnic relations remained peaceful in the period 2003-2011 (see Keesing's 2003-2011; MAR-2012). Indigenous people have their own interest organizations and political parties, and the Miskito Council of Elders announced in 2009 "the creation of a separatist movement demanding independence from Nicaragua" (FH-2010, p. 478). Because there were only minor ethnic clashes at local levels, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 1 for Nicaragua.

Norway is an ethnically nearly homogeneous country of Norwegians (94%), but there are small ethnic minorities of European and non-European immigrants, including Muslims. Many Norwegians and an anti-immigration party (the Progress Party) resist the immigration from the Middle East and Africa. There have been minor clashes between Norwegians and non-European immigrants, and it has been claimed that police have used discriminatory racial profiling practices against ethnic minorities (FH-2010, p. 494). However, there is no information on serious ethnic clashes (Keesing's 2003-2011).

In Paraguay, mestizos constitute 95 per cent of the population. There are small ethnic minorities of remaining indigenous peoples, Germans, Japanese, and Afro-Paraguayans. Indigenous peoples are still discriminated, but they have their own interest organizations. Afro-Paraguayans are among the most impoverished groups in the country. There is no information on violent ethnic conflicts (see WDM-2011; Keesing's 2003-2011).

Poland is an ethnically highly homogeneous country (Polish 97%). The small German, Belarusian, Ukrainian, and other European ethnic minority groups have their own interest organizations. There is no information on serious ethnic clashes, but Roma people are discriminated (FH-2010, p. 533; Keesing's 2003-2011).

Portugal is also an ethnically homogeneous country (Portuguese 92%). The small ethnic minorities include European and non-European immigrants. There is no information on ethnic clashes, but non-European immigrants and especially Gypsies are to some extent discriminated (WDM-2011; Keesing's 2003-2011).

In St. Lucia blacks and mixed constitute the large majority (94%) of the population. The small ethnic minorities include indigenous Carib people, East Indians and some immigrant groups. There is no information on ethnic violence (Keesing's 2003-2011).

Samoa's indigenous people are Samoan (Polynesian, 93%). The rest of the population are mostly Euronesians (mixed Europeans and Polynesians). The very small number of Chinese immigrants constitute the only distinct ethnic group. There is no information on ethnic violence (see WDM-2011; Keesing's 2003-2011).

Sao Tome and Principe is a country of mestizos and other mixed people (99%). There does not seem to be any distinct ethnic minority group, although there are some migrant workers from other African countries. There is no information on ethnic

violence (Keesing's 2003-2011).

Solomon Islands is inhabited by Melanesians (94%) and small minorities of Polynesians and Micronesians, but there are no data on possible ethnic divisions within the Melanesian population. In 1998-2003 there was a violent conflict between the militias representing the indigenous people of the main island of Guadalcanal and migrants from other islands to the capital city Honiara. It seems to have been principally a conflict between the militias of different islands, although it has also been called an ethnic conflict (cf. Reilly, 2006, p. 40). At least 100 people were killed and 20,000 displaced by the unrest, which was ended by the arrival of an Australian-led military peacekeeping force (Keesing's 2003, pp. 45353, 45474, 45520, 45558; 2004, pp. 45960, 46372; 2005, pp. 46526, 46633, 46787; 2010, p. 48742). Polynesians and Micronesians have been discriminated in employment, and in 2006 there was a clash between indigeneous people and Chinese traders (see WDM-2011; FH-2010, p. 595). WDM-2011; FH-2010, p. 595).

Swaziland is an ethnically almost homogeneous country. Swazis constitute 97 per cent of the population. There is a small European minority, which owns much of the country's productive land, but any serious ethnic conflicts have not yet erupted (see WDM-2011; Keesing's 2003-2011).

Tunisia is an ethnically almost homogeneous Arab country (98%). Berbers are combined into the same category with Arabs. Ethnic minorities include some Europeans, Jews, and immigrants from other African countries. There have been some attacks against Jews, but otherwise ethnic relations have remained peaceful (see WDM-2011). There is no information on serious ethnic clashes (Keesing's 2003-2011).

Uruguay is an ethnically almost homogeneous country of whites and mestizos (96%). There is only a small Afro-Uruguayan minority (4%). Blacks are still discriminated. The indigenous inhabitants were almost completely exterminated in the nineteenth century. There is no information on ethnic

violence from the period 2003-2011 (Keesing's 2003-2011).

Vanuatu is inhabited by Melanesian Ni-Vanuatu people (98%) without any distinct ethnic minorities and without any ethnic conflicts. There are only some immigrants from other Oceanian countries.

Venezuela. The combined group of mestizos, mulattos and whites comprises 93 per cent of the population. The white minority, together with mestizos, dominates in politics and economy. The blacks and the remaining Amerindians are marginalized (cf. Wilbert, 2004). There have been minor ethnic clashes in the territories of Amerindian peoples, especially in the jungles of the Amazon region. Extensive racial mixing between whites, indigenous peoples and blacks seems to have blurred ethnic boundaries and decreased ethnic conflicts. There is no information on serious ethnic violence from the period 2003-2011, but blacks and indigenous people are still discriminated (see WDM-11; MAR-2012; Keesing's 2003-2011).

Yemen is an Arab country (96%), but the Arab majority is divided into Shias in the north and Sunnis in the south. There have been serious violent conflicts in Yemen between the north and the south and between religious sects, but because these conflicts have taken place within the Arab community (cf. Alley, 2010), I have not classified them as ethnic conflicts (cf. *The Economist,* March 5th 2011, p. 45). There is a small Afro-Arab minority and some immigrant workers from India. Any special information about possible ethnic conflicts with these minorities is not available (see Keesing's 2003-2011).

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The above review of ethnic cleavages and conflicts in 47 ethnically highly homogeneous countries indicates that even small ethnic minorities tend to become organized along ethnic

lines in order to further their interests and that the existence of small ethnic minorities is enough to cause ethnic clashes at least at individual and local levels, although the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is low (EEC 1) for all these countries. For example, it was noted that non-European immigrants have caused increasing ethnic tension and minor clashes in many European countries (cf. Tepfenhart, 2011).

2. Ethnically Heterogeneous Countries Close to the Regression Line

The second subcategory of countries around the regression line includes ethnically heterogeneous countries (EH 10 or higher) close to the regression line (residuals ±0.4 or less). This subcategory includes the following 58 countries: Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Macedonia, Malawi, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.

It is common to these countries that they are close to the regression line, although the level of ethnic heterogeneity (EH) and the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (EEC) vary considerably. It was possible to predict the level of EEC quite well for all these countries on the basis of EH. So these countries support the first research hypothesis strongly. In the following, my intention is to describe the nature of ethnic divisions in greater detail than was possible in Appendix 2 and to refer to the

most important ethnic conflicts in the period 2003-2011. More attention will be focused on ethnically highly heterogeneous countries than on ethnically less heterogeneous ones. Consequently, the lengths of the country reviews vary. In each country review, I try to describe ethnic divisions, the nature of ethnic conflicts, and incidents of ethnic violence in the period 2003-2011, but in several cases country reviews also include references to the historical background of ethnic violence. These reviews provide material for readers to evaluate to what extent my classifications are appropriate and based on empirical evidence.

Algeria. It is not self-evident whether Arabs (83%) and Berbers should be combined into the same ethnic group or separated from each other. I decided to regard them as separate ethnic groups because Berbers are linguistically and partly territorially separated from the Arab majority. "Linguistic discrimination became the driving force behind the formation of Berber political parties" (MAR-2012). However, there are no reliable data on the number of Berbers, and in some sources Berbers are not separated from Arabs (see CIA-2011). In fact, the majority of Algerians have at least some Berber heritage. The French population, which was previously 10 per cent, has fallen to 1 per cent. Genocidal ethnic massacres had characterized ethnic relations between French and Arab/Berbers during the period of French colonization (see Kiernan, 2007, pp. 364-374). Berbers have separatist movements in the Kabylian mountains (see Banks et al., 2007, p. 28), and there have been some violent clashes between Berber separatists and the government troops (Keesing's 2009, pp. 49066, 49234; FH-2010, p. 28; WDM-2011). Consequently, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is 2 for Algeria.

Angola's population is divided by tribe and language into numerous ethnic groups, of which Ovimbundu (37%) is the largest one. After the Portuguese withdrawal in 1975, different ethnic groups were not able to agree on the sharing of power, and political parties and militant groups struggled for power until the

ceasefire in 2002. It is estimated that nearly one million people died in the civil war, and 4 million people were displaced. The level of ethnic violence decreased drastically in the period of 2003-2011, although there have been occasionally violent clashes, and political parties are still principally organized along ethnic lines (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 39-42; Roque, 2009). The separatist rebellion continued in the northern enclave of Cabinda until the 2006 peace accord between the government and Cabinda separatists (MAR-2012; Keesing's 2010, pp. 49608, 49931; FH-2010, p. 34; WDM-2011). Because important political parties are still ethnically based and separatist strivings continue in Cabinda, the estimated scale of ethnic conflict is 3 for Angola.

Bahrain. Bahraini Arabs constitute the large majority (63%) of the population. The ethnic minorities include migrant workers from Iran, India, the Philippines and other Asian countries. Migrant workers are non-citizens and without any political rights. The Arab majority is divided by religion into the dominant Sunni Muslim minority and the discriminated Shia Muslim majority. The Shias are second-class citizens (MAR-2012), but they have strong organizations, which demand political equality with the Sunnis. Shias have protested and rioted many times (cf. Tristan, 2008). In 2011 the Shia opposition demonstrated and revolted against the Sunni government (see *The Economist,* February 19th 2011, pp. 39-40). Armed forces were needed to suppress the Shia opposition (see Keesing's 2009, p. 49174; 2010, pp. 50056, 50106; 2011, pp. 50314, 50371, 50426, 50585, 50625, 50677; FH-2010, pp. 57-59). Because of the institutionalized subjugation of the non-Arab migrant workers and the discrimination of the Shia Muslims, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 3.

Belgium is an ethnically deeply divided country because of stabilized national and linguistic cleavages. It has become more and more difficult for the Fleming majority (58%) and the French-speaking Walloons (31%) to share power within the same country. Both groups have their own ethnically based social and

cultural organizations and political parties (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 113-115). Thomay (1993, p. 50) notes that "a century and a half of communal living has not succeeded in bringing together these two nations and it did not eliminate hostilities; on the contrary, relations seem to have gone from bad to worse." However, the country's democratic system has helped to keep the deep institutionalized ethnic conflict peaceful, but ultimately the unsolved conflict may lead to the partition of the country. Besides, there are numerous new immigrant minorities from other European countries and from non-European countries. Ethnic tension between Belgians and Muslim immigrants has intensified and led to violent clashes. The success of anti-immigration and anti-Islamic parties reflects this ethnic conflict (Keesing's 2004, pp. 46078,46274; 2005, pp. 46944, 46997; 2006, 47218, 47277; 2007, p. 48207; 2011, p. 50149; FH-2010, pp. 74-75). Because of the extremely deep institutionalized ethnic conflict and numerous clashes with non-European immigrants, the scale of ethnic conflict was estimated to be 3. Belgium provides an example of an ethnically deeply divided society in which democratic power-sharing has helped to avoid the escalation of ethnic interest conflict into violence.

Bhutan. The most important ethnic cleavage in Bhutan is between the indigenous Buddhist population (approximately 75%) and the Nepali-speaking minority in the southern parts of the country. The indigenous Bhutanese are Buddhist Drukpas, and Nepali-speakers are Hindus. This ethnic cleavage led to a violent conflict in the first years of the 1990s when the indigenous Bhutanese started to fear that they might lose the control of their country to the growing number of Nepalese immigrants. The government refused to recognize Nepali-speakers as citizens and resorted to some kind of ethnic cleansing. Approximately 120,000 Nepali-speakers were forced to leave the country. Since then they have lived in refugee camps in Nepal and India. They would like to return to Bhutan, but the government has allowed only some thousands of them to return (see MAR-2012). The

Nepalese minority in Bhutan claims that they still suffer from forced expulsion and non-rehabilitation of their lands, but the level of ethnic violence has remained low since the 1990s, although there are some reports about unrest in the south (MAR-2008; Keesing's 2003, pp. 45195, 45348, 45647; 2004, pp. 45789, 45961; 2007, p. 47930). Because of the unresolved problem of refugees and the discrimination against ethnic Nepalis, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 2.

Bolivia. Amerindians constitute the majority (55%, or 62% according to WDM-2011) of the population, but mestizos and whites have traditionally dominated in political and economic life. The persistent ethnic conflict between the white/mestizos and the suppressed indigenous peoples has continued for centuries. The Spanish conquistadors occupied the country in the 16th century. A significant part of the indigenous population was decimated in the violent racial struggle for the control of territories. The existence of extensive mountainous regions in Bolivia helped the survival of Amerindian people, for the whites are not adapted to live in as high altitudes as Amerindians. In the contemporary Bolivia, there are some indigenous organizations which try to further economic, cultural, and political interests of indigenous peoples (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 131-134; MAR-2012). Occasional violent clashes have continued in different parts of the country. Indigenous peoples are still discriminated and suppressed, but since becoming the first indigenous president in 2005, Evo Morales has embarked a number of reforms intended to improve the position of the historically marginalized indigenous population (see WDM-2011; FH-2010, pp. 86-90; Keesing's 2003, p. 45187; 2007, pp. 47687, 48033, 48186; 2008, pp, 48630, 48770; 2010, p. 49832). Because of the ethnically based political parties and continual suppression of indigenous peoples, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is 3 for Bolivia.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is an ethnically deeply divided country of Bosniaks (48%), Serbs (37%) and Croats (11%). Religion separates Bosnia's Muslims from Orthodox Serbs and

from Catholic Croats. These cleavages are hundreds of years old. Besides, the three ethnic groups are territorially partly separated from each other, although the boundaries are not clear in all points. Bosnia & Herzegovina achieved independence in 1992 when the former Federation of Yugoslavia disintegrated. The authoritarian communist regime in multiethnic Yugoslavia had been strong enough to prevent eruptions of ethnic violence, but when the socialist political system collapsed, ethnic groups began to struggle for power and for the control of territories. In the bloody civil war in 1991-95, tens of thousands of people were killed, and ethnic cleansing affected hundreds of thousands (see Kiernan, 2007, pp. 588-589). The Dayton peace agreement in 1995 ended the civil war. The country was divided into two federal units: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosniaks and Croats) and the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The sharing of power between the three ethnic groups was institutionalized in the constitutional structure of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Constitutional institutions were established on the basis of ethnic divisions, and all major interest groups and political parties are organized along ethnic lines (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 142-148; MAR-2012). After the 1995 democratic compromise, violent conflicts between ethnic groups disappeared nearly completely, although isolated incidents of violence continued, but the EU peacekeeping troops were needed to maintain peace. Some 500,000 refugees were still living abroad, and some 200,000 individuals remained internally displaced (see FH-2010, pp. 90-93; Keesing's 2010, p. 50103; Banks et al., 2007, pp. 140-149). I estimated the scale of ethnic conflicts to be at the level of 4 because ethnic conflicts have become institutionalized more extensively than in any other country of the world and because the number of refugees is still large. Bosnia & Herzegovina is a country in which an attempt has been made to prevent ethnic violence by sharing power on equal terms and by adapting constitutional institutions to ethnic cleavages and ethnic strivings.

Brazil is also an ethnically deeply divided country. Whites constitute a small majority (55%). The rest of the population is racially mixed people and blacks. Winn (2006, p. 293) notes that "Brasilia received the largest share of the more than nine million Africans sold in the Americas during the three centuries of the Atlantic slave trade." There are also small minorities of Japanese and indigenous people. Whites dominate in politics and economic life. Afro-Brazilians are discriminated, and they are underrepresented in political institutions. However, they have hundreds of their own interest organizations which attempt to improve the position of Afro-Brazilians. Violent clashes between whites and blacks have been rare. The remaining indigenous peoples are discriminated. Conflicts concern land rights especially: according to WDM-2011, "violence and killings continue to mark relations between indigenous peoples and landowners" (see also Reichmann, 1999; MAR-2012). There is only little information on serious violent clashes (Keesing's 2003, 45185; 2004, p. 45945; 2005, p. 46565; 2006, p. 47198; 2007, p. 47859; 2010, p. 49935). Because of the continual discrimination of blacks and indigenous people, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is 3.

Bulgaria. During the five centuries of the Ottoman rule, the level of ethnic conflict was high, and the population of Bulgaria became ethnically heterogeneous. The ethnic conflict between the Bulgarian majority (84%) and the Turkish minority (9%) in the south of the country has become institutionalized. Turks have their own political party and interest organizations, and they have been represented in the parliament and government through their own party. The relations with Roma (5%), who are present throughout the country, are more problematic. There have been violent incidents with Roma, and they "remain deeply marginalized, and routinely confront police abuse and harassment" (WDM-2011; Keesing's 2011, p. 50723). Because there is no information on serious ethnic violence from the period 2003-2011 (Keesing's 2003-2011; MAR-2012), the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is not higher than 2. The

communist government had discriminated Turks, and in 1989 the conflict escalated violently. Nearly 400,000 Turks fled to Turkey. After the collapse of the communist regime, the new democratic government reinstated the rights of Turks, and most of the refugees returned from Turkey.

Burkina Faso's population is tribally quite heterogeneous, but until now the country has avoided serious ethnic violence. The Mossi, who predominate in the central region around the capital city, constitute the largest ethnic group (48%), but there are also other important tribal groups. The country was ruled by a Mossi dominated political party until the 1990s. The 1991 constitution presupposes democratic institutions and a multiparty system, but a clearly ethnic-based multiparty system has not yet emerged (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 176-179), although several other tribal groups have their own interest organizations. There have been tension between groups in different parts of the country, but Burkina Faso has not experienced any serious ethnic violence (Keesing's 2003-2011). According to FH-2010 (p. 110), "Discrimination against various ethnic minorities occurs but is not widespread". The scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 2. The lack of ethnic violence may be due to the fact that people have not yet become organized for political action at the national level. It is reasonable to expect that tribal conflicts will increase with the process of democratization when all tribal groups become politicized and start to participate in national politics.

Cameroon. In 1961 the former British and French trust territories were combined into a new state of Cameroon. Its population is divided into more than 250 ethnic groups and subgroups. The Cameroon Highlanders are assumed to constitute the largest tribal group (31%). Other tribal groups include Equatorial Bantu (19%), Kirdi (11%), Fulani (10%), Northwestern Bantu (8%), Nigritic (7%) and other African tribes. There is no dominant tribal group. Major ethnic conflicts have taken place between northerners and southerners and between Anglophones and Francophones. There are also conflicts between

Christians and Muslims in the north (cf. Chadova, 2007). Numerous political parties are fragile tribal alliances (see Azevedo, 1995; Banks et al., 2007, pp. 200-203; MAR-2012). Tribal and regional divisions are reflected in the support of political parties, and presidents have tended to favor their own tribal group and to discriminate some others. The Cameroon National Council represents the secessionist strivings of the former British Cameroon. There is no information on serious ethnic violence from the period 2003-2011 (Keesing's 2003-2011), but because important parties and interest groups are organized along ethnic lines and because there are separatist strivings in the former British Cameroon, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 3.

Central African Republic is inhabited by many culturally different tribal groups. Baya (33%) is the largest ethnic group, and Banda (27%), Mandjia (13%) and Sara (10%) other important ethnic groups. The political history of the country has been violent since its independence in 1960, including military coups and the long Bokassa dictatorship from 1966 to 1979. When a democratic system was established in 1993, ethnically related political parties started to compete for power. General Bozize took power by a military coup in 2003 and confirmed his position through elections in 2005. After the 2005 elections, violence escalated in the northern region, forcing thousands to flee to Chad. Violent ethnic conflicts have taken place in the Central African Republic principally through military coups, rebellions and mutinies. The government made a peace agreement with the rebels in June 2008, but some rebel activities continued (Keesing's 2003, p. 45276; 2006, pp. 47024, 47081, 47137, 47299, 47563, 47622; 2007, pp. 47793, 47851, 47970; 2008, pp. 48568, 48623, 48721; 2010, pp. 50017, 50122; 2011, pp. 50218, 50497; FH-2010, pp. 131-133). Because of the continual violent ethnic conflicts in some parts of the country, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 3.

Chad's population is not only tribally but also racially divided. According to Morrison et al, 1972 (p. 205), Arab

peoples constitute 46 per cent of the population and various African tribal groups the rest. Arabs are Muslims, whereas most Africans are Christians or animists (cf. Whiteman, 1988). Racial and other ethnic divisions have provided a natural social basis for political organizations. Ethnically based political and militant groups have struggled for power since the beginning of independence in 1960 (see May, 2003). There were no power-sharing institutions to accommodate ethnic interest conflicts. The first president Tombalbaye was deposed by a military coup in 1975, after which military rulers, transitional governments, and elected presidents have alternated in power. In the period 2003-2011, the long-standing cultural, religious, and ethnic divide between southern Chad and the rest of the country continued as the most important dividing line in politics. Most political parties are to some extent ethnically based (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 229-233). Various ethnic insurgencies continued in different parts of the country (see WDM-2011; MAR-2012; Keesing's 2003, pp. 45174, 45728; 2004, p. 46148; 2005, pp. 46767, 46862; 2006, pp. 47023, 47133, 47188, 47242, 47445, 47504, 47621; 2007, pp. 47673, 47734, 47850, 48233, 48176; 2008, pp. 48392, 48338, 48452, 48507, 48625; 2009, pp. 48971, 49188; 2010, p. 49772; FH-2010, pp. 134-137). The extreme ethnic heterogeneity of the population, which is intensified by the deep racial cleavage between the southern black Africans and Saharan Arabs (Berber and Tuareg) in the north, provides a principal explanation for the high level of ethnic conflicts in Chad. The estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is 4 for Chad.

Colombia is dominated by the mestizo/white majority (73%). Ethnic minority groups include mulattos, blacks, and Amerindians. The long civil wars in Colombia between the government and insurgents have not been ethnic ones, although ethnic minorities have suffered from this violence more than other groups (Keesing's 2005, pp. 46512, 46617, 46678; 2007, p. 47800; 2008, p. 48723; 2009, pp. 49028, 49352, 49453;

MAR-2012). Afro-Colombians and indigenous peoples are still discriminated, and their representatives have claimed that their communities are victims of slow and systematic ethnocide (see WDM-2011; FH-2010, p.155). Because of serious repression of ethnic minorities, the scale of ethnic conflicts is estimated to be 2 for Colombia.

Djibouti. The indigenous population is divided into two Hamitic groups: the Somalis (60%) and the Afars (35%). The Somali-speaking Issas have dominated in politics. It has been difficult for the two ethnic groups to agree on the sharing of power. Political parties are ethnically based. After the Afars rebelled against the Issa domination in the 1990s, the largest rebel faction agreed to end its insurgency in exchange for inclusion in the government, but sporadic attacks by a radical wing of the Afar rebel organization continued in the period 2003-2011 (Banks et al., 2007, p. 342; Keesing's 2010, p. 49878; MAR-2012). The partial democratization carried out in Djibouti furthered the re-establishment of ethnic peace, but because ethnic tension continues and parties are ethnically based, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is 2 for Djibouti.

Dominican Republic. Whites (16%) and mulattos (73%) are combined into the same dominant ethnic group (89%), as in Cuba. The black minority, including black Haitian migrants, comprises the rest of the population. Dominican Republic is the nation with the highest proportion of mulattos in America, although the word "mulatto" rarely appears on the official identity cards (Winn, 2006, p. 299). Extensive racial mixing has restrained ethnic conflicts and supported ethnic peace in the country. Ethnic violence has been limited to the harassment and forced deportation of black Haitians, who are frequent targets of Dominican violence (see Baronov and Yelvington, 2003, p. 228; MAR-2012). There is no information on serious ethnic violence from the period 2003-2011 (see WDM-2011; Keesing's 2003-2011), but because black Haitians are systematically persecuted and discriminated, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 2.

Ecuador. Data on the ethnic composition of Ecuador's population vary, but it is clear that mestizos, mulattos and whites constitute a large majority (56%). Ethnic minority groups include indigenous peoples (39%) and blacks. The large indigenous population has not yet been able to achieve political equality and fair representation in political institutions, but they have their own political parties and interest organizations (see Banks et al., 2007, p. 358; MAR-2012). They resist the penetration of indigenous territories and have occasionally rebelled and demonstrated against the government. In 1990, Ecuador's Indians organized extensive riots against the government. Peter Winn (2006, p. 269) says that when "The Uprising was over, the myth of Indian passivity had been shattered and Ecuador's Indians had established themselves as a powerful political force". Indigenous people and blacks have organized demonstrations, but there is no information on any serious ethnic violence from the period 2003-2011 (Keesing's 2009, p. 49453; 2010, p. 49780; FH-2010, pp. 205-206; MAR-2012). However, because some important parties and interest groups are organized along ethnic lines and because the discrimination of indigenous people and Afro-Ecuadorians continues, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 3.

Eritrea. Tigrinyas constitute the largest ethnic group (50%). Tigre and Kunama (40%) and Afar (4%) are other significant ethnic groups. Christians (mostly Tigrinyas) and Muslims are approximately as large religious groups (cf. Pool, 1997). The ruling People's Front for Democracy and Justice is a nonsectarian party, but it is supported primarily by Coptic Christians. Muslims and other ethnic groups have their own interest organizations (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 383-384). Eritrea was a military dictatorship without any democratic elections in the period 2003-2011. The Muslim/Christian polarization continues, but there is little information about ethnic violence within Eritrea, although Eritrea and Ethiopia have had border wars (see WDM-2011; Keesing's 2010, p. 49827).

However, according to dKosopedia's "World's Conflict List" (2007), there have been regular occurrences of inter-ethnic violence especially amongst refugees. The Kunama people in the west have faced severe discrimination (FH-2010, pp. 222-223). The level of EEC was estimated to be 2.

Ethiopia is en ethnically deeply divided country. The largest ethnic groups are Oromo (32%), Amara (30%), Tigraway (6%), and Somalie (6%). However, data on ethnic groups are only rough estimations. Religious and regional divisions deepen ethnic cleavages. After the overthrow of the Haile Selassie regime in 1974, ethnic insurgency groups emerged in different parts of the country. The rebel forces overthrew Mengistu's Marxist regime in 1991, and the Ethiopia's People's Revolutionary Democratic Front dominated by the northern Tigranyans took power. The new 1995 constitution divided the country into nine ethnic states and attempted to adapt political structures to the ethnic divisions of the country, but the new system has not satisfied all ethnic groups (Harbeson, 2005). Several separatist groups continued their rebellions against the government. Most political parties are organized along ethnic lines (see Banks et al., 2007, pp 396-401; WDM-2011; MAR-2012; Keesing's 2004, p. 45836; 2005, p. 46918; 2006, p. 47444; 2007, pp. 45852, 47910; 2008, pp. 48566, 48621; 2009, p. 49025; 2010, pp. 49774, 49878). Because of the ethnically based parties and separatist strivings in some parts of the country, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 3.

Fiji. The population is racially divided into the Fijian (Melanesian) majority (57%) and the Indian minority (38%). Indians were brought to Fiji by the British colonial government to work in the sugar industry. Ethnic tension and rivalry between the two communities continued throughout the period 2003-2011, but there are no reports on ethnic violence. Political parties are principally organized along ethnic lines (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 406-408). Democratic institutions have helped to mitigate ethnic interest conflicts. I think that Fiji's constitutional system of 1997, which safeguards the predominance of Fijians, provides

reservation of seats for racial groups and presupposes a multi-racial government, is well adapted to the requirements of ethnicity (cf. Pirie, 2000; Shoup, 2011). However, the competing ethnic and political groups have not yet agreed on the rules of power-sharing, and a new military coup in December 2006 interrupted the function of democratic institutions (see WDM-2011; Keesing's 2006, p. 47631; 2007, p. 47705). According to FH-2010 (p. 234), "Race-based discrimination is pervasive, and indigenous Fijians receive preferential treatment in education, housing, land acquisition, and other areas". Discrimination and political turmoil have caused more than 140,000 Indo-Fijians to leave Fiji since the late 1980s. The estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is 3 for Fiji. Because of the deep racial cleavage, the future of ethnic relations is unclear. It is noted in MAR-2012: "It remains to be seen if the majority community is willing to reach an agreement that would allow the institutionalization of a power-sharing agreement that would give a voice to both of the two groups that comprise the country's population."

Ghana. The major ethnic groups in Ghana comprise Akan (45%) in the south and central regions, Mole-Dagbani in the north, and Ewe in eastern Volta region. Political parties have traditionally been based more on tribal affiliations than on ideological differences (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 466-468; MAR-2012). There has been a multiparty system since 1992. Political competition has remained peaceful, and contenders have been satisfied with the results of elections. Ethnic interest conflicts have been mitigated by including representatives of all major tribal groups into the governments (see Langer, 2008, pp. 184-187). In the period 2003-2011, there were some ethnic clashes between tribal and religious groups especially in the north (see Keesing's 2003, p. 45329; 2008, p. 48339; 2010, p. 49827). Because some significant political parties are organized along ethnic lines (cf. Gyimah-Boadi, 2009), the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is 2 for Ghana.

Guatemala's population is ethnically divided into the Amerindian majority (53%) and the minority of whites and mestizos. Mestizos and whites have traditionally dominated in politics and suppressed and discriminated indigenous people by violent means. George A. Bowdler and Patrick Cotter (1982) note that Guatemala is a Central American country "in which the Latino-Indian dichotomy is most severe and the one in which the political milieu is most polarized" (p. 102). The ethnic groups have struggled over land ownership and control. Indigenous people have already lost most of their lands, but they try to defend those that remain. The history of ethnic relations has been violent, but the peace agreement made between the government and guerrillas in 1996 ended the 36-year long, partly ethnic, civil war, in which more than 200,000 people died. Ethnic violence decreased. Indigenous people are still discriminated and underrepresented in political institutions, but there is no information on significant ethnic violence from the period 2003-2011 (see WDM-2011; Winn, 2006, pp. 276-283; Kiernan, 2007, p. 582; MAR-2012; Keesing's 2004, p. 46246; 2007, p. 48074; 2009, p. 49456; 2010, p. 50127). Because the Latino-Amerindian ethnic tension continues, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 3.

Honduras is dominated by the large mestizo and white majority (87%), but there are ethnic minorities of remaining Amerindians and Afro-Hondurans. Indigenous people have attempted to defend their land rights and they have organized several protests over the past years. In these conflicts, some indigenous leaders were murdered, but the country has avoided serious ethnic violence (see WDM-2011; Keesing's 2003-2011; MAR-2012). Afro-Honduran activists have regularly been victims of threats and repression (FH-2010, p. 287). Because there have been violent ethnic clashes at local levels, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is 2 for Honduras.

India. It is not self-evident what type of ethnic division is the most important one in India. Language, religion, caste, and tribe divide India's population into many more or less separate ethnic

groups. Hindi (41%) is the largest linguistic group, but there are also other significant ethnic cleavages. According to one classification, Indo-Aryan (72%), Dravidian (25%), Mongoloid and other (3%) are the three major ethnic groups. In practice, religious cleavages have been very important: Hindu (81%), Muslim (13%), Christian (2%), and Sikhs (2%). In addition to these ethnic cleavages, the population is divided into thousands of more or less endogamous caste groups. The scheduled castes (the Dalits) comprise 16 per cent of the population and scheduled tribes (the Adivasis) 8 per cent. There are ethnic tensions between many ethnic groups (cf. Rastogi, 1986). All ethnic cleavages are reflected in ethnic organizations and in the party system. Most parties are to some extent organized along ethnic lines, but the Indian National Congress is the most important all-India party whose support extends across linguistic, religious, and caste boundaries (see Malik et al., 2009, pp. 89-119; Ganguly, 2009). In the period 2003-2011, there were violent clashes between Hindus and Muslims in different parts of the country, also between Hindus and Christians, and between caste Hindus and scheduled castes. Civil wars in several tribal regions continued as well as a separatist Muslim rebel in Kashmir (see Keesing's, 2003, pp. 45193, 45243, 45290, 45347, 45518, 45551, 45601, 45692; 2004, pp. 45787, 45844, 45903, 45949, 46059, 46155, 46207, 46253, 46310; 2005, pp. 46625, 46824; 2006, pp. 47147, 47209, 47314, 47363, 47466, 47574; 2007, pp. 47692, 47806, 47869, 48136; 2008, pp. 48302, 48354, 48409, 48469, 48581, 48641, 48689, 48728, 48776; 2009, pp. 49039, 49087, 49259, 49319, 49573; 2010, pp. 49844, 50026; 2011, pp. 50233, 50287, 50568; WDM-2011; MAR-2012). Incidents of ethnic violence took place in all parts of the country, but they remained limited to local and regional levels. Different ethnic groups lived more or less peacefully side by side in most parts of the country (cf. Malik et al., 2009, pp. 129-138). Therefore the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is only 4, not 5.

Indonesia's population is racially relatively homogeneous,

but there are geographically separate ethnic groups. Javanese (41%) is the largest ethnic group. Most people are Muslims (86%), but Christians, Hindus, and animists constitute significant religious minorities in some regions. The economically important Chinese minority comprises approximately 3 per cent of the population. Political parties are partly organized along ethnic lines. In the period 2003-2011, Indonesia was devastated by ethnic rebellions and ethnic violence in the Aceh province in Northern Sumatra, Moluccas, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan (cf. Reilly, 2006, p. 39). The Free Aceh movement had demanded independence from Indonesia, but the 2005 peace agreement ended the Aceh rebellion. The indigenous Papuans in western New Guinea resist the immigration of Javanese people and demand independence. "There have been massive protests and sporadic rebellion among West Papuans since 1999" (MAR-2012). The non-Malay people of the Moluccas have long resisted Javanese domination. There has been sectarian violence between Muslims and Christians. The ethnic Chinese have been persecuted and attacked on several occasions (see Keesing's, 2003, pp. 45198, 45247, 45351, 45411, 45463, 45557, 45594, 45644; 2004, pp. 45795, 45852, 45959, 46011, 46056, 46317; 2005, pp. 46418, 46883; 2006, pp. 47048, 47156, 47460; 2008, pp. 48463, 49522, 48697; 2009, pp. 49152, 49316; 2010, pp. 49638, 50034; 2011, pp. 50284, 50600, 50655, 50770; WDM-2011). Regional ethnic rebellions in Indonesia seem to be related to institutional defects of the country's political system (cf. Aspinall, 2010). The structure of the governmental system is highly centralized despite the country's geographical and ethnic diversity. Because ethnic violence was limited to some regions of the country, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is not higher than 4.

Kazakhstan. When Kazakhstan achieved independence in 1991, the population was nearly equally divided into indigenous peoples and Russians and other European groups (cf. Olcott, 1997). Since then, the emigration of more than one million Russians and other Europeans has reduced the share of

Europeans and increased the majority of Kazakhs and other indigenous groups. Now Kazakhs comprise a clear majority (63%) of the population and the share of Russians has decreased. Other ethnic groups include Ukrainians, Uzbeks, Germans, Tatars, and Uighurs. National, linguistic, and religious cleavages coincide in many points. The two major ethnic groups are territorially separated from each other. Russians and other European groups mainly inhabit the northern parts of the country. There is ethnic tension between Kazakhs and Russians. The policies of Kazakhization have effectively excluded Russians from the public sector, and Russian separatists demand greater autonomy for the Russian regions or even reunification with Russia (see MAR-2012). Ethnic relations have remained relatively peaceful (see Keesing's 2003-2011; Gajanov, 2006), although there have been some violent clashes (see, for example, Ferghana.news, 22 November 2011). Because of the continual discrimination of the Russian minority and of some separatist strivings, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 3. The extensive emigration of Russians and Germans from the country reflects the impact of serious ethnic conflict.

Kuwait's population is ethnically divided into Arabs (80%) and migrant workers from South Asia and Iran. Kuwaiti Arabs (45%) have hegemonic power in the country. Other Arabs (35%) and immigrants from other countries are without political rights and also without any legal opportunities to get citizenship. The authoritarian government of the emir and his family has been strong enough to maintain the hegemony of the Kuwaiti Arabs and peace between ethnic groups. The position of foreign immigrants living and working in Kuwait is so weak that they have been unable to organize themselves, although there certainly is ethnic tension and ethnic interest conflicts between them and dominant Arabs. There is no information on ethnic violence from the period 2003-2011 (Keesing's 2003-2011), but because the subjugation of ethnic minorities is institutionalized, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 2, not 1.

Kyrgyzstan. The major ethnic conflict is between the Kyrgyz majority (65%) and the Uzbek minority (14%). Russians comprise 12 per cent of the population. Ethnic minority groups have complained of discrimination, and Uzbeks in the south have demanded more political and cultural rights (FH-2010, pp. 267-268; MAR-2012). Hundreds of people were killed in Kyrgyz-Uzbek ethnic violence in 1990 (cf. Rotar, 2005). Ethnic tension between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks continued, and a new violent conflict erupted in 2010, in which approximately 2000 people were killed or injured and 400,000 were temporarily displaced (see *The Economist,* June 19th 2010, pp. 23-25). There have been minor incidents also with other ethnic minorities (Keesing's, 2003, p. 45404; 2004, p. 45953; 2005, p. 46686; 2010, pp. 49783, 49841, 49889, 49984, 50136; 2011, p. 50455; WDM-2011). Because of the violent ethnic conflicts between the government and the Uzbek minority, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to rise to 3.

Lebanon. The ethnic heterogeneity of Lebanon's population is based on deep cleavages between religious communities. Muslims constitute a majority of the population (approximately 60%), but they are divided into Shia, Sunni and Druze communities. Christians are divided into Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Armenian communities (cf. MacDowall, 1984; Held, 1994, p. 221). Each community has its core region, but most of them are distributed around the country without any clearly demarcated own territory. When Lebanon achieved independence in 1946, it adopted a democratic system based on the sharing of power between religious communities. The system worked, and Lebanon avoided large-scale ethnic violence until 1975 when tension between communities exploded into a civil war, which lasted until 1990. The war was ended by agreeing on a new formula of power-sharing. There has been sporadic ethnic violence after 1990, but Lebanon has avoided a new large-scale civil war. Most fighting in the period 2003-2011 occurred between Hezbollah/Palestinian forces and Israeli troops. There was also some fighting between Lebanese

army units and Hezbollah (Shia militants) fighters (see Keesing's 2004, p. 46288; 2005, pp. 46546, 46652, 46714; 2006, pp. 47125, 47287, 47389, 47433; 2007, pp. 47778, 47954, 48013, 48062, 48164; 2008, pp.48381, 48436, 48605, 48664, 48752; MAR-2012). Because important parties are organized along ethnic lines (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 707-708) and because violent ethnic conflicts have continued to some extent, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 3. Lebanon's example shows that it is possible to mitigate ethnic conflicts and to avoid ethnic violence by adapting democratic institutions to the nature of the population's ethnic structure and by institutionalizing the sharing of power.

All Liberia's tribal groups are minority groups, which means that it is difficult for any ethnic group to achieve a hegemonic position. The largest tribe Kpelle comprises only 19 per cent of the population. After the autocratic system of the True Whig Party of a small "Americo-Liberian" elite (2%) was overthrown by a military coup in 1980, various tribal groups established their own political and military organizations. The struggle for power escalated into a bloody civil war in the 1990s. It continued until the peace agreement made in June 2003. It is estimated that between 60,000 and 200,000 people were killed in the war and hundreds of thousands were displaced. Mats Utas (2006, p. 163) says that "during the course of the war most Liberians were displaced at some time". Large-scale ethnic violence ended in 2003, and only sporadic clashes continued. Democratic political institutions were stabilized through presidential and parliamentary elections in 2005 (see WDM-2011; Keesing's, 2003, pp. 45231, 45329, 45393, 45452, 45506; 2004, p. 46240; 2010, p. 49716; 2011, p. 50309). Because the ethnic civil war still continued in 2003, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 3 for the period 2003-2011.

Macedonia. Macedonians (64%) constitute the ethnic majority, and ethnic minority groups include Albanian (25%), Turkish (4%), Roma (3%), and Serb (1%). Albanians constitute

a concentrated majority in the western part of the country, which strengthens their position as a separate ethnic minority. Ethnic tension escalated to a violent Albanian insurgency in 2001. It was ended by a political compromise (the Ohrid accords), which secured for the Albanian minority a fair representation in the national unity government. The Albanian, Roma, and Serb minorities have their own political parties and interest organizations (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 745-750; MAR-2012). Some Albanian separatists have demanded autonomy for the Albanian region, but there were hardly any violent ethnic clashes in the period 2003-2011 (Keesing's, 2003, p. 45618; 2006, pp, 47225, 47373; 2008, p. 48480; 2009, p. 49160; 2010, p. 49864, 2011, pp. 50305, 50579). The scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 3 because many important parties are ethnically based and because the discrimination of the Roma minority continued. Macedonia's democratic institutions are partly adapted to satisfy the requirements of ethnicity, and Albanians are represented in the government through their own parties.

Malawi. The population is ethnically heterogeneous, but numerous intermarriages have blurred tribal boundaries. Available data on ethnic groups vary. According to *The World Guide* (2007), Marawi (including Nyanja, Chewa, Tonga, and Tumbuka) is the largest tribal group (58%). Lomwe (18%), Yao (13%), and Ngoni (7%) are other tribal groups. Malawi has avoided violent ethnic conflicts. During the long period of his autocratic rule, President Hastings Banda played ethnic groups against each other in order to support the hegemony of his own Chewa tribe. Since the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1994, ethnic competition has taken place through elections. Regional tribal cleavages are to some extent reflected in the support of political parties (see Ferree and Horowitz, 2010). Political power seems to be shared by the main tribal groups, but no region or tribal group is permanently excluded from political institutions (cf. Donghe, 1995; Decalo, 1998). There is no information on any serious ethnic violence from the period

2003-2011 (Keesing's 2003, p. 45448), but the ethnicity of political parties is enough to raise the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts to 2.

Mexico. Mestizos and whites comprise a large majority of the population (85%). The remaining indigenous Amerindians constitute the most significant ethnic minority groups. The whites and mestizos dominate in politics and economy, and indigenous communities have been traditionally discriminated. In 1994, the armed Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas gained international attention. The Zapatistas demanded land reform, autonomy, and collective rights for indigenous peoples. Occasional violent clashes between the government forces and indigenous rebels have continued in the south. The indigenous peoples of Mexico are still without a fair representation in political institutions through their own parties, although they have strong interest organizations (see WDM-11; MAR-2012; Keesing's 2005, p. 46677). Because of the existence of important ethnically based interest organizations and the subjugated position of indigenous peoples, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 2. The extensive racial mixing has probably decreased the intensity of ethnic conflicts in Mexico.

Moldova. Romanian Moldovans (78%) constitute the large majority of the population, but there are significant territorially separated ethnic minorities: Ukrainians and Russians (14%) on the eastern side of the Dniester river and the Turkic-speaking Gagauz minority (4%) in the south. After Moldova's independence in 1991, both Ukrainian/Russians and Gagauz strived for independence, which caused a civil war in Transdnestr. It ended to a stalemate when the Russian army occupied the rebellious region. The conflict with the Gagauz minority was resolved in 1995 by granting an extensive autonomy to the Gagauz region. The Ukrainian/Russian minority established the Dnestr Republic. The military stalemate between Moldova and this separatist region continues, but there is no information on any serious ethnic clashes from the period 2003-

2011 (Keesing's 2003, p. 45567; 2004, p. 45868; 2008, p. 48593; MAR-2012). The estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is 2 for Moldova because of the separatism of Transdnestr (see FH-2010, pp. 790-793).

Montenegro. Montenegrins (43%) and Serbs (32%) are combined into the same group of Eastern Orthodox (75%). The other ethnic groups include Bosniaks (8%), Albanians (5%), Croats, Macedonians and other. Ethnic conflicts have become institutionalized through a multiparty system and competitive democratic elections (cf. Darmanovic, 2007). Serbians, Bosniaks and Albanians have their own parties (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 832-834). There have been only minor clashes with Albanians (Keesing's 2007, p. 48216; Darmanovic, 2007). Because significant political parties are ethnically based, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is 2 for Montenegro.

Mozambique. The population of Mozambique is divided into several tribes, but data on tribal groups are only rough estimations. Makua (47%) is the largest tribe. Other significant tribal groups include Tsonga, Malawi, Shona, and Yao. Most tribal groups are geographically separated from each other. When Mozambique achieved independence from Portugal in 1975, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) was installed as the only legal party. The Movement of National Resistance (Renamo), supported by South Africa, started a civil war against the Frelimo government. The adversaries in the civil war in the 1980s resorted to ethnic divisions in the mobilization of supporters (cf. Hall and Young, 2003). The civil war continued until the peace agreement in 1992. Hundreds of thousands of people were killed in the war. The 1994 elections helped to institutionalize ethnic conflicts. Frelimo won in the southern provinces and in two northern provinces, and the main opposition party (Renamo) won in the central provinces, in the region of the Makua-Lomwe ethnic group (Lloyd, 1995). Parties have continued to compete through elections, and the level of violence decreased drastically. Ethnic peace was re-established in Mozambique when Frelimo and Renamo realized that they were

not able to subjugate each other and to achieve absolute hegemony by military means. They made a democratic compromise, which presupposes the sharing of power through elections. Because competing parties are partly ethnically based, the scale of ethnic conflicts is estimated to be 2, although there is no information on serious ethnic violence from the period 2003-2011 (Keesing's 2011, p. 50637).

Namibia's black population is divided into several tribal groups. Ovambos (50%) comprise about half of the population, but there is also an important racial cleavage between the black majority (87%) and the white (6%) and mixed (7%) minorities. An exodus of the white population, traditionally engaged in commercial farming and ranching, has reduced their share from approximately 12 per cent to 6 per cent (Banks et al., 2007, p. 858). During the German colonization before World War I, Namibia's tribal peoples had experienced genocidal violence. Ben Kiernan (2007, p. 383) tells, for example, about the German attack against the Herero people in 1904: "The pursuing German troops massacred almost everyone they found, including women and children, and poisoned water holes in the desert." The country's present multiparty system reflects institutionalized ethnic interest conflicts (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 862-864; MAR-2012). In the period 2003-2011, some ethnic clashes occurred between the government forces and the Caprivi separatists in the Caprivi Strip. The scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 2.

The Netherlands. Dutch (81%) and immigrants from other EU-countries constitute the white majority of the population (86%), but there are significant Indonesian, Turkish, Surinamese, Moroccan and other non-European minority groups. There have been occasional violent clashes with non-European immigrants and especially with Muslims. The murder of film-maker Theo van Gogh on November 2, 2004, led to an eruption of ethnic and religious violence (see Keesing's, 2003, p. 45362; 2004, p. 46330; 2005, p. 46486). Ethnic minority groups have their own

interest organizations. Gert Oostindie (2005, p. 179) notes that "Dutch public debate today is very much focused on the drawbacks of multiculturalism, often boiling down to straightforward xenophobia." Because of some violent ethnic incidents, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 2.

New Zealand's most significant ethnic cleavage is between the white majority (74%) and the minorities of indigenous Maoris (8%), Asians (6%), Pacific Islanders (4%), and racially mixed people. The level of ethnic violence was high during the period of colonization when European settlers occupied the country and decimated a significant part of the indigenous population. In the period 2003-2011, ethnic relations were generally peaceful. There were only minor incidents of interethnic unrest (see Keesing's, 2003, p. 45248; 2005, p. 46745; 2009, p. 49033). The indigenous Maoris have their own political parties and interest organizations (see Banks et al., 2007, p. 891; MAR-2012). Ethnic conflicts have become institutionalized. Because some significant political parties are organized along ethnic lines, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is 2 for New Zealand.

Oman. The major ethnic cleavage is between the Omani Arab majority (74%) and national and linguistic minority groups including immigrant workers from India and Pakistan (cf. Held, 1994, p. 337). The position of immigrant workers is subjugated as in the other Middle East Arab countries, but there is no information on any serious ethnic clashes (Keesing's 2003-2011). The estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is 2 because of the institutionalized discrimination of ethnic minorities. Ethnic peace in Oman is not based on democratic compromises. The Sultanate of Oman is an absolute monarchy, in which power and privileges are concentrated in the hands of the ruling family. Ethnic peace can be traced to the fact that immigrant workers, who constitute the largest minority groups, are without citizenship and any political rights. Because of their subjugated position, they have been unable to cause serious ethnic troubles. As temporary migrants they are not allowed to organize themselves for political action. Oman is an example of an autocratic regime, which is able

to subjugate ethnic minority groups and to prevent the escalation of ethnic interest conflicts into violent ones.

Pakistan. Language divides the population into several clearly different ethnic groups. Punjabis in the northern province of Punjab constitute the largest ethnic group (45%). Other significant ethnic groups include Sindhi in the southern province of Sindh, Baluch and several other ethnic groups in Baluchistan, Pashtun tribes in the North-West Frontier, and Urdu-speaking Mujahirs (refugees from India) principally in Karachi. Pakistan is divided into four provinces: Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, and North-West Frontier. Islam is the state religion (96%), but there are small Christian and Hindu minorities. Principal parties have traditionally resorted to the support of Punjabis and Sindhis respectively, but there are ethnically based parties and other organizations also in Baluchistan and in the North-West Frontier (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 938-944). Besides, there are several religiously based Islamic parties (see Malik et al., 2009, pp. 176-193). There has been sporadic ethnic violence in different parts of the country since Pakistan's independence in 1947, and it continued in 2003-2011. Pakistan's armed forces struggled with tribal Islamists in the North-West Frontier (cf. *The Economist,* September 20th 2008, pp. 57-68). There were violent clashes between Mujahirs and Sindhis in Karachi. The most serious ethnic violence took place in Baluchistan, where tribal groups have struggled with Pakistan's armed forces. Rebels demanded greater autonomy for Baluchistan and an increased share of the revenues from the exploitation of Baluchistan's natural resources (cf. MAR-2012). There was sectarian violence between the Shia and Sunni communities in Baluchistan. Many people were killed in this ethnic violence (Keesing's 2003, pp. 45192, 45649; 2004, pp. 45843, 45902, 45951, 46003, 46061, 46157, 46252; 2005, pp. 46412, 46465, 46516, 46569, 46990; 2006, pp. 47038, 47098, 47149, 47208, 47365, 47465; 2007, pp. 47695, 47868, 47926, 48190, 48246; 2008, pp. 48356, 48471, 48531, 48583, 48643, 48688, 48727, 48774; 2009, pp. 48986, 49041, 49145,

49258, 49360, 49402, 49572; 2010. pp. 49630, 49679, 49786, 49843, 49891, 49982, 50027, 50080; 2011, pp. 50343. 50400, 50559, 50603, 50650; Malik et al., 2009, pp. 195-206). On the basis of this information, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 4. The high level of ethnic conflicts in Pakistan is related to the inability of the political leadership to solve ethnic interest conflicts by institutional arrangements. The low level of democracy in Pakistan has probably intensified ethnic conflicts and hindered possibilities to solve conflicts by sharing power through democratic elections. Ethnic conflicts have a long history in Pakistan.

Papua New Guinea. It is difficult to estimate the level of ethnic heterogeneity for the reason that the country's population is divided into hundreds of small tribal and linguistic groups, which are too small to provide solid foundation for political parties or rebel movements. My estimation on the degree of ethnic heterogeneity is based on the division of the population into Papuans (85%) and other Melanesians. Papuans are found in the New Guinean Highlands, and most Melanesians are in the costal areas and on the other islands. However, there are no reliable data on the division of the population into these categories or into any other ethnic groups. There is a long tradition of violent clashes between hundreds of small ethnic groups in Papua New Guinea, but the secessionist rebellion in Bougainville in 1988-2001 caused a bloody civil war. A peace treaty between the government and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army ended this civil war in 2001 (cf. Reilly, 2006, p. 40; MAR-2012). Since then ethnic relations remained more or less peaceful in the period 2003-2011, although occasional ethnic clashes continued in Bougainville and in the other parts of the country (Keesing's, 2003, pp. 45248, 45297, 45520; 2004, p. 46065; 2005, p. 46577; 2006, pp. 47266, 47419, 47586; 2008, p. 48312; 2009, p. 49213; 2010, p. 49847; 2011, p. 50771). Because of the low level of ethnic violence, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is not higher than 2.

The Philippines. The population is divided into numerous

genetically closely related ethnic groups just like tribal groups in African countries. Tagalog (28%) is the largest of those ethnic groups. The religious division between Christians and Muslims (5%) seems to be the most significant ethnic cleavage. The Muslims (Moros) of the southern Philippines have rebelled against the Christian Filipino government since the 1960s. The Muslim rebellion in the southern Mindanao and Sulu archipelago continues. The secessionists demand separation and the creation of an Islamic state in the south. Thousands of people have been killed and hundreds of thousands displaced in this ethnic civil war (Keesing's 2003, pp. 45246, 45294, 45351, 45408, 45462; 2004, pp. 45852, 46200, 46365; 2005, pp. 46417, 46472, 46938; 2006, pp. 47203, 47310, 47370, 47417, 47461; 2007, pp. 47876, 47982, 48085; 2008, pp. 48522, 48695, 48735, 48782; 2009, pp. 48992, 49035, 49264, 49315, 49365, 49412, 49467, 49525, 49579; 2010, pp. 49687, 49792, 49899, 50033, 50084; 2011, pp. 50285, 50600, 50716). "State repression of the Moros includes the destruction of property, arrests, saturation police/military presence, and the destruction of suspected rebel areas" (MAR-2012). However, because this violent ethnic conflict is limited to the southern parts of the country, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is not higher than 3.

Serbia. After the dissolution of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2006 and the secession of Kosovo in 2008, Serbs constitute 83 per cent of the population in the remaining territory of Serbia. There are small Hungarian, Romani, Bosniak, and other minority groups (cf. Demographics of Serbia, 2008). A serious ethnic civil war between Kosovo's Muslim Albanians and Serbian forces broke out in February 1998, which led to NATO's intervention. Finally, on June 3, 1999, President Milosevic accepted the terms of a peace agreement. Serbia had to withdraw the Serb army, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo and the NATO dominated peacekeeping forces took over. Despite the peace agreement, occasional ethnic violence continued in Kosovo in the period 2003-2011 (see Keesing's

2003, pp. 45250, 45568, 45660; 2004, pp. 45924, 45973, 46025; 2005, pp. 46433, 46754, 46790; 2006, p. 47225; 2008, pp. 48421, 43479; 2009, pp. 49329, 49377; 2011, p. 50158), but ethnic relations remained peaceful within the boundaries of Serbia. The Croat, Hungarian, Roma, and Sandzak Bosniak ethnic minorities have their own parties and interest groups (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 1083-1085; MAR-2012). Therefore the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is 2 for Serbia.

Sierra Leone. Temne (30%), Mende (30%), and Limba are the largest tribal groups in Sierra Leone. Besides, Creoles, descendants of freed Jamaican slaves who were settled in the Freetown area in the late 18th century, comprise approximately 10 per cent of the population. The support of political parties has reflected major ethnic cleavages since independence in 1961. The drifting of Sierra Leone into military coups and partly ethnic civil wars in the beginning of the 1990s can be traced to the degeneration of the country's political system from the original multiparty democracy to an ineffective and corrupted one-party system since 1978. Widespread violence in neighboring Liberia seems to have contributed to the spread of violence to Sierra Leone. The Revolutionary United Front, established in Liberia, launched a guerrilla campaign against President Joseph Momoh's one-party regime in 1991. The president was deposed by a military coup in 1992. Various partly ethnic-based military groups struggled for power and for the control of key diamond-rich areas. Thousands of people were killed and probably more than one million people had to flee. Several attempts were made to end violence and to establish civilian rule. The United Nations sent peacekeepers to Sierra Leone in 2000. Finally, ethnic-based political parties were re-established and competitive presidential and parliamentary elections were held in 2002 and in 2007 (Wyrod, 2008). The main parties are the Mende-dominated Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) and the Limba- and Temne-dominated All People's Congress (APC). Ethnic violence nearly disappeared in the period 2003-2011 (see MAR-2012; Keesing's 2004, p. 46192). Because the most important parties are ethnic-

based (cf. Banks et al., 2007, pp. 1095-1097), the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 3.

Singapore. The population is divided by race, language, and religion into three main groups: Chinese (77%), Malay (14%), and Indian (8%). These ethnic groups live intermixed in the same small territory. There is no news of serious ethnic violence in Singapore (see Keesing's 2003-2011). The political hegemony of the Chinese majority and the institutionalization of ethnic interest conflicts help to explain the lack of ethnic violence. Malays and Indians have their own organizations and parties (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 1100-1101; MAR-2012), but because of the majoritarian electoral system they cannot get a fair representation in parliament through their own parties. The ruling Chinese-dominated People's Action Party has co-opted minority representatives to the parliament and other political institutions. Singapore's dominant party system has made possible a limited ethnic power-sharing in political institutions. The deepest ethnic cleavage seems to be between the Buddhist or Christian Chinese majority and the Muslim Malays, who are not satisfied with their subjugated position. The scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 2.

Slovakia. Their ethnic origin and language separate the Slovakian majority (86%) from the Hungarian minority (10%). Hungarians live almost entirely in the southern part of the country in the regions adjoining the Danube river and the border with Hungary, but they do not have a clearly demarcated own territory. The Roma people (2%) are dispersed around the country, and their number may be higher than 2 per cent. Both Hungarians and Roma have their own political parties (see Banks et al., 2007, p. 1108; MAR-2012). There is no information about serious ethnic clashes between Slovaks and Hungarians from the period 2003-2011, although ethnic tension between them continues. The position of the Roma minority is much worse. They are still subject to several forms of discrimination and prejudice. The Roma have organized violent riots, and there have

been many incidents of racist violence against them (FH-2010, p. 589; Keesing's 2004, p. 45867; 2007, p. 47824). The estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is 2 for Slovakia.

Spain. The population of Spain is divided by language and national identity into regionally separate ethnic groups. The speakers of Castilian Spanish constitute the largest language group (74%). Other important regional languages include Catalan (17%), Galician (7%), and Basque (2%). The estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (2) reflects the rebellion and terrorism of Basque separatists, which has continued since the 1960s. The Basque separatist organization (ETA) has demanded independence for the Basque region, but this demand has remained unacceptable for the Spanish government and people (see Keesing's 2003, pp. 45418, 45483, 45526; 2004, pp. 45862, 45910, 46132, 46170, 46226; 2005, p. 46430; 2006, pp. 47595, 47647; 2007, pp. 47715, 47938, 47998, 48098, 48267; 2008, pp. 48367, 48537, 48599, 48651, 48707, 48746, 48797; 2009, pp. 49003, 49057, 49105, 49217, 49335; 2010, pp. 50042, 50204; 2011, p. 50294; MAR-2012). Most Basques are satisfied with their regional autonomy, but the most radical of them seek complete independence and unification with the Basques in France. The other regional ethnic groups have been satisfied to further their interests through democratic politics.

Switzerland. The Swiss (79%) are divided by language into four major groups: German (65%), French (18%), Italian (10%), and Romanesch (1%); and by religion into two major groups: Protestants (44%) and Catholics (48%). Linguistic and religious cleavages are, however, cross-cutting in many points, which dampens the intensity of ethnic conflicts. Besides, it should be noticed that the Swiss population is racially homogeneous, which means that ethnic cleavages are not genetically as deep as in racially divided societies (cf. Thomay, 1993, pp.75-79). Ethnic interest conflicts have become institutionalized through federal and political institutions. The country is divided into autonomous cantons that are ethnically relatively homogeneous. Each canton is represented by two members in the upper house of the Federal

Assembly. The members of the lower house are elected by a proportional electoral system, which guarantees a fair representation for all major ethnic groups. Political parties are to some extent organized along ethnic lines (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 1196-1198). However, the most significant ethnic cleavage is between the Swiss and immigrant groups from Europe, especially from the former Yugoslavia, and from non-European countries. Immigrant workers are without citizenship and without possibility to get citizenship. They are in a subjugated position, and there is a serious ethnic conflict between them and the Swiss population (see MAR- 2012). There is no information on serious ethnic violence in Switzerland (see Keesing's 2003-2011), but because some important parties are ethnically based and foreign workers are discriminated, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 2.

Taiwan. The population is ethnically divided into Taiwanese (84%), mainland Chinese (14%), and indigenous (2%). Political competition between the traditionally dominant descendants of mainland Chinese and indigenous Taiwanese has been intense, but it did not escalate into ethnic violence in the period 2003-2011 (see Keesing's 2003-2011). Democratic institutions function effectively in Taiwan. The estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (2) reflects the institutionalized competition between indigenous Taiwanese and mainland Chinese ethnic groups. In the 1990s the Taiwanese established their own political party, the Democratic Progressive Party, which advocated Taiwanese nationalism and separatism (MAR-2012).

Tajikistan. The population is ethnically heterogeneous as in the other former Soviet republics of Central Asia. The Tajik majority comprises 80 per cent of the population. The ethnic minority groups include Uzbek (15%), Russian (1%) and Kyrgyz (1%). After independence in 1991, a civil war broke out between Islamists and the supporters of secularism. According to WDM-2011, "The civil war saw mobilization of supporters along regional, ethnic and clan lines in the struggle to resolve the

ideological conflict between Islam and secularism and the political question of who would rule the country". The war continued for nearly a decade and claimed up to 100,000 dead and a million refugees (cf. Jawad and Tadjbakhsh, 1995; Atkin, 1997). Most Russians and many Uzbeks fled the country, which strengthened the hegemony of Tajiks, but because there is still a significant Uzbek minority in the eastern Ferghana valley, the eruption of new ethnic violence is possible. "Ethnic Uzbeks face widespread societal discrimination in Tajikistan as well as some forms of governmental restrictions" (MAR-2012), They are underrepresented in national political institutions. There is not much information about serious ethnic violence from the period 2003-2011 (see Keesing's 2010, pp. 50029, 50078; 2011, p. 50405). The scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 2.

Tanzania has more than 100 ethno-linguistic groups, but because all of them are small tribal groups, and Bantu tribes comprise 95 per cent of the population, I selected to calculate the level of ethnic heterogeneity on the basis of the largest linguistic group. Swahili-speakers comprise 88 per cent of the population. The Zanzibar Arabs constitute the most important ethnic minority. Zanzibar has extensive autonomy within the United Republic of Tanzania, but it does not satisfy separatist groups in Zanzibar. The Arab separatists desire to separate from Tanzania completely. There has been continual tension between Christians and Muslims. Religious discrimination and violence increased in the period 2003-2011, and there have been some ethnic clashes in Zanzibar (see MAR-2012). Because of strong separatist strivings in Zanzibar, I estimated the scale of ethnic conflicts to be 2 for Tanzania.

Uganda is a country of significant tribal, linguistic and religious diversity. There are ethnic cleavages between Bantu, Nilotic, Sudanic, and Nilo-Hamitic tribes. Collectively Bantu-speakers comprise the majority of the population, but there is no dominant ethnic group. The largest tribal group, Baganda, comprises only 17 per cent of the population. Power holders have been from various ethnic groups and they have usually

favored the members of their own group. Yoveri Museveni's National Resistance army usurped power in 1986, and Museveni has since then ruled the country (see Izama, 2011). Various ethnic groups have rebelled against the government. The most serious rebellion was in the north. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), supported mainly by the Acholi tribe, resisted the government and thousands of people were killed in fighting (see *The Economist,* May 7, 2005; MAR-2012; Keesing's 2003, p. 45449; 2004, pp. 45833, 46298, 46355; 2005, pp. 46397, 46725, 46863; 2006, pp. 47399, 47501; 2007, pp. 47678, 47852; 2008, pp. 48394, 48504, 48569; 2009, p. 49391; 2010, pp. 49721, 49882). Because of serious ethnic violence in some parts of the country, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 3. Nearly all East Indians had been forced to leave the country in the 1970s (see Thomay, 1993. pp. 29-31).

Ukraine. The population is ethnically divided into the Ukrainian majority (78%) and the Russian minority (17%) in eastern Ukraine. Besides, there are several small ethnic minority groups, including Crimean Tatars. The ethnic tension between the two major ethnic groups is reflected in the support of political parties, but there have been few violent clashes between Ukrainians and Russians. Conflict between Crimean Russians and Crimean Tatars is much more serious. They struggle for the control of the same territory. However, there is no information about serious ethnic violence from the period 2003-2011 (see Keesing's 2003-2011). Ethnic interest conflicts have become institutionalized. Democratic institutions and a multiparty system have facilitated power-sharing between the Ukrainian and Russian sections of the population. The estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is 2 for Ukraine.

United Kingdom. The most important ethnic cleavages in the United Kingdom are racial ones. The group of White British comprises 85 per cent of the population. The rest of the population is relatively recent immigrants from non-European countries, including people from African and Caribbean countries

as well as from India, Pakistan, and other Asian countries. Both Asian and black immigrants face discriminatory barriers. Afro-Caribbeans, for example, "encounter discriminatory barriers in housing and access to most middle and higher status occupations as well as discrimination in hiring practices at all levels of employment" (MAR-2012). Islamist radicals and other non-European immigrants have been involved in occasional violent ethnic clashes. Sectarian violence in Northern Ireland continued but decreased significantly in the period 2003-2011 (see Keesing's 2003, pp. 45202, 45311, 45480, 45524, 45664, 45715; 2004. pp. 45800, 45858. 45912, 45969, 46080, 46126, 46273; 2005, pp. 46427, 46747, 46795, 46897; 2006, p. 47109; 2007, pp. 47714, 48055; 2008, pp. 48429, 48539, 48649; 2009, pp. 49279, 49337, 49540; 2010, pp. 49852, 49908, 49955, 49993, 50089; 2011, pp. 50569, 50609). Because violent clashes were limited to Northern Ireland and to some localities in the other parts of the country, the estimated scale of ethnic conflict is not higher than 2.

United States. The white majority (80%) in the United States, including Hispanic/Latinos, is decreasing. The most important ethnic minority groups include blacks (12%), Asians (4%), and Amerindian and Alaskan natives (1%). According to some other classifications, the white majority may already have decreased to 67 percent (see Huntington, 2004). During the period of American colonization, the history of ethnic relations between whites and indigenous peoples as well as between whites and blacks were characterized by extreme forms of violence (cf. Waters, 1996). The number of victims in genocidal violence rose at least to hundreds of thousands if not to millions (see Kiernan, 2007, pp. 310-363; Andregg, 2008). In the period 2003-2011, the level of ethnic violence was low, although there were occasional clashes between whites, latinos, and blacks (see MAR-2012). Ethnic interest conflicts have become institutionalized. All ethnic minorities have their own interest organizations. Therefore, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is 2 for the United States.

Uzbekistan. The Uzbeks constitute a large majority (80%) of the population, but there are small Russian (5%), Tajik (5%), Kazakh (3%) and other ethnic minorities. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, most Russians and Germans emigrated from Uzbekistan. The emigration of minorities indicates the existence of ethnic conflicts. Some ethnic minority groups, especially Tajiks, have been discriminated, and there have been some serious ethnic clashes (see MAR-2012). According to WDM-2011, "Hundreds of unarmed people protesting in the eastern city of Andijan, perhaps as many as 750, were killed on 13 May 2005 by Uzbek government forces" (see also Keesing's 2004, p. 45901, 46158; 2005, p. 46622). Because of some violent ethnic clashes, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 2.

Vietnam. The ethnic majority of Vietnamese comprises 86 per cent of the population. There are numerous small ethnic minority groups. There have been occasional violent clashes in the Central Highlands region where ethnic minority groups (Montagnards) resist the government policies and would like to get more autonomy. The Montagnards demand autonomy and greater religious freedom, as well as the end of land confiscation acts (see MAR-2012). There have also been violent clashes between the army and the Hmong people in the north-western province of Dien Bien (see Keesing's 2003, pp. 45200, 45409; 2004, pp. 45957, 46057; 2007, p. 47750; 2011, p. 50459). Because of significant ethnic violence at local levels, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 2.

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The review of 58 ethnically heterogeneous countries around the regression line indicates that the nature of ethnic conflicts varies from country to country. For some countries, the estimated scales of ethnic conflicts are principally based on institutionalized ethnic conflicts, and for some other countries

more on violent conflicts. The significance and intensity of ethnic conflicts varies greatly, but it is remarkable that in all these countries the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts differs only slightly from the level predicted by the regression equation. In other words, ethnic nepotism measured by ethnic heterogeneity explained quite well the variation in EEC. In many countries the level of ethnic conflicts seems to have remained more or less stable over time, but there are also countries in which it has varied considerably over time. Algeria, Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Guatemala, Lebanon, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, and Sierra Leone at least are countries in which the level of ethnic violence was previously sometimes much higher than in the period 2003-2011. Political and democratic compromises helped to stop or at least to decrease ethnic violence in these countries.

Chapter 6

Countries with Moderate Residuals

1. Moderate Positive Outliers (Residuals +0.5 or +0.6)

2. Moderate Negative Outliers (Residuals -0.5 or -0.6)

The second category of countries around the regression line comprises the 34 countries which deviate moderately from the regression line. They are divided into two subcategories: (1) countries with moderate positive residuals (+0.5 or +0.6) and (2) countries with moderate negative residuals (-0.5 or -0.6). These countries deviate clearly from the regression line and contradict the hypothesis to some extent, although only moderately. It would be interesting to find out whether there are any systematic differences between these two groups of countries.

1. Moderate Positive Outliers (Residuals +0.5 or +0.6)

The subcategory of moderate positive outliers (residuals +0.5 or +0.6) includes the following 18 countries: Bangladesh, Chile, China, Croatia, Egypt, France, Guinea, Hungary, Israel, Libya, Mauritania, Nepal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Syria, Togo and Zimbabwe. It is common for these countries that their estimated level of ethnic conflicts is slightly higher than expected

on the basis of the regression equation. In the following, each country will be discussed separately. I try to find out why the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is slightly higher than expected.

Bangladesh. The religious cleavage divides the Bengali population into the Muslim majority (90%) and the Hindu minority. The separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971 was connected with a high level of ethnic violence. West Pakistani troops in East Pakistan killed Bengali Muslims and Hindus. Ben Kiernan (2007, pp. 573-576) notes that the final toll, "variously estimated from 300,000 to well over 1 million, included disproportionate numbers of local Hindus and city dwellers, though most victims were Muslim Bengali villagers." The Chittagong Hill tribes (1%) differ from the Bengali majority in many respects. They have attempted to defend their territories against the encroachments of Bengalis. This conflict has caused violent clashes (see MAR-2012). There have also been occasional violent clashes between Muslims and Hindus (see Keesing's 2003, p. 45403; 2004, p. 45788; 2005, p. 46415; 2009, p. 49319; 2010, p. 49682). Because of occasional ethnic clashes and the discrimination of religious minorities (see MAR-2012), the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 2.

Chile is ethnically a highly homogeneous country. White and mestizos comprise 92 per cent of the population and the remaining indigenous peoples 8 per cent. Peter Winn (2006, p. 252) claims that "today more than one million Chileans proudly identify themselves as Mapuche." During the period of colonization, indigenous people were persecuted and decimated. However, Mapuches in southern Chile successfully resisted European conquest for three centuries and their contemporary descendants defend their remaining territories against the continual inroads of the white settlers. According to WDM-2011, "Land and resource disputes have long pitted indigenous Mapuche communities against private landowners and, more recently, forestry companies and hydroelectric projects in southern Chile." Conflict has become increasingly violent since the late 1990s (see

Keesing's 2003, p. 45397; 2007, p, 48187; 2009, pp. 49353, 49398; 2010, pp. 49936, 50022, 50334; MAR-2012). WDM-2011 notes that "Despite the government's professed openness to resolving the Mapuche conflict, violent confrontations over collective land and water rights and human rights abuses against indigenous people continue unabated in southern Chile." The Mapuche people have their own political party (Banks et al., 2007, p. 238). Because of the Mapuche conflict, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (2) is clearly higher than expected.

China is populated by 56 officially recognized ethnic groups, but because Han Chinese constitute 92 per cent of the population, the degree of ethnic heterogeneity is low. The ethnic minority groups occupy significant parts of the country in the west and south. The fact that minority groups differ from the Han majority not only regionally but also by culture and religion, and partly also by race, has made it impossible to assimilate ethnic minorities into the Han majority (cf. "China's Ethnic Groups," 2004). The constant influx of Han people into the traditional territories of ethnic minorities especially in western provinces and Tibet has caused serious ethnic conflicts and violence. Muslim Turkmen in Xinjiang would like to keep their extensive territory for their own use and therefore they resist the influx of Han Chinese. Tibetans demand extensive autonomy within China. Because of these contradictory strivings, there have been violent ethnic conflicts in Tibet and in the territories of Turkmen (see Keesing's 2003, p. 45189; 2007, p. 47758; 2008, pp. 48461, 48519, 48692, 48733; 2009, pp. 49311, 49407, 49464; 2011, p. 50562; *The Economist,* July 12th 2008, pp.61-63; September 6th 2008, p. 60; MAR-2012). It should be noted that violent ethnic conflicts are limited to a small minority of China's population. Therefore the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is not higher than 2 for China, although the extent of ethnic violence in those minority regions would presuppose the level 3. The intense struggle for the control of territories between ethnic minorities and Han Chinese seems to explain the higher than expected level of ethnic violence in China.

Croatia. In the contemporary Croatia the population is ethnically divided into the Croat majority (90%) and the Serb (4%), Bosniak, Hungarian, Slovene, and Roma minorities. The level of ethnic violence was high during the civil war between the Croat majority and the Serb minority in 1991-95. The number of Serbs declined drastically as a consequence of ethnic cleansing. The remaining Serb minority and other ethnic minority groups have their own interest organizations and political parties (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 307-309). There is no information on any serious ethnic violence from the period 2003-2011 (see Keesing's 2003-2011; MAR-2012), but the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 2 because of the continual ethnic tension between the Croat majority and especially the Serb minority.

Egypt. Muslim Arabs constitute approximately 90 per cent of the population and Coptic Christians 9 per cent. The ethnic tension between these two groups has persisted over several centuries. The Muslim Arabs have traditionally discriminated and repressed Copts since 641 A.D. when Arabs conquered Egypt (cf. Ibrahim, 1996; MAR-2012). In the period 2003-2011, Muslim militants occasionally attacked churches and properties of the Copts as well as foreign tourists. Several people were killed in these clashes (see *History of the Copts,* 2008; Keesing's 2004, p. 46290; 2005, p. 46602; 2006, p. 47234; 2008, 48807; 2009, p. 49175; 2010, p. 49657; 2011, pp. 50256, 50367, 50485, 50735). Because of violent attacks against the Copt minority, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 2 rather than 1.

France. French and other Europeans constitute a large majority (91%) of the population, but the number of non-European immigrants is growing and it may be higher than 9 per cent. As in several other European countries, there have been violent ethnic clashes between the indigenous national groups and non-European immigrants, especially with Muslims. Besides, there have been serious clashes with a separatist movement in Corsica (see Keesing's 2003, pp. 45201, 45307, 45366, 45419, 45611, 45667; 2004, pp. 45813, 45856, 45965, 46020, 46073,

46131, 46273; 2005, pp. 46840, 46893, 46943; 2006, pp. 47111, 47280, 47424, 47538; 2007, p. 48267; 2008, pp. 48434, 48484, 48652, 48707; 2009, pp. 49004, 49165, 49218, 49335; 2010, pp. 49854, 49958, 50092; 2011, p. 50661; MAR-2012). France's higher than expected scale of ethnic conflicts (2) reflects the intensified racial conflict between indigenous French people and non-European immigrants. This conflict will most probably continue.

Guinea's population is tribally heterogeneous without any clearly dominant group. Peuhl (Fulani, 40%), Malinke (30%), and Susu (20%) are the largest tribal groups. Political parties have been linked to regional ethnic communities, and politics has been violent since the 1990s, although it is not clear to what extent political violence connected with military coups and elections has been ethnic by nature. However, competing military groups have been ethnically based (cf. MAR-2012). In the 2010 presidential election, the two contenders were supported by different ethnic groups: Alpha Condé, the candidate of the Rally of the Guinean People, was supported principally by the Malinke ethnic community, and Diallo, the candidate of the Union of Democratic Forces in Guinea, was supported mainly by the Peuhl (Fulani) ethnic community. Probably some hundreds of people were killed in political violence in the period 2003-2011 (see WDM-11; Keesing's 2008, p. 48339; 2009, p. 49562; 2010, pp. 49664, 50121). Because of the bloody ethnic violence connected with elections, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 3 rather than 2.

Hungary. The population is ethnically divided into the Hungarian majority (92%) and Roma/Gypsies and other ethnic minorities. According to some estimates, the number of Roma is 5-10 per cent of the population. Roma have numerous interest organizations (see Banks et al., 2007, p. 524), but, according to WDM-2011, Roma communities continue to face various forms of discrimination in education, employment, housing, and healthcare (cf. MAR-2012). The law on the rights of national and ethnic minorities established in 1993 and amended in 2005

provides wide cultural autonomy for recognized minorities to handle their cultural and educational affairs. There is little information about serious ethnic violence in Hungary (see WDM-2011; Keesing's 2009, p.49372), but "increasing violence against Roma led to four deaths in 2009, and rising insecurity forced Romany men to patrol their own neighborhoods" (FH-2010, p. 290). Because of the serious discrimination of the Roma minority, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 2

Israel's population is divided by nationality, language, and religion into two main groups: Jews (76%) and Arabs (cf. Held, 1994, p. 253). Israel's Arab minority is not fully equal with the Jewish majority, but they have reconciled to their subjugated position. Israel is the State of the Jewish people. Sammy Smooha uses the concept of ethnic democracy to describe the nature of Israel's political system. In such a state, "the dominance of a certain ethnic group is institutionalized along with democratic procedures" (Smooha, 1990, p. 410; cf. Peled, 1992). The ethnic peace between Israel's Jewish majority and the Arab minority is based on the hegemony of Jews, but ethnic violence between Jews and Palestinians has continued in the territories occupied by Israel. Palestinians and Israel struggle for the control of the same territory. It has been a long and cruel war. In the period 2003-2011, suicide bombings and other Palestinian attacks killed or wounded hundreds of Israelis, and Israel retaliated by attacking Palestinian targets in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (see Keesing's 2003, pp. 45378, 45573, 45621; 2004, pp. 45825, 45926, 46029; 2005, pp. 46493, 46653, 46716, 46797, 46852, 46908; 2006, pp. 47126, 47288, 47392, 47436, 47609, 47662; 2007, pp. 47720, 47778; 2008, pp. 48493, 48663, 48711; 2009, p. 49010; 2010, p. 49865, 2011, p. 50622; MAR-2012). The war between Israel and the Palestinians is due to their inability to agree on the partition of the territory of the former Palestine when the State of Israel emerged in 1948. When Israel was established, most of the Arab Palestinians living in the territory were forced to flee to

neighboring countries. They have resisted Israel since 1948. The war between Israel and the Palestinians indicates that it is extremely difficult to solve an ethnic conflict when competition concerns the same territory. The estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is 4 for Israel.

Libya. There are no reliable statistical data on Libya's ethnic groups, but Arabic-speakers of mixed Arab-Berber ancestry constitute a large majority (90%) of the population. The Berber minority comprises from 4 to 10 per cent of the population, and there is also a small Tuareg minority in the south. Berbers and Tuaregs have been discriminated (see WDM-2011). Colonel Gaddafi's autocratic regime maintained ethnic peace, but a violent rebellion against his regime broke out in February 2011 and ultimately led to his killing in October 2011. Thousands of people were killed in this principally political civil war, although it may have had some tribal connections, too (see *The Economist,* February 26th 2011, pp. 23-25; Keesing's 2011, pp. 50309, 50365, 50426, 50485, 50539, 50734). However, because the civil war was principally a political one, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is not higher than 2, but it is slightly higher than expected on the basis of the regression equation.

Mauritania is a racially divided country like Chad and Sudan. Ethnic differences between Arab-related Moors and black Africans are racial by nature. Statistical data on the number of Moors and blacks vary greatly. In this analysis, blacks and black Moors are combined into the largest ethnic group (70%). Black Africans are divided into many tribal groups. Black Moors are former slaves of the dominant White Moors (30%), who have traditionally discriminated and suppressed black Moors and black Africans. The descendants of black slaves (black Moors) have adopted Arab culture and language. The south of the country is inhabited by black African tribes. The party system reflects ethnic cleavages (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 793-796; MAR-2012). Democratic institutions are weak. Ethnic conflict between the dominant White Moors and subjugated blacks continues. Rekiya Omaar and Janet Fleishman (1991) reported

on killings, rapes, confiscations of livestock and possessions, arrests and detentions. Garbo Diallo (1991) claims that black people who were suspected of opposing the forced Arabization were either murdered or illegally detained, while more than 200,000 were deported out of the country to refugee camps in Senegal and Mali. However, there is no information on serious ethnic violence from the period 2003-2011. The first refugees were allowed to return from Senegal in 2008 (see WDM-2011; Keesing's 2008, p. 48339; 2010, p. 50017; 2011, p. 50694). Racial tension between the White Moors and black Africans continues. Therefore the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is 3, which is slightly higher than expected on the bases of the regression equation.

Nepal. The population is ethnically divided by language, caste, religion, and partly also by race into many sections. Malik et al. (2009, p. 378) note that Nepal's "population is divided into two predominant racial groups, Caucasoid and Mongoloid." It is not self-evident how to classify Nepal's population into the most significant ethnic groups for the purposes of this study. I selected to measure ethnic heterogeneity by linguistic divisions as in the case of India. The Nepali-speakers (53%) constitute approximately half of the population. There are racial differences between Caucasoid Indo-Nepalese groups and Mongoloid Tibeto-Nepalese groups, but racial and other ethnic boundaries are to some extent blurred as a consequence of interbreeding. "Upper castes" hill Hindus (Bahun, Chhetri, Thakuri and Sanyasi) comprise 31 per cent of the population (Malik et al., 2009, p. 379). Until recent times, ethnic peace in Nepal was based on the hegemonic position of the Hindu upper castes, but the Maoist insurgency, which began in 1996, changed the situation. The insurgency had a partly ethnic basis. It was a rebellion of traditionally subjugated ethnic groups and lower castes against the dominance of the Hindu upper castes (see *The Economist,* December 1, 2001, p. 55; February 23, 2002, pp. 63-64; April 16, 2005, pp. 19-21; Douglas, 2005). The supporters of the

insurgency included linguistic groups, especially speakers of Tibeto-Burman dialects, as well as lower-caste citizens and "ethnic minority groups with little attachment to the form of Hinduism practiced by the political elite" (Ganguly and Shoup, 2005). After the defeat of King Gyanendra in 2006, the level of ethnic violence decreased drastically, although interest conflicts between various ethnic groups did not disappear (cf. Lawoti, 2008). The competing groups started to seek a democratic compromise (see Keesing's 2003, pp. 45194, 45472, 45552, 45602, 45647; 2004, pp. 45846, 45905, 46003, 46058, 46156, 46311; 2005, pp. 46415, 46568, 46778; 2006, p. 47148; 2007, pp. 47690, 47808, 48249, 48040, 48080; 2008, pp. 48353, 48410, 48467; 2009, pp. 48986, 49037, 49090, 49205; 2011, p. 50705). The scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 4 in the period 2003-2011. The Maoist insurgency explains the rise of ethnic violence temporarily.

Romania. The Romanian majority comprises 90 per cent of the population, the Hungarian minority in Transylvania 7 per cent, and the Roma (Gypsy) minority at least 2-3 per cent, probably considerably more. The Roma people, who live dispersed around the country, have traditionally been discriminated and oppressed. Hungarians do not occupy a compact territory, but they constitute a majority of the population in some of their core areas in Transylvania. They have their own interest organizations and political parties. The conflict between Romanians and Hungarians has a long history because some time earlier Transylvania belonged to Hungary. The Szekler autonomy movement, which represents a part of the Hungarian population, demands a semi-autonomous state of Szeklerland, which has intensified tension between ethnic Hungarians and Romanian nationalists (see MAR-2012). The lack of serious ethnic violence in the period 2003-2011 (Keesing's 2003-2011) can be partly traced to the existence of democratic institutions, which allow Hungarians and other ethnic minorities to participate in politics through their own organizations (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 1011-1016). However,

the Roma people remain in their subjugated and discriminated position. The estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is 2 for Romania.

Saudi Arabia. The population is ethnically divided into the Arab majority (90%) and migrant workers mainly from Africa and Asia (cf. Held, 1994, p. 292). The migrant workers are non-nationals, and their position is so weak that they have not been able to cause any troubles for the autocratic Saudi regime. The religious cleavage between the Sunni majority and the Shia minority (15%) is deep. The Shias suffer from social and institutionalized discrimination, and there have been many episodes of Shia-Sunni clashes in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province (see MAR-2012). Besides, Islamic militants have occasionally attacked Westerners and Christian "infidels" (see WDM-2011; Keesing's2003, p. 45572; 2004, pp. 45981, 46035, 46092, 46141; 2008, p. 48666; 2011, p. 50372). Because of the institutionalized subjugation of non-Arab migrant workers and the discrimination of the Shia Muslims, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 2. The strong autocratic regime has been able to restrict ethnic conflicts.

Senegal. All tribal groups are minorities, but Wolofs comprise 43 per cent of the population. The territory of Gambia separates the Diola region geographically from the other parts of Senegal, which has generated separatist strivings in their region of Casamance. The Wolof and Serer groups have traditionally had a dominant role in politics. Numerous parties are not clearly linked to particular ethnic groups, except the movement of Democratic Forces in Casamance (see Banks et al., 2007, p. 1070). It advocates the secession of the Casamance region of southern Senegal. The conflict escalated into a civil war in the 1990s. Peace agreements have been made between the government and rebels, but they have not ended the separatist rebellion. Low-scale violence continued in Casamance in the period 2003-2011 because the government was unable and unwilling to meet the rebels' minimum demands of widespread

autonomy (see MAR-2012; Keesing's 2004, pp. 46192,46354; 2006, pp. 47133, 47189, 47242; 2010, p. 49716). Because of the continual fighting in Casamance, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 3, although ethnic tension remained low in other parts of Senegal.

Syria. Arabs constitute a large majority (90%) of Syria's population. The rest are Kurds, Armenians and other small groups (cf. Held, 1994, p. 204). Ethnic relations have remained relatively peaceful, although there have been clashes between the government forces and the regionally concentrated Kurdish minority. Kurds are discriminated by the government (see Keesing's, 2004, pp. 45927, 46093; 2005, p. 47010; 2006, p. 47124; FH-2010, pp. 641-642; MAR-2012). Because of the repression of the Kurdish people, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is 2 for Syria. The autocratic regime was able to control ethnic relations. The Syrian uprising and civil war since March 2011 seems to be an internal armed conflict principally between political groups, not between ethnic groups

Togo's population is tribally heterogeneous as in other sub-Saharan African countries. In addition to Ewé (43%), who are predominant in the south, there are several other tribal groups, including Kabre in the north. In Togo, major political conflicts have taken place along ethnic lines, especially between the Ewé and the northern Kabre groups. President Eyadéma, who originally usurped power by a military coup in 1967, resorted to the support of his northern Kabre tribe and of some allied southern tribal groups excluding Ewé. When Eyadéma died in February 2005, his son Faure Gnassingbé took power with the support of the army. The southern opposition groups did not accept his takeover and demanded elections. Violent riots took place, and hundreds of people were killed. Ultimately Gnassingbé legalized his power through a presidential election in April 2005. Violent riots continued after the election, and it is estimated that more than 500 people were killed in violent clashes (see WDM-11; MAR-2012; Keesing's 2005. pp. 46448, 46556, 46613; 2008, p. 48508). Political parties are organized

along ethnic lines, but otherwise political institutions are not adapted to take into account the interests of regional tribal groups. The major ethnic groups have not yet learned to share power through democratic elections. The scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 3. The slightly higher than expected level of EEC is due to the exceptionally violent riots in 2005.

Zimbabwe. The Shona in the north (82%) and Ndebele in the southern area of Matabeleland are the two major tribal groups in Zimbabwe. Shona-Ndebele rivalry has continued since the 18th century (see Sithole, 1995; Alexander, 2006), but it did not caused any serious violent clashes in the period 2003-2011. The most serious ethnic cleavage is between the black majority and the remaining small white minority (less than 1%). Because of land issues, tensions between whites and blacks and between whites and the government are high in Zimbabwe (see MAR-2012). White farmers have been attacked and persecuted. Most of them had to leave the country, and some of them were killed (see Keesing's 2003, p. 45632; 2005, p. 46769; 2010, p. 49880; 2011, p. 50275). The slightly higher than expected scale of ethnic conflicts (2) is due to the racial conflict between the black majority and the white minority.

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The above review of moderately positive outliers indicates that there is not any common factor which could explain their higher than expected level of ethnic conflicts. In each case, particular local factors explain why EEC is slightly higher than expected. In the cases of France, Mauritania and Zimbabwe, significant racial cleavages seem to have raised the level of EEC; in the cases of Bangladesh, Chile, China and Israel, the local factors are connected with the struggle for the control of territories; and in the case of Senegal, separatism in Casamance

has been the crucial local factor.

2. Moderate Negative Outliers (Residuals -0.5 or -0.6)

The group of moderate negative outliers (residuals -0.5 or -0.6) includes the following 16 countries: Azerbaijan, Benin, Cambodia, Cuba, Estonia, Gambia, Germany, Guyana, Iran, Jamaica, Laos, Malaysia, Mauritius, Panama, Sweden and Zambia. It is common for these countries that the level of ethnic conflicts seems to be slightly lower than expected on the basis of the regression equation. An interesting question is whether there are some particular local factors which could explain their lower than expected level of ethnic conflicts. In the following, each country will be discussed separately.

Azerbaijan's contemporary population is ethnically more homogeneous than previously. The Azeri majority comprises 91 per cent of the population. Nearly all Armenians were expelled from Azerbaijan as a consequence of the violent conflict with Armenia in 1988-94. Many Russians have also emigrated from the country. Ethnic minority groups include Dagestani (2%), Russians (2%), Armenians (1%), and Lezgins (a Caucasian mountain people). There has been tension between the Azeri government and Lezgins over issues of land, language, and the absence of autonomy (see WDM-1997; WDM-2011). Some members of ethnic minority groups have complained of discrimination (FH-2010, p. 53). There were clashes between Azerbaijani and Armenian troops in Nagorno-Karabakh (see Keesing's 2005, p. 46531; 2008, p. 48475). The dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan about the control of Nagorno-Karabakh is still unresolved. It is a separate region run by ethnic Armenians (MAR-2012).

Benin. Ethnic divisions in Benin are tribal by nature. Fon and related tribal groups comprise 39 per cent of the population and dominate in the south, but there are several other significant tribal groups with their own languages. Muslim tribes in the

north (Bariba and Fulani) differ most significantly from mainly animist and Christian tribes in the south. Tribal divisions have not yet caused serious ethnic violence. Relations between Benin's ethnic groups have generally been peaceful, but regional divisions, particularly between north and south, have occasionally caused conflicts (see FH-2010, p. 81; WDM-2011). The fact that democratic institutions have functioned successfully in Benin since the 1990s has probably contributed to ethnic peace in Benin. However, because some political parties are ethnically based (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 122-123), the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 2.

Cambodia is ethnically highly homogeneous country. Khmers comprise 90% of the population, Vietnamese 5%, Chinese 1%, and indigenous peoples 4%. During the Khmer Rouge regime in 1975-1979, probably more than one million people died from disease, starvation, and executions, but it was political, not ethnic, violence. There is ethnic tension between the Khmer majority and the Vietnamese minority facing petty harassment from officials, but there was not any serious ethnic violence in the period 2003-2011 (see WDM-11; Keesing's 2003-2011). However, the Vietnamese in Cambodia are subject to numerous restrictions, relations between the government and the Vietnamese remain tense and some parties have demanded the expulsion of the Vietnamese (MAR-2012). Because of the serious ethnic tension between the Khmer majority and the Vietnamese minority, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 2.

Cuba. The population of Cuba is racially divided into the white/mulatto majority (88%) and the minority of blacks. For the purposes of this study, whites and mulattos are combined into the same group. Whites have traditionally dominated in politics and the economy and blacks have been discriminated (cf. "Afro Cubans: Race & Identity in Cuba," 2008). The interbreeding of whites and blacks during the past centuries created a large mulatto population, which has certainly dampened racial conflict. In this respect the situation is the same as in many other Latin American

countries in which large mestizo populations are between the white minorities and the remaining indigenous peoples and blacks. Castro's autocratic socialist regime outlawed all forms of formal discrimination and institutional racism. The majority of Afro-Cubans benefited from social and educational reforms. However, Afro-Cubans are still marginalized. They are not widely represented in the higher levels of the ruling Communist Party nor in the upper levels of the civil service and state industries. Ethnic peace in Cuba can be traced to the strong autocratic governmental system and also to the extensive racial mixing of the population (cf. D'Agostino, 2003, p. 101). The scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 1.

Estonia. The Estonians comprise the majority (68%) of the population. The absence of ethnic violence in Estonia is principally due to the strong legal order, which guarantees equal civil rights to the country's sizeable Russian minority (26%), although many of the Russians are still without citizenship and full political rights. Estonia's citizenship law provides an opportunity for ethnic Russians to get citizenship, although it is not easy for many of them because they must acquire a sufficient knowledge of the Estonian language. Nearly half of the Russians have already acquired citizenship. Estonia's large Russian minority emerged during the Soviet period when the borders of Estonia were opened to Russian and other immigrants from the Soviet Union, and when it was not necessary for immigrants to learn the Estonian language (see MAR- 2012). Democratic political institutions and equal legal rights have helped to resolve ethnic interest conflicts by peaceful means. Ethnic minorities can freely establish their own organizations and political parties (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 388-391). However, ethnic tension between Estonians and Russians continues. It led to violent riots in April 2007 when Russians rioted against the removal of a monument to Soviet soldiers killed in World War II from a square in central Tallinn. One man was stabbed to death and over 150 people were injured (see Keesing's 2007, p. 47891). Because of the ethnic tension between Estonians and Russians and of the

existence of ethnic interest organizations, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 2.

Gambia. Mandinkas (42%) constitute the largest tribal group in Gambia, but there are several other important tribal groups, including Fula, Wolof, Jola, and Serahuli. Politics has been ethnically based, and there is tension between tribal groups, but ethnic relations seem to have remained peaceful, although according to dKosopedia (2007), there has been sporadic violence along political lines (Keesing's 2003-2011; FH-2010, p. 247). Those in power have usually favored their own tribal group and discriminated some other tribes (cf. Samsudeen Sarr, 2008). Because politics has been ethnically based, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is 2 for Gambia.

Germany. During the Nazi period 1933-1945, the level of ethnic violence was extremely high in Germany when the Nazi regime massacred and exiled Jews and other ethnic minorities (see Kiernan, 2007, pp. 416-454). In the contemporary Germany, the German majority (91%) is large, but sizeable Turkish and non-European ethnic minorities remain ethnically separated from Germans. The increasing number of non-EU immigrants, especially Muslims, has caused ethnic tension and racist violence. Turks continue to be target of xenophobic attacks by skinheads and right-wing extremists (see MAR-2012). The government has attempted to restrict immigration. Many Germans tend to see immigration as a threat to ethnic and religious homogeneity (see Sarrazin, 2010). All ethnic minority groups seem to be well organized and able to defend their interests. The far-right National Democratic Party resists immigration. According to FH-2010 (pp. 255-256), "The number of racially motivated crimes reached record heights in 2008 and 2009, confirming an environment of increasing hostility toward immigrants in general and Muslims in particular." In the period 2003-2011, there was some ethnic violence at local levels (see Keesing's 2003, pp. 45306, 45421, 45668, 45752; 2004, pp. 45965, 46329; 2007, p. 48095; 2008, p. 48800; 2010, p. 49910; 2011, p. 50251). Because there have

been only minor ethnic clashes at individual and local levels, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is not higher than 1 for Germany.

Guyana is one of the ethnically most heterogeneous countries in the world. Its population is divided by race, language, and religion into two major and some smaller groups. The two major groups are the East Indians (50%) and blacks (36%). The rest of the population are mixed, indigenous, European, and other Asian people. The Afro-Guyanese are descendants of African slaves, who were brought to Guyana by the Dutch in the 1600s. The East Indians are descendants of indentured workers that the British imported from India in the latter half of the 1800s. The two major groups have remained highly separated from each other and they have struggled for power since the pre-independence period. The two major parties are racially based. The People's Progressive Party (PPP) represents the interests of East Indians and the People's National Congress (PNC) the interests of Afro-Guyanese (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 504-505). From independence in 1966 to 1992, Guyana was ruled by the PNC. The tension between Afro-Guyanese and discriminated East Indians escalated several times into violence. In the 1992 elections, the PPP gained power and has remained in power since then. Racial tension, including violent demonstrations and outbreaks of street violence, has continued (see MAR-2012). The PNC accuses the government of the discrimination of Afro-Guyanese. Some people were killed and properties destroyed in ethnic violence, but large-scale ethnic violence has been avoided (see D'Agostino, 2003, p. 112; Dev, 2004; Schmale, 2004, Seenarine, 2005; Council of Hemispheric Affairs, "Guyana," 2009; Keesing's 2008, p. 48404). FH-2010 (p. 279) notes: "While racial clashes have diminished in the last decade, long-standing animosity between Afro- and Indo-Guyanese remains a serious concern." The struggle for power through elections has become institutionalized, which certainly diminishes the danger of ethnic violence, but a power-sharing system of government is still lacking. Ravi Dev

(2004) argues that the Westminster majoritarian form of democracy is not suitable for Guyana. He says that "in severely divided plural societies such as Guyana, voting is not done on the basis of issues, but almost invariably on the basis of ethnicity, personified by the identity of the leadership of the particular party." Because the racial tension between East Indians and Afro-Guyanese continues and the most important parties are ethnic-based, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 3.

Iran. Persians (51%) make up about one-half of the population in Iran, but Azeris (24%), Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and tribal groups in Baluchistan constitute significant ethnic minority groups with their own territories within the country. More than 90 per cent of the people belong to the Shiite sect of Islam, which to some extent dampens linguistic and national differences. Because the contemporary ethnic groups have persisted for several centuries and resisted their assimilation into the dominant Persian group, it is reasonable to assume that ethnic divisions will continue in Iran (cf. MAR-2012). The present political system does not allow the function of political parties, but ethnic minorities have other types of interest organizations and strive for autonomy. The Kurds have occasionally rebelled against the government, there have been violent conflicts with the Arab minority and the tribal groups in Baluchistan demand autonomy for Baluchistan. John R. Bradley (2007) refers to ethnic tensions between the government and Kurdish, Baluchi, Arab, Turkmen, and Azeri minorities. There have been serious ethnic clashes with Arabs in Khuzestan and even more extensive violence in Baluchistan where several Sunni Baluchi rebel groups resist the Iranian government. Kurds and Azeris have rioted and demanded greater cultural and linguistic rights (see also Keesing's 2005, pp. 46601, 46711, 46800; 2006, pp. 47070, 47179; 2007, p. 47781; 2009, pp. 49231, 49492; 2011, p. 50259). Because of violent ethnic conflicts in some parts of the country, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 3.

Jamaica is dominated by the black majority (91%), and the

country is without any significant ethnic minority groups. The rest of the population (9%) belongs to various ethnically mixed groups. There is no information on any serious ethnic conflicts (see Keesing's 2003-2011).

Laos. Lao Loum peoples constitute a large majority (68%) of the population, but there are no reliable data on ethnic groups in Laos. According to some estimates, there are more than 200 ethnic groups (WDM-2011). The settlement pattern of most minority groups is dispersed, but hill tribes constitute concentrated majorities or minorities in their regions. The most significant ethnic violence has taken place between the government forces and hill tribes, especially with Hmongs (see WDM-2011; *The Economist,* July 17th 2010, p. 51; Keesing's 2004, p. 45909; 2006, p. 47636; 2008, p. 48647). FH-2010 (p. 370) notes that "Discrimination against ethnic minority tribes is common." The Hmong are particularly distrusted by the government and face harsh treatment (MAR-2012). The scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 2 for Laos. The authoritarian regime has been able to keep the level of EEC slightly lower than expected on the basis of the regression equation, but "so long as the government continues to use an indiscriminate repression and forced relocations, violence is likely to continue, at least at low levels" (MAR-2012).

Malaysia is an ethnically deeply divided society, in which ethnicity dominates politics. The major ethnic groups include Malay (50%), Chinese (24%), indigenous (11%), and Indian (7%). National, linguistic, and religious cleavages coincide in many points. The Chinese and Indians are widely dispersed in Malaysia, whereas non-Malay indigenous tribals constitute a significant part of the populations of Sarawak and Sabah. The greatest ethnic tension is between Malays and Chinese (cf. Gatsiounis, 2006). After the World War II, there was a long civil war between the Chinese communist rebels and the British and Malay government forces. The latest violent riots between the two communities erupted in 1969 (see Shoup, 2011, p. 792). Since then the Chinese have been engaged in non-violent protest

activities. The relations between the Malay majority and the Indian minority have in general remained peaceful, although there have been sporadic violent clashes (cf. "Special Report: Ethnic Violence in Malaysia", 2001; "Malaysia: Indian Mutiny," *The Economist,* January 26th 2008, pp. 52-53). The Indian minority is resigned to its subjugated position (see also Keesings 2003, p. 45595; 2006, p. 47310; 2007, pp. 48143, 48256; 2010, p. 49637). There are democratic institutional factors that help to explain the low level of ethnic violence in Malaysia. The indigenous tribals of Sarawak and Sabah have benefited from Malaysia's federal system. Federalism does not help the Chinese and Indian minorities to further their ethnic interests because they are dispersed across the country and do not form a majority in any state. However, the party system has become adapted to the requirements of ethnicity in such a way that the ruling National Front coalition includes also the parties of the Chinese and Indian minorities (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 768-772; MAR-2012; Chin and Chin Huat, 2009). The National Front is dominated by a Malay party, but because of the permanent coalition, ethnic minority parties are always represented in the governmental institutions. The first-past-the-post electoral system compels the minorities to cooperate with the dominating Malay party within the National Front coalition. The party system is almost completely ethnicized (cf. *The Economist,* August 27, 2005, pp. 43-44; Shoup, 2011). Because important parties are ethnically based, and ethnic conflicts have become institutionalized, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 3, although there was not any serious ethnic violence in the period 2003-2011.

Mauritius is an ethnically highly heterogeneous country. The population is from Africa, Asia, and Europe. The major racial groups include Indo-Mauritians (68%), those of mixed Afro-European origin (Creoles 27%), Sino-Mauritians (3%), and Franco-Mauritians (2%). Indo-Mauritians are Hindus or Muslims, and Creoles and Franco-Maurtians are Christians. There is information on some earlier ethnic violence. According

to *Mauritius: 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (2000), "Tension among Hindu, Creole, Muslim, European, and Chinese communities persist and resulted in at least two violent confrontations during the year." People were killed and properties damaged in these interethnic confrontations. There is no information on serious ethnic violence from the period 2003-2011 (Keesing's 2003-2011). The lack of ethnic violence in Mauritius can be traced to democratic political institutions that have become adapted to the requirements of ethnicity. All ethnic groups enjoy equal political and civil rights. The government does not discriminate any ethnic group. Political parties are partly ethnically based. The first parties were the Labour Party, representing the interests of Indo-Mauritians, and the Mauritian Social Democratic Party, supported by Creoles and Franco-Mauritians. Some multiethnic parties emerged in the 1970s. The electoral support of parties varies significantly from one election to the next one, which indicates that the party lines are flexible. Political competition has become institutionalized in Mauritius. All ethnic groups have good chances of getting representation in parliament, and governments are usually coalition governments in which all ethnic groups are represented. Because significant political parties and interest groups are organized along ethnic lines (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 799-802; Kasenally, 2011), the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is 3, although the country has avoided violent ethnic conflicts.

In Panama, mestizos, mulattos and whites constitute the dominant majority (69%) of the population. Amerindians (8%) and blacks (5%) are the most important minority groups. Afro-Panamanians are dispersed in the country without any special own region. There have not been ethnic clashes between them and the dominant white/mestizo community, whereas there have been serious conflicts between mestizos and Amerindian tribes on the control of territories. According to WDM-2011, indigenous people continue to face political and economical discrimination, but they have strong organizations to further their interests. "Protest continues to be a tactic used by various

indigenous organizations to voice their grievances" (MAR-2012). Racial and ethnic discrimination has not ended in Panama. However, because there is no information on ethnic violence from the period 2003-2011 (Keesing's 2003-2011), the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is not higher than 2. The extensive racial mixing of the population may be a factor which dampens ethnic interest conflicts.

Sweden. The indigenous Swedes constitute the large majority (88%) of the population. Ethnic minority groups include Finns, other Europeans and non-European immigrants especially from the Middle East and Africa. Immigrant groups have their own organizations. According to WDM-2011, people from the Middle East and Africa, as well as Roma, are subject to racism and discrimination. However, there is no information on any serious ethnic clashes (Keesing's 2003-2011). Therefore the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is not higher than 1.

Zambia's population is divided into numerous closely related Bantu-speaking tribal groups. The major tribal groups include the Bemba (36%) in the northeast and the Copperbelt, the Nyanja in the east and in Lusaka, the Tonga in the south, and the Lozi in the west (see Morrison et al., 1989). Although there is tension between various tribes, Zambia has enjoyed ethnic peace since independence. Tribal interest conflicts have become institutionalized through political parties. President Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP), established in 1958, was regarded as a Bemba party, but Kaunda tried to hold the country together by de-emphasizing ethnic ties. In the multiparty era since the 1990s, the ethnic ties of political parties have become more significant. According to WDM-2011, "political allegiances have come to be closely associated with particular tribal identities." In the 2006 elections, many Bembas supported the opposition Patriotic Front. UNIP has its traditional stronghold in the east, close to the border with Malawi, and the United Party for National Development (UPND) finds support among Tonga and Lozi voters (see WDM-2011). There is no

information on serious ethnic violence from the period 2003-2011 (see Keesing's 2003-2011; MAR-2012), but because political parties are partly ethnically based, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts for Zambia is 2.

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It is not easy to find any systematic local factors which could separate moderate positive outliers from moderate negative ones. Some countries with moderate positive residuals are characterized by significant racial cleavages (at least France, Mauritania and Zimbabwe), but racial cleavages are important also in some countries with moderate negative residuals (especially Cuba, Germany, Guyana, Malaysia, Mauritius and Sweden). Intensive struggle for the control of the same territory characterizes some countries with moderate positive residuals (Bangladesh, Chile, China and Israel), but the same is true at least for Azerbaijan in the group of moderate negative residuals.

The democratic peace theory suggests that democracies should be more frequent in the group of moderate negative outliers than in the group of moderate positive outliers. Is it true? According to Vanhanen's Index of Democratization (see *FSD1289 Measures of Democracy 1810-2010),* eight of the 16 countries (50%) with moderate negative residuals were above the minimum threshold of democracy throughout the period 2003-2010 (Estonia, Germany, Guyana, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mauritius, Panama and Sweden). Six of the 18 countries (33%) with moderate positive residuals were democracies throughout the period 2003-2010 (Chile, Croatia, France, Hungary, Israel and Romania). Thus the difference in the number of democracies supports the democratic peace theory, although not strongly. The existence of democratic institutions seems to have reduced ethnic violence.

On the other hand, various kinds of autocratic regimes are

more frequent in the group of moderate positive residuals (China, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Zimbabwe) than in the group of moderate negative residuals (Cuba, Iran, and Laos). Autocratic regimes have often been able to prevent the eruption of violent ethnic conflicts, but they have usually discriminated and repressed some ethnic groups more than democratic regimes.

Finally, it is reasonable to assume that the large number of racially mixed people has dampened ethnic conflicts and violence at least in countries like Cuba and Panama. It may be difficult for racially mixed people to know which ethnic group they should support in conflict situations.

Chapter 7

Countries with Large Residuals

1. Large Positive Outliers (Residuals +0.7 or Higher)

2. Large Negative Outliers (Residuals -0.7 or Higher)

On the basis of the regression of EEC on EH, the countries with residuals ±0.7 or higher were classified as large outliers. The subcategory of countries with large positive residuals comprises 21 countries and the subcategory of countries with large negative residuals 16 countries. In this chapter, each of these countries will be analyzed separately in order to see what kinds of local factors and circumstances characterize large positive and negative outliers and in what respects large positive and negative outliers differ from each other. Let us start from the subcategory of 21 large positive outliers.

1. Large Positive Outliers (Residuals +0.7 or Higher)

This category includes the following 21 countries: Afghanistan, Burma (Myanmar), Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, East Timor, Georgia, Iraq, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Russia, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand and Turkey.

It is common for these countries that the estimated level of ethnic conflicts (EEC) is clearly higher than expected on the basis of the regression equation.

Afghanistan's population is ethnically quite heterogeneous. Ethnic origin, language and religion (Sunnis and Shias) divide the population into several territorially separate groups. Pashtuns (in the east and south) constitute the largest ethnic group (42%). Tajiks (27%) in the northeast and in the west, Hazaras in the central region, and Uzbeks in the north are other major ethnic groups. Most are Sunni Muslims (80%), but Hazaras and some Tajiks are Shia Muslims (see also *Afghanistan: A Nation of Minorities,* 1992). The outbreak of ethnic violence in Afghanistan can be historically traced to the Communist coup in 1978 and the Soviet invasion in 1979. Before that the relations between ethnic groups had been relatively peaceful. The withdrawal of the Soviet troops in 1989 intensified ethnic violence. Ethnic-based military forces struggled for control of the country, but no group was strong enough to establish its hegemony over the whole country. It is estimated that more than one million people were killed in the war. The US military intervention and occupation since October 2001 opened a possibility to establish new rules of power-sharing. In December 2001, provincial leaders accepted the establishment of an interim administration headed a Pashtun tribal leader Hamid Karzai. After that the process of democratization continued and the level of ethnic violence decreased significantly (*The Economist,* January 10, 2004. p. 43; October 9, 2004, pp. 23-25; Somit and Peterson, 2005). All ethnic groups have their own political parties (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 7-11). In the period 2003-2011, ethnic violence continued in Afghanistan. Rival tribes and local commanders struggled for power and for control of important resources. Most parts of the country remained under the control of tribal militias and local warlords. Taliban forces, supported mainly by Pashtuns, continued their war against the central government and foreign military forces. Thousands of people were killed every year (Keesing's 2003, pp. 45241,

45289, 45345, 45469, 45600; 2004, pp. 45789, 46004, 46061, 36158, 462005; 2005, p. 46781; 2006, pp. 47150, 47264, 47316, 47366, 47413, 47464; 2007, pp. 47695, 47756, 47809, 47989, 48138; 2008, pp. 48304, 48532, 48643, 48687; 2009, pp. 48988, 49323; 2010, pp. 49842, 50028, 50079; 2011, pp. 50290, 50649). Because of an exceptionally high level of ethnic violence, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (5) is clearly higher than expected on the basis of the regression equation. I want to emphasize that the high level of ethnic violence in Afghanistan is due to exceptional temporary factors and that it would be possible to decrease violence by institutionalizing ethnic conflicts through democratic institutions. This is already taking place in Afghanistan.

Burma (Myanmar) is an ethnically seriously divided society, although Burmese constitute a large majority of the population (68%). Language, nationality, and in some cases also religion separate territorial minority groups from the Burmese majority. When Burma achieved independence in 1948, many ethnic minority groups started to demand greater autonomy if not independence, and when the government rejected such demands, separatist insurgencies broke out in the border regions of Burma. Civil wars with separatist ethnic rebel groups have continued since then (see MAR-2012; Banks et al., 2007, pp. 856-857). The geographical conditions of the country support the separatist strivings of several ethnic minority groups. The government needed a strong army to suppress rebellions. As Aung San Suu Kyi (1991, p. 56) notes, "the need to keep the rebels in check made the army strong." Eventually this led to a military coup in 1962 and to military rule, which continued throughout the period 2003-2011. The military government was able to suppress most rebellions, but a peace based on bayonets is fragile. Several cease-fire agreements were made between the government and ethnic rebel groups, but some insurgencies still continued (Keesing's 2003, pp. 45196, 45293, 45646; 2004, pp. 45794, 45851, 45958; 2005, pp. 46416, 46574, 46630, 46690, 46830; 2006, pp. 47047, 47096, 47155; 2007, pp. 47872, 47984; 2008, pp.

48352, 48639; 2009, pp. 48993, 49095, 49263, 49364; 2010, pp. 50141, 50188; 2011, pp. 50231, 50286, 50402, 50513). The higher than expected level of ethnic conflicts (4) can be traced to the government's refusal to grant sufficient autonomy to territorial ethnic minority groups. The question is of a failure of political leadership. A sufficient degree of federalism might satisfy the demands of territorial ethnic minority groups and end violent struggles. The new process of democratization taking place in Myanmar may lead to a significant decrease in ethnic violence.

Burundi. The Hutu majority constitutes 85 per cent of the population, the Tutsi minority 14 per cent and the Twa, or pygmies, 1 per cent. The problem is that the small Tutsi minority has traditionally dominated the country politically, socially and economically. Pierre K. van den Berghe emphasizes that when the tall Hamitic Tutsis conquered shorter Bantus, they invented their own brand of racism or "heightism" to buttress their domination of the Rwanda and Burundi kingdoms (van den Berghe, 1981, pp. 32, 72). Thomay (1993, p. 73) draws attention to these visual differences: "the Tutsis are amongst the tallest people in the world, with men averaging 7 feet, while the Hutus are much smaller stature." Nowadays the physical differences between the two ethnic groups have diminished as a consequence of considerable biological mixing (see also *Burundi; Breaking the Cycle of Violence,* 1995). The Hutu majority have rebelled repeatedly. Hundreds of thousands of people have been killed in ethnic violence since 1962 when Burundi achieved independence from Belgium's colonial rule. The fact that Burundi is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa has probably intensified the competition and struggle for scarce resources. Many attempts were made to solve the problem of ethnic violence by political means. Finally, a power-sharing agreement was accepted in July 2001 in Arusha. A broad cease-fire was reached in December 2002, but new fighting erupted in July 2003. A new peace agreement was made in November 2003, and representatives of rebel groups were taken into a new government of national unity. The transitional

National Assembly accepted in October 2004 a new constitution (see Peterson, 2006). Ethnic violence decreased but did not end. (see Keesing's 2003, pp. 45504, 45586, 45633, 45680; 2004, pp. 45885, 45990, 46146, 46189; 2005, pp. 46398, 46450; 2006, p. 47298; 2007, p. 48122; 2008, pp. 48511, 48565; 2010, p. 50017; 2011, pp. 50637, 50749). Both ethnic groups are well organized (for parties and rebel groups, see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 185-188). Because of the institutionalized ethnic conflicts and continuing ethnic violence, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 3. The new constitution is intended to institutionalize permanent power-sharing between the Tutsis and Hutus through a system of proportional representation. In the National Assembly, 60 per cent of the regular seats are reserved for Hutus and 40 per cent for Tutsis. If the president is a Hutu, then the first vice president must be a Tutsi, and vice versa. The constitution guarantees for the Tutsis a significant overrepresentation compared to their share of the population (see MAR-2012). This kind of democratic compromise seems to have decreased ethnic violence in Burundi.

Congo, Democratic Republic of, is ethnically divided into more than 200 tribal groups, although there are no reliable census data on ethnic groups. Nearly all belong to Bantu tribes. Luba (18%) may be the largest tribal group. Major tribes are territorially separated from each other. When Congo achieved independence in 1960, regional and ethnic parties were established in all parts of the country, and the southern province of Katanga attempted to secede from Congo. There have been continual ethnic civil wars and separatist strivings. Most conflicts have taken place along ethnic lines. Any truly national party has not emerged, and it has been difficult for the government to extend its rule effectively to all parts of the country. After the collapse of the Mobuto authoritarian regime in 1997, ethnic tension continued to simmer and civil wars escalated. It is estimated that 3-4 million people died in the 1998-2003 civil wars. The peace agreement made in 2003 ended most civil wars, but sporadic fighting continued in different parts of the country

(cf. *The Economist,* November 29th 2009, p. 50). The transitional government of Kabila established in 2003 organized parliamentary and presidential elections in 2006 under the protection of the UN peacekeeping mission (cf. Dizolele, 2010). Congo transited from civil wars to some kind of democratic system, but violent insurgencies continued in some parts of the country, especially in the east (see Keesing's 2003, pp. 45172, 45331, 45389, 45449, 45505, 45634, 45681; 2004, pp. 45833, 45884, 46045; 2005, p. 46810; 2006, p. 47400; 2007, pp. 47793, 48117, 48178, 48235, 48288; 2008, pp. 48340, 48449, 48762; 2009, pp. 49021, 49449, 49506, 49561; 2010, pp. 49721, 49775; 2011, p. 50748; Vlassenroot, 2006; WDM-2011; MAR-2012). Because violent ethnic conflicts decreased significantly after the 2003 peace agreement, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is not higher than 4, but it is clearly higher than expected on the basis of the regression equation. Congo's large geographical area may be an exceptional local factor which explains the difficulty to establish an effective governmental system and to agree on the sharing of power between numerous regional ethnic groups.

Congo, Republic of, is inhabited by numerous culturally different tribal groups without any clearly dominant tribe, although Bakongo in the south is the largest tribal group (48%). Ethnicity had become highly politicized already during the colonial period, and competition and conflicts between regional tribal groups continued in the independent Republic of Congo. After the introduction of multiparty elections in 1992, ethnically based armed militias struggled for power, and when a presidential election approached in 1997, competition escalated into a civil war in which thousands of people were killed. Ultimately one of the three presidential candidates, Gen. Sassou-Nguessa, who was supported by the north, took power by conquering the capital (see Bazenguissa-Ganga, 2003). He legalized his power through a presidential election in 2002. The political parties are offshoots of the militias. Elections have been

marred by violence, and the M'Boshi tribals in the north and the Lari in the south have struggled for control of the country since de-colonialization (MAR-2012; *The Economist,* June 15, 2002, p. 46, and May 7, 2005, p. 38; Keesing's 2003, p. 45276, 45544). Because violent ethnic clashes continued in the period 2003-2011 (see WDM-2011), and important parties were organized along ethnic lines, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is 3 for the Republic of Congo.

Côte d'Ivoire's largest tribal groups include Akan (42%) in the south, Voltaiques or Gur (18%), Northern Mandes (16%), Krous (11%), and Southern Mandes (10%). People in the north are mainly Muslims and in the south Christians. Tribal groups established their own parties when democratic elections were introduced in the 1990s (for parties and groups, see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 299-302). Ethnic conflicts escalated into a civil war between northern Muslims and predominantly Christian southerners in 2002 when parties were unable to agree on the results of the presidential election. Thousands of people died in the war and hundreds of thousands Ivorians fled to neighboring countries. The government and rebels made peace agreements in 2005 and 2006, and UN peacekeepers and French troops prevented the resumption of large-scale clashes. The level of ethnic violence decreased, although sporadic violent clashes and the north-south stalemate continued. A new civil war broke out in November 2010 after the disputed presidential election (see *The Economist,* April 2nd 2011, p. 39). Thousands of people were killed (see Keesing's 2003, pp. 45175, 45230, 45279, 45392, 45584, 45731; 2004, pp. 45835, 45886, 46048, 46149, 46296; 2005, pp. 46556, 46672; 2007, pp. 48025, 48119; 2010, p. 50172; 2011, pp. 50220, 50276, 50329, 50381, 50496). The estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (4) is much higher than expected on the basis of the regression analysis. It seems to be due to exceptional temporary factors, the disputed results of presidential elections. The level of ethnic violence may decrease significantly when political leaders learn to compromise and to share power through democratic elections.

East Timor. It is not self-evident how East Timor's population should be classified by ethnic divisions. They speak 16 indigenous languages as well as Portuguese and Bahasa Indonesia. In this analysis, Timorese (83%) constitute the largest ethnic group, but it should be noted that the Timorese population includes many tribal groups and that there are no reliable statistical data on ethnic divisions. Indonesia invaded the former Portuguese colony in December 1975 and occupied the country. The Timorese revolutionary movement resisted the occupation and started a guerrilla war against Indonesia (cf. Suter, 1997). Finally, international pressure forced Indonesia to accept a UN-supervised referendum on independence in 1999. A period of instability and violence followed the referendum. The international community accepted the independence of East Timor (Timor-Leste) from Indonesia in 2002. Democratic institutions were established, but occasional ethnic violence continued (Smith, 2004). The Chinese and Muslim minorities were persecuted, and most Muslims fled to West Timor or to Indonesia. Later on tension between ethnic groups increased and led to serious violence in 2006 (see Keesing's 2006, pp. 47257, 47308, 47584; 2007, pp. 47749, 47815; 2008, pp. 48417, 48463; WDM-2011). The much higher than expected scale of ethnic conflicts (3) can be traced to the violent struggle for independence and to political instability in the first decade of independence. It is reasonable to assume that the level of ethnic conflicts will decline when the political system stabilizes and competing ethnic groups learn to share power through democratic elections. In other words, the large positive residual for the period 2003-2011 may be due to temporary local conditions.

Georgia is an ethnically divided country, although the Georgian majority comprises 84 per cent of the population. Ethnic minority groups include Armenians, Russians, Azeris, Ossetians, Abkhaz, and Greeks. Territorially separated ethnic minorities are the most important ones. The Ajaris and Abkhazians had autonomous republics and the Ossetians an

autonomous region of South Ossetia during the Soviet period. When the Soviet system began to collapse, the Abkhaz and Ossetian nationalists started to demand independence from Georgia. The South Ossetian autonomous region declared its independence from Georgia in 1990, and a war between rebels and Georgian forces broke out. A ceasefire was agreed in June 1992, but the region's final status remained unresolved. The Abkhazian autonomous republic declared its sovereignty in 1990, which sparked a war between Abkhazian rebels and Georgian forces. The rebels, with the support of Russia, were able to defeat Georgian forces in 1993, and most of the Georgians in Abkhazia had to flee to Georgia. A ceasefire was made in 1994, and Russian troops were sent to Abkhazia's border to control the ceasefire. Abkhazia is *de facto* independent from Georgia. Adzharia's autonomous republic has been reintegrated into Georgia since 2004 (see MAR-2012). The stalemated conflict with South Ossetia escalated into a brief war in August 2008 when Georgia attempted to return South Ossetia to its control by a military offensive. Russia's troops repelled Georgia's attack and invaded some parts of Georgia (see Keesing's 2003, p. 45301; 2004, pp. 45919, 45974, 46135, 46175, 46216, 46337; 2006, p. 47377; 2008, pp. 48593, 48659, 48701, 48740, 48791; 2010, p. 50101; 2011, p. 50418). The attempt of Georgian nationalists to transform the country into a national state of Georgians seems to have worsened ethnic relations. In view of the existence of territorially separated ethnic minority groups, some kind of federation would have been necessary, but Georgian leaders did not provide it, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia demanded full independence. Because of violent ethnic conflicts and separatist strivings in some parts of the country, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 3. The strong separatist strivings of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are exceptional local factors which explain Georgia's clearly higher than expected level of ethnic conflicts.

Iraq. The population of Iraq is divided into three territorially more or less separate ethnic groups. Language and ethnic origin

separate Kurds in the north from the Arabs (approximately 80%) in the south, and religion divides the Arab majority into two antagonistic groups: Shias in the south (approximately 60%) and Sunnis in the central and western parts of the country. In this analysis, the division between Sunni and Shia Muslims is regarded to be the most important ethnic cleavage. Traditionally the Sunni minority dominated in politics. Saddam Hussein, who ruled Iraq autocratically from 1979 to the destruction of his regime in 2003 as a consequence of the US and British military invasion, attempted to establish an absolute hegemony of the Sunni Muslim minority. Kurds rebelled against the Iraqi government and demanded extensive autonomy or independence (Kurdistan) for their northern region. The war between Kurds and the Iraqi army was bloody and long (see Kiernan, 2007, pp. 585-587). As a consequence of the Gulf War in 1991, the Kurds achieved autonomy in the northern part of the country. The region was under the protection of the Western allied forces. The Shia majority was subjugated and discriminated during the Baathist regime. After the Gulf War in 1991, the Shias launched an armed revolt against the government of Saddam Hussein, but the rebellion was crushed. The level of ethnic violence exploded after the US and British invasion in 2003 (cf. Gordesman, 2007). All ethnic groups have their own political parties and militant groups (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 578-582; cf. Dawisha, 2010). Sunni guerrillas started a very extensive terrorist campaign against the foreign occupation forces and Shia Muslims (cf. MAR-2012). In the north, ethnic violence between Kurds and Arabs and between Kurds and local ethnic minorities continued. In the period 2003-2011, ethnic violence covered all parts of the country, although the establishment of democratic institutions through elections in 2005 gradually decreased ethnic violence (see Keesing's 2003, pp. 45264, 45370, 45493, 45622, 45721; 2004, pp. 45826, 45928, 45978, 46032, 46088, 46176, 46229, 46280, 46341, 46388; 2005, pp. 46495, 46543, 46599, 46711, 46760, 46799, 47008; 2006, pp. 47069, 47178, 47605; 2007, pp. 47721,

47779, 48015, 48101; 2008, pp. 48380, 48441, 48491, 48551, 48665, 48804; 2009, pp. 49013, 49172, 49230, 49340, 49370; 2010, pp. 49708, 49812, 49867, 49921, 49964, 50055, 50161; 2011, pp. 50259, 50584, 50624). The much higher than expected level of ethnic conflicts (5) in Iraq is principally due to the failure of political leaders to compromise and to establish power-sharing institutions. The establishment of democratic institutions and a coalition government through elections in 2005 has introduced a new political system adapted to the ethnic divisions of the country. Therefore it is reasonable to expect a significant decrease of ethnic violence. However, it is not certain. The U.S. withdrew its last military troops from Iraq in December 2011, but violent clashes between Sunnis and Shias continued.

Kenya. The African population embraces four main ethnic groups: Bantu, Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic, and Hamitic, and each main category is divided into smaller tribal groups. It is not self-evident how Kenya's population should be classified by ethnic cleavages. The largest single tribe, Kikuyu, comprises 22 per cent of the population. In this analysis, the level of ethnic heterogeneity is calculated on the basis of this percentage of the largest ethnic group. The party system reflects ethnic divisions (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 653-660; MAR-2012). Because all tribal groups are minority groups, tribal alliances in politics have varied and competition has been intensive. There have been continual ethnic clashes, usually connected with elections. The most serious tribal violence erupted in January 2008 in the aftermath of the disputed legislative and presidential elections held on December 27, 2007 (Smith, 2009). The violence broke out after the incumbent President Kibaki (Kikuyu tribe) declared himself the winner of the presidential election. The supporters of the opposition leader Odinga (Luo tribe) did not accept Kibaki's victory. More than one thousand people were killed in post-election violence in various parts of the country, and some 250,000 people had been forced from their homes. The deadlock of the crisis was finally broken when Kibaki ceded to the main demands of the opposition and signed an agreement to share

power with Odinga and his supporters (see Keesing's 2004, pp. 46105, 46147; 2007, p. 48121; 2008, pp. 48336, 48393, 48450, 48504, 48762; 2009, p. 49129; 2010, p. 50017; Chege, 2008; Kramon and Posner, 2011). The sudden escalation of ethnic violence in January 2008 was principally due to the dispute over the results of elections. It was a local and accidental factor, which raised the scale of ethnic conflicts (4) temporarily much higher than expected. It is reasonable to expect that when the ethnic groups learn to share power through democratic institutions, the level of ethnic violence will decrease, although the level of institutionalized ethnic conflicts will remain high.

Mali. Mande tribal groups in the southern and central parts of the country comprise approximately half of the population (50%). Other significant ethnic groups include Peul (Fulani) in eastern Mali, Voltaic tribes, and Tuareg and Moor groups (10%) in the north. Tuareg and Moor groups differ racially from black African tribes. The existence of a multiparty system and democratic institutions since the 1990s has mitigated ethnic conflicts. Berber-speaking Tuaregs and Moors, who are nomadic stock breeders in the semi-arid steppe area bordering the Sahara, have rebelled against the government especially since the 1990s and demanded greater autonomy. There were also other types of sporadic fighting between ethnic groups, in which people were killed (see Keesing's 2004, p. 46193; 2006, pp. 47242, 47301; 2007, pp. 47733, 47913, 48120; 2008, pp. 48453, 48567; 2009, pp. 48971, 49023, 49242; 2011, p. 50752; MAR-2012). Because of the continuing Tuareg rebellion in the north, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is 3. The racial difference between Tuaregs and black Africans seems to be the most important local factor which explains a higher than expected level of ethnic conflicts in Mali.

Niger. The agriculturist Hausa tribe in the south comprises 55 per cent of the population. Other significant tribal groups include Djerma Sonrai in south-eastern Niger, Peuhl (Fulani) and Kanuri. The extensive Sahara desert in the north and centre is occupied principally by Tuareg (9%) camel and goat herders, who

speak a language related to Berber and who differ racially from black Africans. As in Mali, Tuaregs have rebelled against the government. They have several parties and rebel groups (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 908-912; MAR-2012). Their target was to establish a Saharan state for pastoralist people. In 1995 a peace accord was made between the government and Tuareg rebels, but in 2007 a new Tuareg rebel group, the Niger People's Movement for Justice, continued the rebellion (see Keesing's 2007, pp. 47854, 47913, 47966, 48069; 2008, pp. 48511, 48567, 48624; 2009, p. 49447; 2010, p. 49776). The estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (3) for Niger is somewhat higher than expected on the basis of the regression equation. Democratic institutions since the 1993 elections have mitigated ethnic conflicts in Niger, but the conflict with the Tuareg minority continues. They occupy more than half of the area of country, but because they constitute only a small minority of the population, they cannot get any significant representation in national political institutions through democratic elections. Some kind of regional autonomy might satisfy them.

Nigeria's population is ethnically extremely heterogeneous. Tribal groups speak more than 250 languages, and religion divides the population into approximately as large Muslim and Christian sections (see also Thomay, 1993, pp.67-71). The most populous ethnic groups include Hausa/Fulani and other Islamic people in the north, the mixed Christian and Muslim Yoruba in the west, and the predominantly Christian Ibo in the east. Of the single tribal groups, the Hausa/Fulani combination is the largest (29%). Political parties and other interest groups have always been organized along ethnic lines, although the government has attempted to prevent the establishment and function of ethnically based parties (see Nmoma, 1995; Banks et al., 2007, pp. 920-922; Bogaards, 2010). Martin Meredith (2006, p. 194) notes: "Because each region produced its own political party dominated by the major ethnic group based there, the struggle turned into ethnic combat... Tribalism became the ideology of politics." The ethnic divisions have been taken into account in the federal structure of Nigeria. Since 1996 the country has been divided into

36 states, which allows many ethnic groups to manage their own affairs and probably reduces the danger of violent clashes between ethnic groups. At the federal level, Muslims and Christians and various regional groups have struggled for power. Civilian governments have alternated with military governments, and the constitution has been changed several times. Ethnic tension escalated into inter-communal fighting in various parts of the country in the period 2003-2011. There were violent clashes especially between Muslims and Christians (cf. *The Economist,* December 6th 2008, p. 46) but also between Sunni and Shia Muslims in the north and between some ethnic groups in other parts of the country. The most serious ethnic violence broke out in the oil-producing Niger Delta states. Thousands of people were killed in ethnic violence and tens of thousands were displaced (see Keesing's 2003, p. 45279; 2004, pp. 45834, 45886, 45939, 45988, 46048, 46191; 2005, p. 46811; 2006, pp. 47021, 47081, 47136, 47190, 47244, 47300, 47402, 47505, 47622; 2007, pp. 47733, 47912; 2008, pp. 48339, 48568, 48624, 48678, 48765; 2009, pp. 49190, 49301, 49346, 49561, 49611, 49718; 2010, pp. 50064, 50119, 50174; 2011, pp. 50636, 50692, 50750; Usman, 2003; Brunnegger, 2007). Consequently, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 4. Nigeria's somewhat higher than expected level of ethnic conflicts cannot be explained by any single event or cause. Repeated religious clashes, in which thousands of people were killed, have continued since the country's independence in 1960. It has been difficult for Christians and Muslims to agree on the rules of power-sharing.

Russia. The ethnically heterogeneous population includes about 100 nationalities, but Orthodox Russians constitute the large majority (80%). The largest minority groups include Tatar (4%), Ukrainian (2%), Bashkir (1%), and Chuvash (1%). Muslims comprise 10-15 per cent of the population. Tatars and Muslim nationalities in the Caucasus region are the most important ethnic minorities (cf. Ormrod, 1997). The Russian federal system is only partly adapted to satisfy the special interests of ethnic minorities.

Significant regional ethnic minorities have their own republics, territories or autonomous areas, but because of the electoral system, they cannot get representation in the federal political institutions through their own parties. Muslim Tatars seem to be satisfied with their dominant position in Tatarstan and with Tatarstan's widespread autonomy. However, some Tatar organizations have advocated independence for Tatarstan as an Islamic state, but these demands have not led to ethnic violence. Dagestan is the most remarkable example of the possibilities to mitigate ethnic conflicts by power-sharing democratic institutions. Dagestan's 1994 constitution is based on power-sharing arrangements. All indigenous ethnic groups are equally represented in a State Council and electoral districts for legislative elections are formed according to the ethnic majority of each locale. Dagestan remained relatively peaceful compared to its Caucasian neighbors (see *The Economist,* July 9, 2005). The federal structures do not satisfy the autonomous structures of all ethnic minorities, especially not the separatist strivings in the North Caucasus. The Chechen separatists rebelled against Russian rule in 1994 and attempted to separate the Republic of Chechnya from the Russian Federation. Russia responded by a military invasion. The struggle between the Russian government forces and Chechen separatists has continued since then. Tens of thousands of people were killed, and hundreds of thousands of civilians fled the fighting. In the period 2003-2011, guerrilla war continued in the southern mountains of Chechnya. Some ethnic clashes took place also in Dagestan and in other regions of the northern Caucasus (see *The Economist,* November 29th 2008, pp. 14-16; MAR-2012; Keesing's 2003, pp. 45210, 45253, 45302, 45355, 45428, 45565, 45616; 2004, pp. 45976, 46086; 2005, pp. 46423, 46477, 46646, 46756, 46900; 2006, pp. 47272, 47431, 47484; 2007, p. 48148; 2008, pp. 48657, 48702, 48742, 48790; 2009, pp. 49158, 49595; 2010, pp. 49862, 49918, 49999, 50051, 50099, 50155; 2011, pp. 50360, 50576). It is remarkable that ethnic relations have remained peaceful in other parts of the country, although violent racist attacks and racially

motivated murders seem to have increased since the 1990s. Ethnic violence in Russia has been regionally restricted to the North Caucasus. Therefore the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is not higher than 3. However, Chechen civilians are also the targets of active discrimination, violence and intimidation in other parts of the country (MAR-2012). The deep ethnic cleavage between the Muslim nations of the North Caucasus and Russians provides a local explanation for repeated ethnic violence in the North Caucasus and for Russia's higher than expected level of EEC.

Rwanda's population is divided into two clearly different ethnic groups: the Hutu (Bantu) majority (84%) and the traditionally dominant Tutsi (Hamitic) minority (15%). The Hutus overthrew the Tutsi monarchy before independence in 1959. The Tutsis did not accept their defeat. They rebelled several times since 1963. Tens of thousands of people were killed and hundreds of thousands fled to neighboring countries. The cruelest ethnic violence broke out in April 1994 when the plane of Rwanda's president Habyarimana and the Burundian president was shot down. The Hutu army and militia started a genocidal orgy of killing against the Tutsi minority. Hundreds of thousands of people were killed (see Eltringham, 2006). The Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front started a counter-offensive and was able to establish its dominance in Rwanda in July 1994. The carnage caused a mass exodus of perhaps 2 million people from the country. However, the Hutu militants resisted the new Tutsi-dominated transitional government. Finally, a political compromise was reached. The new constitution approved in 2003 is intended to institutionalize power-sharing between the two conflicting ethnic groups. Rwanda's postgenocide reconciliation has decreased ethnic violence. There is hardly any news of ethnic violence from the period 2003-2011 (Keesing's 2003, p. 45680; 2010, pp. 49668, 49722, 49824). However, the Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy remained as strong as ever, tens of thousands of Hutus were still imprisoned and accused of taking part in the genocide, and militant Hutu groups continued a guerrilla war against the

Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (see MAR-2012). Therefore the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 3 for Rwanda. A final democratic compromise has not yet been found.

Somalia is a linguistically and religiously homogeneous country, but the population is divided into numerous clans and subclans, which are comparable to tribal groups. As Hussein M. Adams notes, "In Somali society, ethnic conflicts take the form of clan conflicts" (1995, p.197). There are six major clan families: the Darood (perhaps 20%), the Haviye in the region of Mogadishu, the Isaaq mostly in the northern Somalia, the Dir at the border with Djibouti and the Digil and Rahanwayn in southern Somalia (Samatar, 1991). These clan-families became highly politicized in the 1980s when General Barre, the country's military dictator, started to favor his own subclan and to discriminate other clans. The Isaaq clan in the north established the Somali National Movement to fight against Barre's regime, and clan-based militant groups emerged in other parts of the country. The opposition forces ousted President Barre in January 1991, but clan-based military organizations were not able to agree on a new political system. They started to fight with each other, and Somalia was without any effective central government. The former British Somaliland in the north seceded from Somalia and declared its independence in May 1991 (see Adams, 1995; Kaplan, 2008). Different clans have their own parties and militant groups (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 1124-1126; MAR-2012). In the period 2003-2011, the warlords continued their struggle for the control of territories. A peace agreement was made in 2004, and a transitional federal assembly and government were established, but the new government was unable to take control of the country. Warlords controlled their own territories, and ethnic violence continued (see Keesing's 2003, pp. 45391, 45634, 45729; 2004, pp. 45772, 46147, 46188; 2005, pp. 46670, 46918; 2006, pp. 47083, 47134, 47240, 47296, 47353, 47398, 47503, 47620; 2007, pp. 47672, 47734, 47792, 47852, 47910, 48070, 48177, 48232; 2008, pp. 48393, 48450, 48505, 48565, 48611, 48719, 48763; 2009, pp. 49024, 49186, 49303, 49347,

49448, 49560; 2010, pp. 49720, 49823, 49878, 49929, 49970, 50013, 50066, 50166; 2011, pp. 50273, 50325, 50385, 50549, 50688, 50748). The much higher than expected level of ethnic conflicts (5) is principally due to the failure of political leadership. Before General Barre's coup d'etat in 1969, clan-families lived without any serious violent clashes. Barre's dictatorship "led to two decades of instability, brutal civil strife, and the manipulation of clan loyalties for political purposes" (*Freedom in the World 2007,* p. 725). In principle, it should be possible to re-establish ethnic peace through appropriate institutional arrangements based on the idea of power-sharing. It would be useful to examine the nature of Somalia's political system before Barre's dictatorship.

South Africa. The population of South Africa is racially divided into four groups: African (79%), white (10%), colored (9%), and Indian/Asian (2%). The African population is further divided into linguistically based tribal groups, of which Zulu (15%) and Xhosa are the largest ones. These racial and other ethnic divisions have emerged gradually since the 17th century when the Dutch and later British settlers invaded the country and established their dominance. The British settlers imported indentured laborers from India to South Africa in the last decades of the 19th century. Africans were subjugated since the beginning of the colonial period. The violent suppression of the black majority was most extensive during the period of the apartheid system from the 1950s to the first years of the 1990s (see Horowitz, 1991). Racial relations were violent since the beginning of the colonial period. Finally, the black resistance and partly violent struggle for equality led to the collapse of the apartheid system and to a democratic compromise in 1993. Power was transferred from the white minority to the black majority through democratic elections in 1994. After the establishment of a democratic system, the extent of ethnic violence decreased dramatically, although occasional ethnic clashes continued (see Keesing's 2003, pp. 45173, 45682; 2008, pp. 48564, 48620). The

intensity of racial and other ethnic interest conflicts has remained high, and nearly all political parties and other interest organizations remain ethnically based (see Maphai, 1995; Banks et al., 2007, pp. 1139-1143; Friedman, 2009). Because nearly all important political parties and interest groups are organized along ethnic lines, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is 3 for South Africa. Thomay (1993, pp. 26-27) referred to the dangerous situation in South Africa before democratization: "All the elements of an adverse situation are present: the minority and the majority belong to very much visibly different races, mostly they speak different languages, they are members of thoroughly different cultures, and they are separated by vastly different economic conditions and educational levels."

Sri Lanka. The major ethnic cleavage in Sri Lanka is between the Sinhalese (74%) and Buddhist majority and the Tamil (19%) and Hindu minority. Muslim Moors (7%) constitute another, less important, ethnic minority. The Tamils are divided into two groups: the Ceylon or "old" Tamils, whose forebears came to the island more than a thousand years ago, and Indian Tamils, who were brought to Ceylon by British planters in the 19th and 20th centuries to work in tea plantations. The old Tamils live in the northern and eastern provinces, whereas most of the Indian Tamils work in the central upland part of the country (see Björkman, 1987; Nissan, 1996). Sri Lanka has been a democracy since its independence in 1948, but the constitutional institutions inherited from the British colonial period did not provide any special status to the Tamil and Muslim minorities, and the governments of independent Ceylon did not try to adapt democratic institutions to the requirements of ethnicity. Tamil parties demanded autonomy for the Tamil regions, but the two competing Sinhalese parties were not willing to make any concessions to Tamils. The failure of moderate Tamil parties to gain autonomy for the Tamil regions strengthened the position of Tamil separatists, who demanded an independent Tamil state (see Malik et al., 2009, pp. 334-342). The conflict between the Sri Lanka government and Tamil separatists accelerated in 1983

to a civil war, which continued until the complete defeat of the Tamil Tigers in May 2009. Tens of thousands of people were killed in fighting and more than a million people were displaced (see Keesing's 2003, pp. 45194, 45292, 45348, 45551; 2004, pp. 45788, 45904, 45948, 46123; 2005, pp. 46875, 46990; 2006, pp. 47040, 47098, 47211, 47263, 47314, 47364, 47409, 47467, 47521, 47575, 47639; 2007, pp. 47754, 47807, 47870, 47987, 48038, 48236, 48303; 2008, pp. 48355, 48469, 48529, 48582, 48641, 48690, 48729, 4877; 2009, pp. 48982, 49040, 49088, 49174, 49198; 2011, p. 50561; Malik et al., 2009, pp. 348-354; WDM-2011). The estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (5) is much higher than expected on the basis of the regression equation. It is obvious that the failure of political leadership to compromise and to adapt political institutions to the requirements of ethnicity contributed to the deterioration of ethnic relations and to the eruption of the ethnic civil war. It is reasonable to expect that after the complete defeat of the Tamil separatists the level of ethnic violence will decrease permanently, although the significance of institutionalized ethnic conflicts will remain high (for political parties and groups, see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 1160-1166; MAR-2012).

Sudan was one of the ethnically most heterogeneous countries in the world before the secession of South Sudan in 2011. Its population was racially divided into Arabs in the north and black Africans in the south, but there are several ethnically mixed ethnic groups between them. There are no reliable census data on ethnic groups. It is estimated that Arab groups comprised 39 per cent of the population. Because of its population's deep racial cleavages, Sudan was an artificial state since 1898 when the territory was made an Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. African tribal groups in the south and some other ethnic groups rebelled against the Arab-dominated central government since Sudan's independence in 1956 (cf. Verney, 1995). When the central government rejected the demands of autonomy, Africans resorted to violent struggle and gradually were able to control

most regions in the south. It is estimated that at least two million people were killed in the civil war, and other millions had to flee from their homes. Political parties and other interest organizations were completely organized along ethnic lines (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 1173-1177). Many peace agreements were made during the decades, but they failed to produce peace. Finally, in January 2005 the government and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) made a peace agreement and established a transitional power-sharing cabinet. In an interim constitution signed on July 9, 2005, the south was given a large degree of autonomy and the right to decide, by a referendum in January 2011, whether they would like to continue under Khartoum's rule or to become independent (MAR-2012). The south selected independence and an independent state of South Sudan was established (Medani, 2011). The 2005 peace agreement ended the 21-year war in the south, but bloody fighting in the western region of Darfur, which had erupted in 2003, continued unabated. There were rebellions and ethnic violence also in some other parts of Sudan in the period 2003-2011 (see Keesing's 2003, pp. 45230, 45278, 45507, 45634. 45729; 2004, pp. 45772, 45834, 45938, 45989, 46044, 46105, 46147, 46188, 46241, 46298, 46352; 2005, pp. 46396, 46449, 46506, 46557, 46611; 2006, pp. 47022, 47188, 27241, 47296, 47398, 47444, 47620; 2007, pp. 47851, 47965, 48024, 48069, 48120; 2008, pp. 48392, 48451, 48506, 48566, 48625, 48676; 2009, pp. 49023, 49187, 49243, 49347, 49390, 49505; 2010, pp. 49719, 49822, 49877, 49971; 2011, pp. 50272, 50326, 50492, 50548, 50519, 50636, 50689, 50748). Because of the many ethnic civil wars, the scale of ethnic conflicts (5) was estimated to be much higher than expected on the basis of the regression equation. The deep racial and other ethnic cleavages are exceptional local factors which explain the high level of ethnic violence in Sudan. The long civil war between the Arabs of the north and the blacks of the south reflected the political failure to compromise and to agree on power-sharing. The secession of South Sudan solved this

problem but not serious ethnic interest conflicts in other parts of the country.

Thailand. The Thai majority comprises 75 per cent of the population. Ethnic minority groups include Chinese (12%), Malay (5%), and northern hill tribes. Chinese are dispersed without any core region, whereas Malays constitute a concentrated territorial majority in the south. Muslim Malays have resisted the government's assimilation policies and rebelled since the 1950s. A new rebellion broke out in 2004. The Muslim rebels would like to separate the three southern Muslim-majority provinces into an independent Islamic state. Thousands of people were killed in these conflicts in the period 2003-2011 (see Keesing's 2004, pp. 45794, 45851, 45906, 45958, 46009, 46115, 46163, 46210, 46316, 46364; 2005, pp. 46524, 46574, 46690, 46738, 46831; 2006, pp. 47371, 47417, 47458, 47583; 2007, pp. 47701, 47749, 47874, 48046, 48087; 2008, pp. 48465, 48696; 2009, pp. 48994, 49469; 2010, pp. 49794, 49900, 50085; 2011, pp. 50231, 50286, 50346, 50654; Brown, 2008, p. 255; MAR-2012). Because ethnic violence in Thailand is limited to the Muslim-majority southern provinces, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is not higher than 3. The deep religious and partly racial cleavage between Thais and Muslim Malays in the south is a local factor which explains the Muslims' rebellion in the south.

Turkey. The major ethnic division in Turkey is between the Turkish majority (75%) and the Kurdish minority (approximately 20%). The large Kurdish minority in the southeast of Turkey has caused troubles since the 1920s when the plan to establish an independent Kurdistan failed and the old Ottoman territory inhabited by the Kurds was divided between Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. There are also Kurds in Iran. The Armenian minority in the former Ottoman Empire was almost completely decimated in the Armenian genocide in 1914-1915 (see Kiernan, 2007, pp. 396-415). The new republican Turkey refused to grant any distinct status for non-Turkish Muslims or autonomy to the

region of the Kurds. On the contrary, it tried to assimilate the Kurdish population into Turkish society by prohibiting the use of the Kurdish language and by banning Kurdish schools and publications. The strategy of assimilation succeeded only partly. The majority of Kurds retained their separate Kurdish identity, although they "suffer from discrimination that includes serious restrictions on their language and any expression of Kurdish culture, as well as restrictions on non-violent political organizing" (MAR-2012). Repeated Kurdish rebellions were suppressed. In 1984, the Kurdistan Workers' Party started a guerrilla war against the Turkish state, which has caused tens of thousands of deaths. Violent clashes between the Kurdish rebels and the Turkish army continued in the period 2003-2011 (see *The Economist,* July 24th 2010, p. 23; Keesing's 2003, pp. 45618, 45708; 2004, pp. 45820, 46135, 46175; 2005, pp. 46490, 46591, 46846, 46965; 2006, pp. 47226, 47428, 47483; 2007, pp. 47764, 48151, 48265, 48316; 2008, pp. 48427, 48480, 48545, 48595, 48660, 48701, 48743, 48792; 2009, pp. 48999, 49049, 49227, 49374; 2010, pp. 49748, 49861, 49916, 49953, 49997, 50050; 2011, pp. 50359, 50578, 50618, 50669, 50732, 50786). Because ethnic violence was mostly limited to the territory of the Kurds in Turkey, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is not higher than 3. During the last years, the Turkish government has changed its policy toward the Kurdish minority by granting some cultural rights to Kurds, although it still officially denies the existence of a Kurdish language. It might still be possible to solve the Kurdish problem by granting sufficient cultural and regional autonomy to Kurds.

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It is not possible to find any common factor which could explain the higher than expected level of ethnic conflicts in these 21 countries. Various local factors and circumstances seem to

explain why the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is clearly higher than expected. In the country reviews, I have attempted to indicate such local factors. It is common for almost all these countries that the higher than expected scale of ethnic conflicts is principally due to the increased level of ethnic violence. In several of these countries, at least in the cases of Afghanistan, Burma, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Iraq, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand and Turkey, ethnic civil wars raised the level of ethnic violence. Deep racial cleavages seem to have increased ethnic violence in countries like Mali, Niger, South Africa and Sudan. It is also obvious that the failures of political leadership to compromise have intensified ethnic violence. Constitutional and political institutions were not sufficiently adapted to satisfy the requirements of rebelling ethnic groups. This concerns especially countries like Afghanistan, Burma, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, East Timor, Iraq, Kenya, Russia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand and Turkey. Some of these countries have democratic institutions, but they failed to maintain ethnic peace. However, the examples of Afghanistan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Africa show that it is possible to mitigate ethnic conflict or to restore peace by democratic reforms and compromises. Religious divisions characterize ethnic conflicts and violence in some of these countries, especially so in the cases of Côte d'Ivoire, Iraq, Nigeria, Russia, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Some of these local factors connected with a higher than expected level of ethnic conflicts may be temporary, but most of them seem to be more or less permanent, which means that higher than expected levels of ethnic conflicts may continue in the future.

2. Large Negative Outliers (Residuals -0.7 or Higher)

The category of countries with negative residuals -0.7 or

higher includes the following 16 countries: the Bahamas, Belize, Brunei, Canada, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Latvia, Lithuania, Madagascar, Peru, Qatar, Slovenia, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, Turkmenistan and the United Arab Emirates. The level of ethnic conflicts was clearly lower than expected in all these countries in the period 2003-2011. In the following, my purpose is to describe the nature of ethnic cleavages and ethnic conflicts in these countries and, if possible, to find out local factors which might explain their somewhat lower than expected level of ethnic conflicts.

The Bahamas. Blacks constitute a large majority (85%) of the population and whites (12%), Asians and Hispanics (3%) are ethnic minorities. Whites dominate in the economy, but political power is in the hands of the black majority. Minor incidents of ethnic violence seem to have been limited to the eviction of Haitian migrant workers (see WDM-2011). There is no information on ethnic violence from the period 2003-2011 (Keesings 2003-2011). Because of the stabilized ethnic peace, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is not higher than 1 for the Bahamas. The fact that the black majority dominates in politics through democratic institutions and that the economic position of the white minority is stabilized may explain the lack of ethnic violence in the Bahamas.

Belize is a racially highly heterogeneous country. The population includes Spanish-speaking mestizos (49%), indigenous Maya (11%), English-speaking Afro-Belizian Creoles (25%), who are mainly descendants of British settlers and African slaves, Afro-indigenous Garifunas (6%), and some whites, Chinese, and East Indians (cf. Ewens, 1996; Barnett, 2002). Ethnic groups are to some extent regionally differentiated from each other, but mostly they are dispersed around the country. Despite deep ethnic cleavages and racial tension, there is no information on ethnic violence from the period 2003-2011 (see WDM-2011; Keesing's 2003-2011). The estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (2) is based on the fact that ethnic interest conflicts have become institutionalized. The fact that most people

belong to racially mixed groups (Mestizos, Creoles, Garifunas) may provide a partial explanation for the much lower than expected level of ethnic conflicts. Many people are not sure to what ethnic group they belong. Numerous interethnic marriages dampen ethnic conflicts. Besides, democratic institutions are adapted to the ethnic divisions of the country, and the major parties represent the two largest ethnic groups: mestizos and creoles (see Banks et al., 2007, p. 118). However, both parties are to some extent multi-ethnic. Ralph Premdas (2002) refers to several factors that may explain the lack of open ethnic and racial strife in Belize. One factor is that "each of the major communities has pre-eminence in its own geographical sphere which limits inter-ethnic contest over power, recognition and resources." However, ethnic group consciousness is strong, and many issues have become ethnicized and racialized in Belize. There is inter-ethnic and cross-racial hostility, although ethnic relations have remained principally peaceful. Premdas assumes that inter-marriages between the black community and Central American migrants (mestizos) have moderated inter-ethnic relations. Premdas comes to the conclusion that there "is extensive inter-racial mixing in Belize creating a population that is increasingly becoming ´brown´." Besides, most people in Belize are descendants of relatively recent immigrants without historical attachment to particular territories.

Brunei. The lack of ethnic violence in Brunei (see Keesing's 2003-2011) cannot be traced to democratic institutions but to a strong authoritarian control, which is based on the absolute hegemony of the Malay community (67%). Most of the Chinese immigrants (15-20%) are still without citizenship. They cannot challenge the Sultan's government or the Malay hegemony, although their economic position is strong. The indigenous tribal groups live in the forested interior of the country and are still outside the modern economy. They are without their own organizations and are not capable of challenging the government. The state has pressed them to adopt Islam. Brunei's political

institutions are not intended to facilitate the sharing of power between ethnic groups. Brunei's wealth is based entirely on the petroleum industry, and the Sultan's family controls oil money. Brunei is an example of a country in which ethnic peace is maintained by authoritarian control and in which the hegemony of one ethnic group is absolute. Ethnic minorities are to some extent discriminated. According to WDM-2011, "Non-Malay and non-Muslim minorities continue to be subjected to unfavorable treatment by Brunei authorities." Because of the latent ethnic tension and the subjugated position of minorities, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 2, which is slightly lower than expected on the basis of the regression equation.

Canada It is problematic to classify Canada's population by ethnic groups. In this analysis, the most significant ethnic cleavage is regarded to be between the combined group of Europeans (66%) and non-Europeans. The group of Europeans includes English-speakers and French-speakers as well as more recent European immigrants. The category of non-Europeans includes racially mixed people, immigrants from Asia and Africa, and indigenous peoples. Ethnic-linguistic conflict has remained peaceful since 1857 when Canada achieved dominion status in the British Empire and when its federal institutions were established. Ethnic peace in Canada is related to institutional arrangements that were made to satisfy the demands of various ethnic minorities. The French-speakers have in Quebec their own parties and organizations, which are fully capable of furthering the regional and cultural interests of French-speaking Quebec. There is a strong separatist movement in Quebec, but until now it has failed to acquire the support of the majority (cf. Thomay, 1993, pp. 57-59). Indigenous peoples living in the northern regions of Canada are not any longer discriminated. The government has granted autonomy to the Northwestern Territories, Yukon Territory, and Nunavud Amerindian peoples. However, there are still serious disputes over

resources and land issues (MAR-2012). Because of the institutionalization of ethnic interest conflicts, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is not higher than 2. Canada provides an example of the possibilities to mitigate ethnic interest conflicts by adapting political institutions to the requirements of ethnicity and by guaranteeing equal political, economic, and legal rights to all ethnic groups. There is no special information on possible conflicts with the non-European immigrant groups.

Gabon is a tribally heterogeneous country. Fang-speaking Bantus constitute approximately 50 per cent of the population. Pygmies were the indigenous inhabitants of the country, but they were displaced by Bantu people centuries ago. All Bantu tribal groups are closely related. Some political parties are ethnically based (see Azevedo, 1995; Banks et al., 2007, pp. 437-439). There is no information on ethnic violence from the period 2003-2011 (see WDM-11; Keesing's 2003-2011). The scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be only 1 for Gabon. It may be that clearly ethnic-based political parties emerge sometimes later when tribal interest conflicts become politicized.

Guinea-Bissau. The largest tribe is Balanta (30%). The other significant tribal groups include Fula (20%), Manjaco (14%), Mandinga (13%), and Papel (7%). Ethnic peace has prevailed in the country, but there has been ethnic violence in connection with military coups and attempted coups. Political parties are to some extent ethnically based (see Keesing's 2003, p. 45584; 2004, p. 46240; 2009, p. 49072). Banks et al. (2007, p. 497) refer to "rivalry among heavily armed ethnic groups." Therefore the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 2 for Guinea-Bissau. It may be that the level of ethnic conflicts rises in the future when tribal interest conflicts become more extensively politicized.

Latvia. The major ethnic conflict is between the Latvian majority (58%) and the Russian (29%) minority. Latvia had lost its independence, together with Estonia and Lithuania, in 1940

when the Soviet Union occupied the country and made it a Soviet republic. After Latvia regained its independence in 1991, Latvians started to re-establish their hegemony in their own country. Russians lost their privileged position, but the country's democratic institutions and legal order safeguard Russians' and other national minority groups' civil rights, although approximately 50 per cent of the ethnic Russians have yet to attain citizenship (see MAR-2012). There was no ethnic violence in the period 2003-2011. The ethnic conflict has become institutionalized. Russians have their own political parties (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 698-699). Besides, a high rate of ethnic intermarriage tends to dampen ethnic conflict. However, political, social and economic discrimination of the Russian minority continues (see WDM-2011; Keesing's, 2004, p. 45867; 2010, p. 50096). Because some significant political parties are organized along ethnic lines and because the discrimination of the Russian minority continues, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 2.

Lithuania. Lithuanians constitute a large majority (83%) of the population. Poles (7%) and Russians (6%) are the most significant ethnic minorities. Lithuania regained its independence in 1991, and the Lithuanian majority consolidated its dominant position. By allowing all people residing in the republic to become Lithuanian citizens, Lithuania virtually eliminated the critical issue of citizenship that dominates interethnic relations in the other Baltic countries. Ethnic minorities enjoy equal democratic rights and liberties, which has mitigated ethnic conflicts (see WDM-2011; MAR-2012; Keesing's 2003-2011). The estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is 1 for Lithuania. The granting of citizenship to Russians and Poles may be an important local factor which decreased ethnic conflicts in Lithuania compared to Estonia and Latvia.

Madagascar. Empirical data on the ethnic composition of Madagascar's population are scarce. According to Banks et al. (2007, p. 751), although "the population includes some 18 distinct ethnic groups, the main division is between the light-skinned

Mérina people of the central plateau and the more Negroid peoples of the coastal regions (*côtiers).*" In this analysis, the Mérina people (27%) are regarded to constitute the largest ethnic group. Different ethnic groups are united by the Malagasy language, which is of Malayo-Polynesian origin. Political parties are partly ethnically based. "Ethnic divisions represented through opposing parties have been the defining force in the post-independence era" (MAR-2012). Ethnic animosities between the Mérita people and côtiers have sometimes led to violent clashes. However, there is no information on ethnic violence from the period 2003-2011 (see WDM-2011; Keesing's 2009, pp. 48973, 49024). Democratic institutions have probably decreased ethnic violence in Madagascar. Because significant political parties are to some extent ethnic-based, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 2.

Peru. The population of Peru is racially divided. Amerindians comprise 46 per cent of the population and mestizos and whites 44 per cent. Most of the rest are mulattos. The white minority with the support of mestizos has dominated in politics and economy. The Spanish conquistadors expropriated most territories of indigenous peoples and subjugated them. Violent conflict between the two racial groups has continued since the 16th century. Indigenous people did not support the recent insurgencies of the Shining Path and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement to any significant extent, but they suffered the most: "75 percent of the victims were Quechua-speakers and approximately 600,000 Quechua *campesinos* were displaced, fleeing from the conflict zones to the misery belts around Peru's major cities" (WDM-2011; cf. Caumartin et al., 2008). Ethnic relations are still based on inequality, discrimination and suppression, although the political and social position of indigenous peoples has improved since the 1990s. There is not much information on serious ethnic violence from the period 2003-2011, but ethnic tension between the racial groups continues (see WDM-2011; MAR-2012; Keesing's 2005, p. 46406; 2008,

p. 48723; 2009, pp. 49250, 49512; 2010, p. 50073). Native Americans have been slow to establish their own political parties and organizations, but recently the number and significance of such organizations has increased. Indigenous peoples demand equal rights, autonomy and control over their remaining territories and natural resources. There are also some small indigenous guerrilla groups. It seems to be justified to estimate that the scale of ethnic conflicts is 3 for Peru.

Qatar is another autocratic political system in which one ethnic group has hegemonic power. Arabs, who constitute 40 per cent of the population, have absolute political power through the ruling family. Other ethnic groups include Indian (18%), Pakistani (18%), Iranian (10%), and other (14%). Citizenship and political rights are limited to indigenous Arabs. Immigrant workers from South Asia and Iran are without legal equality and citizenship. They are in a subjugated position and under strict control of the autocratic government. They are not able to further their interests through protest movements or by resorting to violence. There is no information on ethnic violence from the period 2003-2011 (see Keesing's 2003-2011), but because the majority of the population is subjugated by the ruling Arab minority, the scale of ethnic conflicts is estimated to be 3. The difference between Arabs and South Asian migrant workers is not only national and cultural but also racial.

Slovenia. Slovenians constitute a large majority (83%) of the population. The small ethnic minority groups like Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks, Roma, and others are dispersed around the country and are without their own territories. They do not seem to have their own political parties (see Banks et al., 2007, pp. 1113-1115), but as citizens they can take part in national politics through democratic institutions. There is no information on serious ethnic violence (see Keesing's 2003-2011). Consequently, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is not higher than 1.

Suriname is an ethnically extremely heterogeneous country without any ethnic majority group. East Indians (37%) constitute the largest ethnic group, but the group of racially mixed Afro-

Creoles (31%) is nearly as large. The other ethnic groups include Javanese (15%), Maroons (10%), indigenous Arawaks and Caribs (2%), and Chinese and Europeans. Creoles are largely of African descent, East Indians originate from India, and Javanese are of Indonesian origin. The Dutch-speaking Maroons are descendants of African slaves who fled slavery and established their own society in the interior jungles (see Oostindie, 2005, pp. 6-8, 29-31, 53-57). There is not much data on ethnic conflicts and violence. Maroons rebelled against the government forces in the 1980s. Some indigenous tribes have also been involved in guerilla warfare against the government, but there is very little data on ethnic clashes from the period 2003-2011 (see Keesing's 2003-2011). However, Maroons and indigenous peoples are discriminated and marginalized (WDM-2011). The fact that the party system is partly ethnic-based (see Banks et al., 2007, pp.1181-1183) illustrates the institutionalization of ethnic conflicts. Douglas W. Payne (1996) notes that ethnicity has been the defining element of Surinamese politics since internal self-rule was established in 1948, and that political parties were organized on an ethnic basis. The country's proportional electoral system makes it possible for ethnic groups to get a fair representation through their own parties, but because all ethnic groups are minorities, there have also been alliances of ethnic parties. Ethnic interest conflicts dominate politics in Suriname, but democratic institutions have made it possible to share power and to make compromises, which helps to avoid the escalation of ethnic conflicts into violent ones. Suriname is an example of an ethnically highly heterogeneous country in which ethnic interest conflicts have become institutionalized through democratic institutions. However, there is no guarantee on the survival of ethnic peace in the future. Suriname's President Ronald Venetiaan warned in 2006 against ethnic violence in Suriname. He said that there are signs of promoting ethnic rallying which could ultimately result in an ethnic divided community and a disruption of brotherly atmosphere in Suriname ("Suriname president warns against

ethnic clashes," 2006). I think that the credit for ethnic peace in Suriname is due to the country's political leaders, who have been willing to make compromises and to share power with the representatives of other ethnic groups (cf. Oostindie, 2005, p. 58). Because ethnic interest conflicts dominate politics in Suriname, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 3, although there have been only minor ethnic clashes.

Trinidad and Tobago is a Caribbean country in which democracy seems to have pacified ethnic interest conflicts. The East Indian (40%) and African (37%) communities are the largest ethnic groups. They are divided by race, language and religion from each other. The other ethnic groups include mixed (21%) and some Europeans and other Asians. East Indians and blacks have struggled for power since the beginning of independence in 1962, but the struggle has remained generally peaceful (see Hookumchand, 2000; Winn, 2006, pp. 318-322). The People's National Movement (PNM), which represents the interests of the Afro-Trinidadian community, dominated in politics until the 1990s. East Indians have their own parties. The latest and the most significant East Indian party is the United National Congress (UNC), which won the 1995 elections and was able to form the government. The electoral system is based on single-member constituencies, but because the two communities are to some extent regionally separated from each other, the simple plurality system has not led to a great over-representation of the winning party. The existence of a significant group of ethnically mixed people has made ethnic party lines flexible. The two communities have learned to accept the results of elections, although they have not yet learned to share power at the level of government. However, it is customary for the ruling party to give some representation to the other ethnic community in the government. Ethnic tension persists between the black and East Indian communities, but it has rarely led to ethnic violence. According to WDM-2011, "Despite non-violent racial tensions that sometimes emerge between Indo-Trinidadians and Afro-Trinidadians, the country's diverse racial and ethnic groups continue to live in what

on the surface appears to be peace and mutual respect." There is no information about ethnic violence from the period 2003-2011 (see Keesing's 2003-2011), but because the most important parties are ethnically based, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to rise to 3 just like in Suriname.

Turkmenistan. The population of Turkmenistan is relatively homogeneous. The Turkmen constitute a large majority (85%). Ethnic minority groups include Uzbek (5%), Russian (4%), and other small ethnic groups. Political power is completely in the hands of the Turkmen majority. There is no information on ethnic violence from the period 2003-2011 (see Keesing's 2003-2011). The country's authoritarian government has been strong enough to maintain ethnic peace (see MAR-2012). The economic and educational position of the Russian minority is still relatively strong. The regionally concentrated Uzbek minority constitutes a more serious threat to ethnic peace. Minority communities do not seem to have important interest organizations or political parties (see Banks et al., 2007, p. 1267). Consequently, the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts is not higher than 1.

The United Arab Emirates. The indigenous Arabs do not constitute more than 19 per cent of the population and with other Arabs 42 per cent. The other ethnic groups include South Asians (50%), Westerners, East Asians and Africans. Only indigenous Arabs are citizens. All immigrant groups are without citizenship and political rights. However, the fact that nearly all immigrants are Muslims may dampen ethnic interest conflicts. The position of immigrant workers is weak and subjugated. They are not even allowed to establish their own interest organizations. The hegemony of indigenous Arabs, supported by the autocratic political system, has been strong enough to prevent protest activities of the subjugated ethnic groups and to maintain ethnic peace. Political power is in the hands of the ruling Emirian elites, the rulers of the seven member states of the federation. In this case, federalism is not intended to facilitate power-sharing between ethnic groups. There is no information on any serious

ethnic violence from the period 2003-2011 (see Keesing's 2006, p. 47181). Because of the subjugated position of the immigrant workers, the scale of ethnic conflicts was estimated to be 2.

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The review of the countries with large negative residuals indicates that in some respects these countries differ clearly from the countries with large positive residuals. The most obvious difference concerns the level of ethnic violence. Nearly all large positive outliers are characterized by an exceptionally high level of ethnic clashes and violence, whereas almost all negative outliers are characterized by a low level or ethnic violence or by the lack of any serious ethnic violence. What background factors could explain this difference? It is remarkable that nine of the large negative outliers (56%) were above the minimum threshold democracy throughout the period 2003-2010 and that Gabon, Guinea-Bissau and Madagascar were only some years below the threshold of democracy in the period 2003-2010 (see *FSD1289 Measures of Democracy 1810.2010)*. Four other countries were strong autocracies (Brunei, Qatar, Turkmenistan and the United Arab Emirates). Of the 21 large positive outliers, only five (24%) countries (Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, Sri Lanka and Turkey) remained above the minimum threshold of democracy throughout the period 2003-2010. The rest of the large positive outliers are unstable democracies and autocracies. This difference between the two subcategories of countries implies that democratic institutions tend to reduce ethnic violence because they are usually better adapted to satisfy the requirements of ethnicity than autocratic systems. Consequently, this difference in the relative number of democracies can be interpreted to support the democratic peace theory.

It was noted in the case of moderate negative outliers that the existence of large racially mixed populations had probably

restrained ethnic conflicts at least in Cuba and Panama. The same seems to be true in the case of large negative outliers at least in the cases of Belize, Madagascar, Peru and Suriname. This observation leads to the assumption that the furthering of interracial and interethnic marriages would provide an effective strategy to mitigate ethnic conflicts.

Chapter 8

Summary and Conclusions

1. Ethnic Nepotism as an Explanatory Factor

2. Measures of Ethnic Conflicts and Ethnic Nepotism

3. Results of Empirical Analyses

4. The Impact of Exceptional Factors

5. Means to Mitigate Ethnic Conflict and Violence

6. Persistence of Ethnic Conflict and Violence

Ethnic conflicts break out again and again in ethnically divided societies in all parts of the world. Even small ethnic differences may lead to conflicts and violent acts. In the contemporary world, most violent disturbances, including interstate wars, civil wars, rebellions and terrorism have been related to ethnic conflicts. Millions of people have been killed in ethnic violence, and even more people have been displaced, expelled from their home regions or forced to flee from their country. The number of ethnic refugees rises to tens of millions. The extent of ethnic conflicts does not seem to be decreasing. The problem explored in this study concerns the question of why ethnic groups tend to conflict in all ethnically heterogeneous countries.

1. Ethnic Nepotism as an Explanatory Factor

I have attempted to show in this book that we can trace the origin of ethnic conflicts to some evolved characteristics of human nature (ethnic nepotism) and that, therefore, it is reasonable to expect that ethnic conflicts will continue in all ethnically divided societies. However, it should be noted that ethnic nepotism is not assumed to be the original cause of interest conflicts in human societies. As explained in Chapter 1, the original cause of conflicts is in the fact that we are bound to the endless struggle for permanently scarce resources. The theory of ethnic nepotism does not explain the evolutionary origin of conflicts, but it explains why many kinds of interest conflicts tend to become canalized along ethnic lines in ethnically divided societies. The evolutionary roots of nepotism are assumed to be in our genome because it has been genetically rational to support relatives. Ethnic nepotism is an extended form of family nepotism. On average, the members of an ethnic group are genetically more closely related to each other than to outsiders. Because the rules of ethnic nepotism are engraved in our genes by evolution, it is hardly possible to eradicate this behavior pattern from human nature.

The argumentation about the causal impact of ethnic nepotism led me to assume that there must be a systematic relationship between the degree of ethnic diversity and the extent of ethnic conflict. I assumed that ethnic diversity leads to ethnic conflict in all ethnically divided societies and that sometimes ethnic conflicts escalate into violent ones. The extent and significance of ethnic conflicts were assumed to rise, the higher the level of ethnic heterogeneity of the population. Briefly stated, it was hypothesized that the more deeply a country's population is ethnically divided, the more interest conflicts become canalized along ethnic lines.

Because ethnic nepotism belongs to human nature, which is shared by all human populations, this relationship is assumed to

be universal and to appear in all human populations across all civilizational and cultural boundaries. This hypothesis contradicts cultural explanations of ethnic conflicts, which are based on the assumption that ethnic conflicts and violence are caused by particular cultural and environmental factors that vary from place to place and that, therefore, there cannot be any common explanatory factor behind all ethnic conflicts. Of course, various cultural, local and accidental factors affect always the emergence and nature of particular ethnic conflicts, but my argument is that, to some extent although not completely, it is possible to trace the origin of all ethnic conflicts to the common underlying explanatory factor, ethnic nepotism, which is measured by ethnic heterogeneity (EH) in this study.

It is possible to test this hypothesis on the impact of ethnic nepotism on ethnic conflicts by empirical evidence, whereas it has usually not been possible to test cultural explanations for the simple reason that it has been difficult or impossible to operationalize cultural concepts into measurable variables. The hypothetical concepts of cultural explanations have been too vague.

2. Measures of Ethnic Conflicts and Ethnic Nepotism

The central hypothesis derived from the theory of ethnic nepotism was tested by empirical evidence by substituting hypothetical concepts for operationally defined variables - the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (EEC) and the level of ethnic heterogeneity (EH).

In Chapter 2, I constructed an indicator - the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (EEC) - to measure the extent and significance of ethnic conflicts at national level. It is a combination of more or less peaceful and institutionalized ethnic conflicts and violent conflicts. Its scores vary from 1 to 5, from minor ethnic conflicts (1) to extremely violent ones (5) in the period 2003-2011. In the estimations of EEC, I tried to apply the same criteria of ethnic

conflicts, briefly defined and described in Chapter 2, to all countries of this study. The estimated scores of EEC are only rough approximations, but I assume that they separate satisfactorily countries with extensive ethnic conflicts from countries with less significant ethnic conflicts or without any serious ethnic conflicts. The estimated scores of EEC with brief descriptions about the nature of ethnic conflicts are presented for 176 countries in Appendix 1.

Because ethnic nepotism is used as the principal explanatory factor in this study, it was necessary to formulate an empirical variable to measure the impact of ethnic nepotism. Unfortunately we do not have any generally accepted measure of ethnic heterogeneity. For the purposes of this study, I constructed a variable which measures the level of ethnic heterogeneity (EH). It is based on the percentage of the largest racial, national, linguistic, tribal or old religious group. In each case it was necessary to decide which type of ethnic cleavage would be the most suitable to measure the level of ethnic heterogeneity in a country. In some countries, racial divisions are most important, whereas in some other countries national, linguistic, tribal or old religious cleavages are most important. The data on the largest ethnic group as well as on the inverse percentages (EH) are given in Appendix 2. It should be noted that the percentage of the largest ethnic group measures the ethnic homogeneity of the population, whereas the inverse percentage of the largest ethnic group measures the level of ethnic heterogeneity (EH). I assume that empirical data on the largest ethnic groups are relatively reliable, although there are several cases in which different interpretations would be possible. Besides, in the construction of EH, an attempt was made to take into account the fact that genetic distances between racial groups are much greater than between other types of ethnic groups, particularly between tribal groups. This was taken into account in the cases of sub-Saharan African tribal groups by dividing the inverse percentage of the largest tribal group by 2. On the other hand, when various ethnic cleavages

coincide nearly completely, the inverse percentage of the largest ethnic group was multiplied by 2 (Israel and Sri Lanka). According to my assumption, the genetic distance between ethnic groups is usually greater, the longer ethnic groups have been separated from each other.

The level of ethnic heterogeneity (EH) is my principal explanatory variable, but certainly there are also other variables which could be used to measure ethnic diversity. I found two measures of ethnic fragmentation (Anckar et al., 2002, and Alesina et al., 2003) which can be used as alternative measures of ethnic nepotism. The purpose was to see to what extent these measures of ethnic fragmentation are correlated with EH and how much they are able to explain of the global variation in EEC.

Further, I wanted to check the explanatory power of EH by some alternative explanatory variables. For this purpose I selected four variables: (1) GNI-PPP per capita 2008, (2) Human Development Index (HDI) 2010, (3) the Index of Democratization (ID) 2010, and (4) Freedom House´s combined ratings of political rights and civil liberties (FH) 2010. The use of these variables is based on the hypotheses according to which the rise in the level of socioeconomic development tends to dampen ethnic conflict and that democracy furthers ethnic peace. The purpose was to see to what extent these variables can explain the variation in EEC and to what extent they are able to do it independently from the level of ethnic heterogeneity (EH).

The operationalization of the dependent and explanatory variables made it possible to transform the original hypothesis into four testable research hypotheses in the end of Chapter 2.

3. Results of Empirical Analyses

The four research hypotheses were tested by correlation analysis in Chapter 3. It was found that Anckar's and Alesina's measures of ethnic and linguistic fragmentation are moderately correlated with EH, whereas their measures of religious

fragmentation are nearly independent from EH and also from their measures of ethnic and linguistic fragmentation (Table 3.1). The four alternative explanatory variables (PPP/GNI-08, HDI-2010, ID-2010, and FH-2010) are only slightly correlated with EH (Table 3.2), which was interpreted to indicate that the level of ethnic heterogeneity is almost independent from the levels of socioeconomic development and democratization.

When EH and the ten other explanatory variables were correlated with EEC (Table 3.3), it was found that EH and EEC are strongly correlated (0.812) in the group of 176 countries, whereas the correlations between the ten other explanatory variables and EEC are only moderate or weak. Thus the results of correlation analysis support strongly the first hypothesis on the positive correlation between EH and EEC. The explained part of variation (66%) is surprisingly high considering the fact that the extent of ethnic conflicts depends also on many exceptional local factors and circumstances, which vary from country to country.

The results of correlation analysis support the second hypothesis on the positive correlation between EEC and the six variables of ethnic fragmentation moderately in the cases of ethnic and linguistic fragmentation, but not at all in the case of religious fragmentation. However, Anckar's and Alesina's ethnic and linguistic variables do not explain more than from 22 to 36 per cent of the variation in EEC. This means that the explanatory power of these variables is much weaker than the explanatory power of EH. The results falsify the second hypothesis in the case of religious fragmentation variables.

The results support the third hypothesis on the negative relationship between EEC and PPP/GNI-08, HDI-2010, and ID-2010 variables only slightly. The correlations are negative as hypothesized but weak (see Table 3.3). The explained part of variation in EEC varies from 6 (ID-2010) to 16 (HDI-2010) per cent. This means that it is not possible to explain the extent of ethnic conflicts to any significant extent by per capita income, the level of human development or the level of democratization. This

is an important finding. The extent of ethnic conflicts (EEC) seems to be nearly independent from the level of socioeconomic development and democratization. The results of correlation analysis support the fourth hypothesis about the positive relationship between FH-2010 and EEC slightly (correlation 0.330). The level of democratization does not provide any significant explanation for the variation in the level of ethnic conflicts, although the results of correlation analysis support the democratic civil peace hypothesis slightly. The extent of ethnic conflicts has been nearly the same both in democracies and non-democracies.

Multiple correlation analysis was used to test the ability of the eight alternative explanatory variables to explain the variation in EEC independently from EH (Table 3.4). The results show that those other explanatory variables are able to increase the explained part of variation in EEC only marginally, from one to six percentage points. Almost all of the explanations provided by these alternative explanatory variables are overlapping with the explanation provided by EH.

The results of empirical analyses lead to the conclusion that ethnic nepotism measured by EH is the evolutionary background factor which explains the universal emergence of ethnic interest conflicts in practically all ethnically divided societies and which is able to explain 66 per cent of the global variation in the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (EEC). Because human disposition to ethnic nepotism is most probably engraved into our genome, it is reasonable to expect that ethnic conflicts will continue in human societies in the future.

The unexplained part of the variation in EEC (34%) is due to other factors, including many kinds of local, temporary and accidental factors as well as measurement errors and the impact of political leadership. My purpose in this study has been to focus on the explanatory power of ethnic nepotism. I did not try to find out a complete explanation for the national variation in the level of ethnic conflicts. However, it would be useful to get some hints about the nature of those other explanatory factors because some

of them may be under conscious human control, which means that they could be used to mitigate or increase ethnic conflicts, especially violent conflicts. Regression analysis (Chapter 4) was used to disclose the countries in which the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts in 2003-2011 was approximately at the level predicted by the regression equation as well as the countries which deviate most from the average relationship (regression line) between EH and EEC and which more or less contradict the hypothesis on the causal relationship between EH and EEC. Because 34 per cent of the variation in EEC remained unexplained, there is room for many clearly deviating countries. The examination of the most deviating countries may provide hints about other factors that affect the extent of ethnic conflicts. I was especially interested to find out the impact of democratic institutions because political institutions constitute a factor that is under conscious human control. All types of democratic institutions do not need to be equally well adapted to mitigate ethnic interest conflicts. Democratic institutions intended to mitigate ethnic conflicts should be adapted to local conditions and ethnic structures, which may differ considerably from country to country. My interest in democratic institutions is based on the idea that by adapting democratic institutions sufficiently well to the requirements of ethnicity and ethnic nepotism it might become possible to avoid the escalation of ethnic conflict into open violence. Because of ethnic nepotism, ethnic interest conflicts are inevitable in all ethnically divided countries, but ethnic violence is not inevitable. It may be possible to avoid ethnic violence by making political compromises between ethnic groups. Systematic differences between large positive and large negative outliers could provide hints on factors that are related to higher than expected or lower than expected levels of ethnic conflicts.

4. The Impact of Exceptional Local Factors

The purpose of the country reviews presented in chapters 5, 6, and 7 has been to provide more information on the nature of ethnic cleavages and ethnic conflicts in each country. The estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (EEC) and the level of ethnic heterogeneity (EH) given in Appendixes 1 and 2 are based on these data. Ethnic conflicts and cleavages are different in each country depending on local circumstances, but it is remarkable that despite innumerable local differences the level of ethnic heterogeneity (ethnic nepotism) predicts the scale of ethnic conflicts (EEC) quite well for most of the 176 countries. The results of the regression analysis of EEC on EH show that in 105 cases the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts differs only ± 0.4 EEC index points or less from the regression line. The actual value of EEC differs moderately (±0.5 or 0.6) from the regression line in 34 cases, and the number of large deviations (±0.7 or higher) is 37. The countries around the regression line are not problematic from the perspective of this study because they support strongly the basic hypothesis of this study, whereas the 34 countries with moderate residuals and even more the 37 countries with large residuals contradict the hypothesis to some extent. They imply the impact of some other systematic or exceptional local factors on the scale of ethnic conflicts. It would be useful to know something about them. The reviews of countries with moderate and large residuals given in chapters 6 and 7 include some references to exceptional local factors which have been related to deviations from the regression line. Let us see what kinds of factors have emerged in country reviews.

The reviews of 18 countries with moderate positive residuals imply that deep racial and cultural cleavages have intensified ethnic conflicts at least in countries like Bangladesh (Bengalis and the Chittagong Hill tribes), Chile (white/mestizos and indigenous Mapuche tribes), France (Europeans and non-Europeans), Mauritania (Moors and black Africans) and Zimbabwe (blacks

and whites). The struggle for the control of the same territory seems to have increased the extent of violent conflicts in countries like Bangladesh, China and Israel. Deep religious and communal animosities seem to have intensified ethnic conflicts and caused violence between Muslims and Hindus in Bangladesh, between Croat Catholics and Serb Orthodox in Croatia and between Muslims and Copt Christians in Egypt. The subjugated and discriminated position of the large Roma minority has intensified ethnic conflicts especially in Hungary and Romania.

The reviews of 16 countries with moderate negative residuals indicate that three types of local factors characterize several of these countries: the existence of democratic institutions in countries like Benin, Estonia, Germany, Guyana, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mauritius, Panama and Sweden; the existence of strong autocratic systems in Cuba, Iran and Laos; and extensive racially mixed population especially in Cuba and Panama. The level of institutionalized ethnic conflicts may remain high in democracies, but if all ethnic groups are allowed to take part in national politics through democratic institutions, it may hamper the escalation of ethnic interest conflicts into violence. Autocratic regimes have often been strong enough to maintain institutionalized discrimination and inequality of some ethnic groups and to prevent violent ethnic clashes. In the countries with large racially mixed populations, the fact that many people are not sure about their ethnic group may tend to hamper ethnic conflicts and violence.

It is evident that exceptional local factors connected with higher than expected and lower than expected scales of ethnic conflicts in the group of moderate positive and negative residuals are quite different. An interesting question is whether the same kinds of systematic differences appear also in the groups of large positive and negative residuals.

The reviews of 21 countries with large positive residuals indicate that deep racial cleavages and religious animosities characterize many of the countries with large positive residuals

just as in the case of moderate positive residuals. Deep racial and cultural cleavages seem to have intensified ethnic conflicts at least in the cases of Chile (whites and indigenous people), France (Europeans and non-European immigrants), Mali and Niger (black Africans and Tuaregs), Russia (Russians and Muslims in the Caucasus region), South Africa (black Africans and whites) and Sudan (Arabs and black Africans). Extensive ethnic violence has been connected with religious animosities especially in countries like Iraq (Sunni and Shia Muslims) and Nigeria (Christians and Muslims). A remarkable difference between the countries with moderate and large positive residuals is in the significance of ethnic violence. Countries with moderate positive residuals have avoided large-scale ethnic violence, whereas an exceptionally high level of ethnic violence has increased the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts at least in Afghanistan, Burma, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, East Timor, Iraq, Kenya, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand and Turkey. Some exceptional local circumstances and the failures of political leaders to compromise contributed to the eruption of serious ethnic violence in all these countries. I want to emphasize that serious ethnic interest conflicts do not automatically escalate into violent conflicts. It is always, or nearly always, possible to avoid violent conflict by making political compromises that satisfy the strivings of the main contenders. In other words, the eruption of violent ethnic conflict is often connected with the failure of political leaders to compromise.

The reviews of 16 countries with large negative residuals disclose that the explanatory local factors are in most cases similar as in the connection of moderate negative residuals. It is remarkable that most of the large negative outliers were democracies in 2010. It is obvious that political leaders had been able to make compromises which helped to avoid serious ethnic violence. Several of the large positive outliers were also democracies in 2010, but their governments had not been able to solve all ethnic problems satisfactorily. Just like in the case of the countries with moderate negative residuals, non-democratic and

autocratic regimes in Brunei, Qatar, Turkmenistan and the United Arab Emirates were strong enough to prevent large-scale ethnic violence and to maintain institutionalized discrimination of some ethnic groups. In the case of Madagascar, the extensive mixing of ethnic groups may have hampered the eruption of ethnic violence.

The observations on the differences between local factors that are connected with larger than expected and smaller than expected scales of ethnic conflicts provide hints about the nature of other explanatory factors that may explain clear deviations from the regression line. Some of those other explanatory factors may provide means to mitigate ethnic conflicts and violence.

5. Means to Mitigate Ethnic Conflict and Violence

The findings of this study provide material to consider various means to mitigate ethnic conflicts and violence. I pay attention particularly to biological mixing, institutional reforms, democratic compromises and the use of partition. It is not possible to eradicate ethnic conflicts from the world because they emerge from our evolved disposition to ethnic nepotism and because their evolutionary roots are in the inevitable struggle for scarce resources, but in particular cases it might be possible to mitigate ethnic conflict and to avoid or reduce ethnic violence by appropriate strategies that are under conscious human control.

Biological mixing

Because the extent of ethnic conflict is strongly related to the level of ethnic heterogeneity (genetic distance between ethnic groups), the biological mixing of conflicting groups would provide the most effective way to reduce and ultimately remove ethnic conflicts. Peter Winn (2006, p. 311) refers to Jorge Amado, a Brazilian writer, who argues that "There exists only one solution to the racial problem and that is the mixing of the races." As a consequence of biological mixing, people would not any longer be

sure about their own ethnic identity and place in ethnic conflicts. Consequently, the impact of ethnic nepotism would decrease drastically. In such circumstances, it would become difficult for people to organize themselves for interest conflicts along ethnic lines. There are already many examples on the mitigating impact of biological mixing from different parts of the world.

Racial mixing has produced large sections of racially mixed people especially in Latin American countries (Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela). It is characteristic for these countries that residuals based on the regression of EEC on EH are small or negative (see Table 4.1). The group does not include any country with a large positive residual, whereas negative residuals are moderate or large for Belize and Cuba. My argument is that the relatively low level of ethnic violence in most Latin American countries is causally related to the fact that racially mixed people constitute a significant part of the population in these countries. Besides, all American countries are lands of relatively recent immigrants (see Winn 2006, pp. 18-20), which means that ethnic groups are not traditionally attached to certain ancestral territories, except Amerindians. Besides, their dispersed settlement patterns reduce the danger of ethnic violence. The remaining indigenous Amerindians differ from this rule, but they have already lost most of their ancestral territories. In Africa, Cape Verde, Comoros, Madagascar and Sao Tome & Principe are countries with large ethnically mixed populations. They have avoided serious ethnic violence. It is possible that the genetic mixing of tribal groups has reduced ethnic violence also in several other African countries.

In principle, the same strategy of biological mixing could be used in many other countries to mitigate ethnic conflicts and to prevent the eruption of ethnic violence, but local circumstances in most countries have not been conducive to extensive biological mixing, although the process of racial and other ethnic interbreeding is taking place in all parts of the world. However, it

is a slow process. Many ethnic groups actively resist interracial and other interethnic marriages. Jews, for example, have more or less retained their existence as a separate ethnic group for two thousand years, although they have been dispersed around the world. In the United States, the biological mixing between whites and blacks has progressed slowly, although many other racial and ethnic groups have become extensively mixed and are losing their separate ethnicity. In the Western European countries, the integration of non-European migrants into indigenous populations has progressed slowly, especially in the cases of Africans, Muslims, and Indians. Consequently, many Western European countries are becoming multicultural, which means that immigrant groups try to retain their separate ethnicity and that the potential for ethnic conflicts increases (cf. *Immigration to Europe*. 2012). Biological mixing of people seems to be especially difficult in countries in which ethnic groups are based on traditional religious cleavages, for example, in countries like Iraq, Israel, Lebanon and Sri Lanka. In some other countries, racial cleavages are so deep that biological mixing of populations has been quite limited, for example, in countries like Sudan and South Africa and also in Guyana, Suriname and Trinidad & Tobago. Biological mixing of ethnic groups has probably been most successful in African tribal societies.

My point is that biological mixing of racial and other ethnic groups would be the most effective strategy to mitigate ethnic conflicts and to reduce the danger of ethnic violence because it would undermine the basis and importance of ethnic nepotism.

Institutional reforms

Some reviews of countries with moderate or large residuals imply that the level of ethnic conflicts does not depend only on EH but also on various institutional arrangements. The degree to which political and social institutions are adapted to the requirements of ethnicity varies greatly. Because political and social institutions are, in principle, under conscious human

control, it would be useful to understand how they have been used and could be used to regulate ethnic relations.

Discrimination, suppression and slavery have been used, especially in autocratically ruled ethnically divided societies, but also in some democracies, to maintain the hegemony of the dominant ethnic group and to prevent violent uprisings of subjugated ethnic groups. It is a method to safeguard ethnic peace, but such a method itself is based on violence. In the period 2003-2011, systematic discrimination and suppression of subjugated ethnic groups were used to maintain ethnic peace, for example, in countries like Bahrain, Bhutan, Brunei, Guatemala, Kuwait, Mauritania, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and, to a lesser extent, in several other countries. This method has not always been successful. Some of the subjugated ethnic groups revolted and attempted to improve their position by means of violence in the period 2003-2011 or a little earlier, for example, in Bolivia, Burma, Burundi, China, Djibouti, East Timor, Ecuador, Georgia, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Laos, Mexico, Nepal, the Philippines, Russia, Rwanda, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand and Turkey. Both authoritarian and democratic systems may fail in their attempts to maintain ethnic peace and traditional ethnic inequalities.

There are several countries in which ethnic groups are legally approximately equal but in which they nevertheless resorted to violent struggle for power in the period 2003-2011 or earlier because the countries had failed to establish satisfactory power-sharing institutions. This group includes at least countries like Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Iraq, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Uganda. The group includes both democracies and non-democracies. Most of them are sub-Saharan African countries. It is obvious that their political systems have not provided sufficient institutional means to resolve ethnic

interest conflicts by peaceful means. The question is what kind of institutions would be needed in such countries to safeguard ethnic peace. I think that the nature of democratic institutions matters. In fact, countries like Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Lebanon, Liberia, Mozambique and Sierra Leone succeeded in ending civil wars by democratic compromises and by establishing constitutional institutions which take into account some requirements of ethnicity.

I am tempted to argue that each significant ethnic group should be allowed to take part in national politics through their own party(ies), but the governments of many countries, especially of sub-Saharan African countries, have attempted to prevent the establishment of ethnic parties by banning parties based on clan, community, ethnicity, faith, gender, language, region, race, sect and tribe (see Bogaards et al., 2010; Moroff, 2010). I think that it would be better to allow people themselves to decide what kind of party is best suited to represent their interests in national political institutions. Benjamin Reilly (2006b) refers to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) whose guidelines "explicitly affirm the right of ethnic minorities to form their own parties and compete for office on an ethnic basis" (p. 814). His conclusion is: "If ethnic groups are unable to mobilize and compete for political power by democratic means, they will likely find other ways to achieve their ends" (p. 824).

Democratic compromises

Old ethnically divided democracies like Belgium, Switzerland and Canada have avoided violent ethnic conflicts, but there are also several new ethnically heterogeneous democracies in which ethnic conflicts have remained more or less peaceful. The examination of countries with moderate or large positive and negative residuals disclosed that democracies are clearly more frequent in the groups of negative outliers than in the groups of positive outliers. This observation supports the democratic peace theory to some extent, but it should be noted that all kinds of

democratic institutions are not equally capable of mitigating ethnic conflict. Presidential systems seem to be more frequent in the groups of moderate or large positive outliers than in the groups of negative outliers. It may be that presidential systems are not as well adapted to mitigate ethnic conflicts as parliamentary systems because, in the former, power is too much concentrated in the hands of one ethnic group.

From this perspective, it would be useful to examine ethnically divided democracies (EH 20 or higher) which have successfully maintained ethnic peace and for which residuals are negative. This group of countries includes most clearly Belize, Benin, Canada, Estonia, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Latvia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Panama, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago and Zambia. It is remarkable that most of them (except Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Panama and Peru) are parliamentary democracies. Political power is more or less shared by all important ethnic groups in all these countries. Their party systems have become adapted to represent all important ethnic groups and ethnic cleavages. Besides, the political systems of Canada, Malaysia and Spain are characterized by some federal structures (cf. Stewart et al., 2008, pp. 306-310).

The political systems of these 14 democracies with negative residuals provide hints about democratic institutions which have been used successfully to regulate ethnic interest conflicts and to maintain ethnic peace in ethnically deeply divided societies. Could it be possible for ethnically divided countries with large positive residuals to follow their example and to reduce ethnic conflict and violence by democratic institutional reforms? In fact, some of them have already attempted more or less successfully to regulate ethnic relations by adapting constitutional institutions to the requirements of ethnic cleavages. The group of such countries includes at least Afghanistan, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Burundi, Ethiopia, Fiji, Iraq, Lebanon and Rwanda. However, I suspect that many countries suffering from ethnic violence would not be able to make the necessary democratic compromises, which presuppose, for example, legal equality between competing ethnic

groups. Further, it would be difficult to make democratic compromises in countries in which ethnic groups struggle for control of indivisible territories as, for example, in Israel and Sri Lanka. Besides, all countries may not be equally able to establish and maintain democratic institutions (cf. Vanhanen, 2009).

The chances of many countries to reduce ethnic violence by democratic compromises are certainly quite limited, but it is useful to recognize that ethnic violence is not inevitable and that there are institutional means to resolve conflicts. The fact is that many contemporary democratic and other political institutions are not particularly well adapted to satisfy the needs of ethnicity or to mitigate ethnic conflict. Usually political institutions are adapted to safeguard the interests of dominant ethnic group(s). My argument is that there are still a lot of unused possibilities to mitigate ethnic conflicts by institutional engineering, especially through democratic institutions. Of course, this applies only to democracies or to countries which would be able to establish and maintain democratic institutions. The introduction of democratic institutions would not help in countries which are not able to maintain democratic competition for power, or in which democratic institutions are insignificant compared to the importance of autocratic power structures.

In ethnically divided democracies, democratic institutions of power-sharing should be adapted to local circumstances. There is no general pattern which would apply equally well to all countries. In each case, it should be considered what kind of state structure (federalism or unitary state), governmental system (parliamentary or presidential), electoral system (proportional or majoritarian) and party system would be best adapted to satisfy the interests of various ethnic groups and to make possible political compromises and sharing of power between ethnic groups. There are ethnically divided old democracies (like Canada, Belgium and Switzerland) in which democratic institutions have become well adapted to the requirements of ethnicity and which have avoided ethnic violence. There are also

some examples of new democracies (like Bosnia & Herzegovina and Fiji) in which serious and successful attempts have been made to adapt constitutions and democratic institutions to the requirements of ethnicity. It would be useful to examine such old and new examples in other ethnically divided societies and to consider how they could improve the adaptation of their own political institutions to the requirements of ethnicity. Human intelligence and experiences from other countries should be used to solve the problems of cohabitation of different ethnic groups within the borders of the same country.

However, the earlier experience shows that the willingness of competing ethnic groups to solve their interest conflicts by democratic compromises and power-sharing is limited. It is difficult for dominant ethnic groups to grant equality for previously subjugated ethnic groups and to share power with them on equal terms. And it is difficult for subjugated ethnic groups to accept their less than equal position. I think that we should not completely exclude the possibility of democratic compromises based on unequal terms. Fiji's and Burundi's new constitutional structures are examples of democratic compromises based on unequal terms. In practice, in many old and new democracies some ethnic minorities are institutionally discriminated and prevented from fair representation. In such cases, ethnic minorities seem to have accepted their unprivileged position because it is balanced by some rights and possibilities to survive.

Briefly stated, I think that ethnic violence could be avoided in many ethnically divided societies by democratic compromises, which presuppose the adaptation of political institutions to satisfy the reasonable interests of all important ethnic groups. In practice, we cannot expect any significant increase in the use of democratic compromises for the reason that few ethnic groups are willing to give up privileges they have achieved. Besides, the unprivileged ethnic groups are not always satisfied with the concessions made by dominant ethnic groups. The making of democratic compromises may become even more difficult in

situations in which more or less equal ethnic groups struggle for the control of the same territory.

Partition

In some extreme cases, in which ethnic groups struggle for the control of the same indivisible territory, partition of the country should not be excluded (cf. Thomay, 1993, pp. 124-126). Partition was used in India when it became independent in 1947 and later in Pakistan when Bangladesh separated from Pakistan. Cyprus is divided into Greek and Turkish sectors. Recently partition occurred *de facto* in Somalia, when Somaliland seceded from Somalia in 1991, in Serbia, when Kosovo declared its independence in 2008, in Georgia, when Abkhazia and South Ossetia declared their independence in 2008, and in Sudan, when South Sudan became independent in 2011. There are some other countries in which partition might be possible. However, it should be noted that not all partitions have led to permanent ethnic peace or that they have not yet become legally accepted by all parties concerned. The relations between India and Pakistan have remained poor; there is a military stalemate between the Greek and Turkish sectors in Cyprus; Armenia and Azerbaijan have not yet been able to agree on the destiny of Nagorno-Karabakh; and the same concern *de facto* partitions in Somalia, Moldova, Serbia and Georgia.

The most successful partitions took place in the former Soviet Union when all Soviet republics declared their independence; in Czechoslovakia when it was divided into the Czech Republic and Slovakia; and in the former Yugoslavia when it was dissolved and its federal units declared their independence. Partitions in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia occurred peacefully, whereas bloody civil wars followed partition in some parts of the former Yugoslavia.

6. Persistence of Ethnic Conflict and Violence

Our evolved disposition to ethnic nepotism maintains ethnic tension and interest conflicts in ethnically divided societies and occasionally leads to ethnic violence. Because we do not have any means to eradicate this disposition from human nature, it is reasonable to expect that ethnic interest conflicts will continue in the world and that they will occasionally lead to ethnic violence. The fact that the history of ethnic violence seems to extend to the dawn of human history supports this expectation (cf. Kiernan, 2007). It is also reasonable to expect that, because of ethnic nepotism, the extent of ethnic conflicts will continually correlate with the level of ethnic heterogeneity. The deeper ethnic cleavages are, the more ethnic conflicts can be expected.

Transcontinental migrations increase the ethnic diversity of populations in many countries and consequently also the probability of ethnic conflict. The growth of the world population is another factor which raises rather than decreases the probability of ethnic conflict and violence. When more people have to struggle for survival and scarce resources in the same limited space, the intensity of interest conflicts rises, and, in ethnically divided societies, such conflicts become more and more canalized along ethnic lines. Human evolved disposition to territorial behavior accelerates the intensity of such conflicts. Ethnic groups defend their territories and are unwilling to give up their territories to the members of other ethnic groups. For these reasons, we can expect more rather than less ethnic conflicts in the future.

We are bound to live in the world of increasing intrastate ethnic conflict and ethnic violence. Interstate violent ethnic conflicts may also increase. International terrorism represents a new dimension of ethnic violence. It has become adapted to the opportunities provided by modern weapon and communication technologies. It would be worthwhile to explore institutional means to mitigate ethnic conflicts and to avoid outbreaks of

ethnic violence, but the chances to prevent ethnic violence by institutional means may remain quite limited for the reason that it is often difficult for parties to agree on the nature of appropriate institutions intended to share power between ethnic groups. We should learn to accept the fact that the world we live in is unsafe and that it is impossible to eradicate the evolutionary roots of interest conflicts. The international and domestic struggles for survival and scarce resources are often taking place between ethnic groups, and these struggles are powered by ethnic nepotism.

I have explored the confrontation between democracy and ethnicity on the basis of the hypothesis (see Chapter 2) that democracy reduces the danger of ethnic violence and creates democratic ethnic peace, which might ultimately cover the whole world. Unfortunately the results of this analysis provide only limited support for such an expectation of democratic ethnic peace. The level of democratization explains hardly anything of the variation in ethnic conflicts independently from the level of ethnic heterogeneity, and democracies are nearly as frequent in ethnically heterogeneous and ethnically homogeneous countries. Many examples show that ethnic violence also breaks out in democratic countries. Besides, international terrorism as a new dimension of ethnic violence crosses all political boundaries. Democracy does not eradicate our disposition to ethnic nepotism from human nature, but because there are some examples of ethnically divided societies in which democratic institutions have helped to maintain ethnic peace, it is worthwhile to explore what kinds of democratic institutions might be best adapted to particular ethnically divided countries and to experiment with them.

The central message of this study is that ethnic conflict and violence, empowered by ethnic nepotism and the inevitable struggle for scarce resources, will not disappear from the world. It is more probable that the incidence of

ethnic violence will increase in the more and more crowded world. However, despite this prediction on the persistence of ethnic conflicts, it is worthwhile to explore how competing ethnic groups could resolve their interest conflicts by peaceful means.

Appendix 1

The estimated scale of ethnic conflicts (EEC, scores 1 through 5) over the period 2003-2011 in the group of 176 countries

	Country	EEC	Comments
1	Afghanistan	5	Continual ethnic civil wars and ethnic terrorism
2	Albania	1	Only minor incidents with the Greek minority
3	Algeria	2	Berber parties and separatist strivings
4	Angola	3	Ethnically based parties; occasional tribal clashes
5	Argentina	1	No information on ethnic violence
6	Armenia	1	No information on ethnic violence
7	Australia	1	Isolated incidents of inter-ethnic unrest
8	Austria	1	Minor incidents with immigrants
9	Azerbaijan	1	No information on ethnic violence
10	Bahamas	1	No information on ethnic violence
11	Bahrain	3	Violent clashes with the discriminated Shia community
12	Bangladesh	2	Occasional clashes with the Chittagong tribal groups
13	Barbados	1	No information on ethnic violence
14	Belarus	1	Minor incidents with the Polish minority groups
15	Belgium	3	Ethnic party system; clashes with non-European immigrants

	Country	EEC	Comments
16	Belize	2	Ethnically based parties
17	Benin	2	Some ethnically based parties; north-south split
18	Bhutan	2	Forced expulsion of 100,000 Nepalese continued
19	Bolivia	3	Clashes with indigenous groups; ethnic parties
20	Bosnia and Herzegovina	4	Ethnically based political system; inter-ethnic clashes
21	Botswana	1	No information on ethnic violence
22	Brazil	3	Ethnic divisions in politics; clashes with indigenous peoples
23	Brunei	2	Ethnic minorities discriminated
24	Bulgaria	2	Important party of the Turkish minority
25	Burkina Faso	2	No major ethnic conflicts, but the Mossis dominate in politics
26	Burma (Myanmar)	4	Separatist ethnic rebellions, civil wars
27	Burundi	3	Violent conflicts between Tutsis and Hutus; ethnic parties
28	Cambodia	2	Serious tension between Khmers and Vietnamese
29	Cameroon	3	Ethnically based and secessionist parties; secessionist unrest
30	Canada	2	Separatist movement in Quebec
31	Cape Verde	1	No information on ethnic conflicts
32	Central African Rep.	3	Ethnic violence especially in the northern regions; refugees
33	Chad	4	Ongoing ethnic civil wars and rebellions
34	Chile	2	Clashes with the Mapuche Indians in the south

	Country	EEC	Comments
35	China	2	Violent ethnic conflicts in Xinjiang and Tibet provinces
36	Colombia	2	Violent conflicts with indigenous groups
37	Comoros	1	No information on ethnic conflicts
38	Congo, Dem. Rep.	4	Millions of people killed in ethnic civil wars
39	Congo, Republic	3	Violent ethnic clashes; ethnic parties
40	Costa Rica	1	No information on ethnic conflicts
41	Côte d'Ivoire	4	Ethnically based civil war
42	Croatia	2	Serb separatism
43	Cuba	1	No information on significant ethnic conflicts
44	Cyprus (Greek)	1	No information on ethnic violence
45	Czech Rep.	1	Only minor incidents with the Roma minority
46	Denmark	1	Some incidents with Muslim immigrants
47	Djibouti	2	Clashes between Afar rebels and government troops
48	Dominican Republic	2	Black Haitians are systematically discriminated
49	East Timor (Timor-Leste)	3	Inter-ethnic violence; ethnically based parties; refugees
50	Ecuador	3	Ethnic clashes; discrimination of indigenous peoples
51	Egypt	2	Coptic-Muslim clashes
52	El Salvador	1	No information on significant ethnic conflicts
53	Equatorial Guinea	1	No information on significant ethnic conflicts

	Country	EEC	Comments
54	Eritrea	2	Muslim-Christian polarization; inter-ethnic clashes
55	Estonia	2	Ethnically based parties
56	Ethiopia	3	Repeated ethnic clashes; ethnically based parties
57	Fiji	3	Ethnic parties; minor incidents of inter-ethnic unrest
58	Finland	1	Only minor incidents at individual level
59	France	2	Clashes with Muslim immigrants; separatism in Corsica
60	Gabon	1	Minor inter-ethnic clashes
61	Gambia	2	Tribal conflicts in politics; some ethnically based parties
62	Georgia	3	Civil wars with secessionist Abkhazia and South Ossetia
63	Germany	1	Minor inter-ethnic incidents at local levels
64	Ghana	2	Repeated inter-ethnic violent conflicts; ethnic parties
65	Greece	1	No information on significant ethnic conflicts
66	Guatemala	3	Violent clashes with Amerindians; serious discrimination
67	Guinea	3	Some inter-ethnic violence
68	Guinea-Bissau	2	Clashes between heavily armed ethnic groups
69	Guyana	3	Regular inter-ethnic violence; major parties ethnically based
70	Haiti	1	No information on ethnic conflicts
71	Honduras	2	Violent ethnic clashes at local levels
72	Hungary	2	Discrimination of the Roma minority

	Country	EEC	Comments
73	Iceland	1	No information on ethnic conflicts
74	India	4	Regional civil wars; violent clashes between religious groups
75	Indonesia	4	Extensive ethnic violence in some parts of the country
76	Iran	3	Kurdish separatism; ethnic clashes especially in Baluchistan
77	Iraq	5	Ethnic civil wars and ethnic terrorism
78	Ireland	1	No information on ethnic conflicts
79	Israel	4	Continual Jewish-Palestinian confrontation and war
80	Italy	1	Tension between Italians and non-European immigrants
81	Jamaica	1	No information on ethnic violence
82	Japan	1	No information on ethnic conflicts
83	Jordan	1	No information on significant ethnic conflicts
84	Kazakhstan	3	Occasional ethnic clashes; discrimination of ethnic minorities
85	Kenya	4	Repeated inter-tribal violence; ethnically based parties
86	Korea, North	1	No information on ethnic conflicts
87	Korea, South	1	No information on ethnic conflicts
88	Kuwait	2	Non-Arab immigrant groups discriminated
89	Kyrgyzstan	3	Violent Uzbek-Kyrgyz clashes, hundreds of people killed
90	Laos	2	The Hmong tribals persecuted

	Country	EEC	Comments
91	Latvia	2	Ethnic parties; discrimination of the Russian minority
92	Lebanon	3	Communal divisions dominate in politics; sectarian violence
93	Lesotho	1	No information on ethnic conflicts
94	Liberia	3	Partly ethnic civil war in 2003; ethnically based parties
95	Libya	2	Partly ethnic civil war in 2011
96	Lithuania	1	No information on ethnic violence
97	Luxembourg	1	No information on serious ethnic conflicts
98	Macedonia	3	Violent clashes with the Albanian separatists
99	Madagascar	2	Occasional ethnic clashes
100	Malawi	2	Tribal divisions reflected in the party system
101	Malaysia	3	Ethnically based party system; occasional ethnic clashes
102	Maldives	1	No information on ethnic conflicts
103	Mali	3	Repeated fighting with the Tuareg rebels; ethnic parties
104	Malta	1	No information on ethnic conflicts
105	Mauritania	3	Moorish domination; repressive policies towards blacks
106	Mauritius	2	Ethnically based political parties
107	Mexico	2	Indigenous insurgencies in the south
108	Moldova	2	Separatist Transdnestr region (Russian minority)
109	Mongolia	1	No information on significant ethnic conflicts

	Country	EEC	Comments
110	Montenegro	2	Albanian and Serb minority parties
111	Morocco	1	No information on significant ethnic conflicts
112	Mozambique	2	Ethnic divisions reflected in party support
113	Namibia	2	Separatism in the Caprivi Strip; ethnically based parties
114	Nepal	4	Partly ethnic civil war; ethnically based parties
115	Netherlands	2	Clashes with non-European immigrants
116	New Zealand	2	Significant Maori parties and organizations
117	Nicaragua	1	Minor inter-ethnic clashes
118	Niger	3	Repeated violent clashes with the Tuareg rebels
119	Nigeria	4	Muslim-Christian clashes; thousands of people killed
120	Norway	1	Minor incidents with Muslim immigrants
121	Oman	2	Institutionalized discrimination of ethnic minorities
122	Pakistan	4	Continual civil wars, terrorism and rebellions
123	Panama	2	Indigenous political movements; blacks discriminated
124	Papua New Guinea	2	Widespread inter-ethnic tension and unrest
125	Paraguay	1	No information on ethnic conflicts
126	Peru	3	Continually violent clashes with indigenous peoples
127	Philippines	3	Secessionist rebellion in the south (Muslims)
128	Poland	1	No information on ethnic conflicts

	Country	EEC	Comments
129	Portugal	1	No information on ethnic conflicts
130	Qatar	3	Non-Arab immigrants subjugated
131	Romania	2	Parties of the Hungarian minority
132	Russia	3	Secessionist wars and rebellions in North Caucasus
133	Rwanda	3	Guerrilla war; ethnically based parties
134	St. Lucia	1	No information on ethnic conflicts
135	Samoa	1	No information on ethnic conflicts
136	Sao Tome and Principe	1	No information on ethnic conflicts
137	Saudi Arabia	2	Sunni-Shia clashes; discrimination of foreign workers
138	Senegal	3	Separatist civil war in Casamance; inter-ethnic violence
139	Serbia	2	Some inter-ethnic violent clashes
140	Sierra Leone	3	Ethnically based party system; some inter-tribal clashes
141	Singapore	2	Parties of ethnic minorities (Malays and Indians)
142	Slovakia	2	Parties of the Hungarian minority
143	Slovenia	1	No information on ethnic conflicts
144	Solomon Islands	1	Inter-islands unrest
145	Somalia	5	Continual inter-clan civil wars
146	South Africa	3	Ethnically based parties; occasional ethnic clashes
147	Spain	2	The Basque terrorism and separatism; ethnic parties

	Country	EEC	Comments
148	Sri Lanka	5	Civil war with Tamil separatists
149	Sudan	5	Ethnic civil wars; separatism in the south
150	Suriname	3	Most parties ethnically based
151	Swaziland	1	No information on ethnic conflicts
152	Sweden	1	Minor incidents with immigrants
153	Switzerland	2	Tension between the Swiss and foreign workers
154	Syria	2	The Kurds are repressed
155	Taiwan	2	Chinese/Taiwanese conflict reflected in the party system
156	Tajikistan	2	Violent clashes in the eastern Rasht valley
157	Tanzania	2	Separatist strivings in Zanzibar
158	Thailand	3	Separatist Muslim rebellion in the south
159	Togo	3	Post-election ethnic violence in 2005; ethnically based parties
160	Trinidad and Tobago	3	Ethnic parties dominate in politics
161	Tunisia	1	No information on ethnic conflicts
162	Turkey	3	Armed insurgency in Kurdish southeast
163	Turkmenistan	1	No information on ethnic conflicts
164	Uganda	3	Armed insurgency in north
165	Ukraine	2	Ukrainian-Russian confrontation reflected in the party system
166	United Arab Emirates	2	Non-Arab immigrant groups discriminated

	Country	EEC	Comments
167	United Kingdom	2	Occasional clashes in Northern Ireland; inter-ethnic unrest
168	United States	2	Occasional inter-ethnic clashes
169	Uruguay	1	No information on ethnic conflicts
170	Uzbekistan	2	Some serious ethnic violence
171	Vanuatu	1	No information on ethnic conflicts
172	Venezuela	1	No information on significant ethnic conflicts
173	Vietnam	2	Frequent occurrences of inter-ethnic violence
174	Yemen	1	Civil wars but not between ethnic groups
175	Zambia	2	Tribal divisions reflected in the party system
176	Zimbabwe	2	Widespread inter-ethnic violence

Sources

The estimated scales of EEC are principally based on data derived from the following sources: *Keesing's Record of World Events,* 2003-2011; Freedom House, *Freedom in the World,* 2010; Minority Rights Group International, *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples,* 2011; Banks et al., *Political Handbook of the World 2007* (2007), *The World Guide, Global reference, country by country* (2007); *Minorities at Risk: Monitoring the persecution and mobilization of ethnic groups worldwide* (2012). http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr.mar/.

Appendix 2

The percentage of the largest ethnic group and the inverse percentage indicating the level of ethnic heterogeneity (EH) in the group of 176 countries.

	Country	Largest ethnic group	%	EH	Main sources
1	Afghanistan	Pashtun	42	58	CIA-11; FW-06
2	Albania	Albanian	95	5	CIA-11; FW-06
3	Algeria	Arab	83	17	Philip's-2000; cf. WG-07
4	Angola	Ovimbundu	37*	32	CIA-11; FW-06
5	Argentina	White/mestizo	96	4	EGLA
6	Armenia	Armenian	98	2	CIA-11
7	Australia	White	92	8	CIA-11; FW-06
8	Austria	Austrian and German	92	8	CIA-11; FW-06
9	Azerbaijan	Azeri	91	9	CIA-11; FW-06
10	Bahamas	Black	85	15	CIA-11; FW-06
11	Bahrain	Bahraini Arab	63	37	CIA-11; FW-06
12	Bangladesh	Muslim	90	10	CIA-11; cf. FW-06
13	Barbados	Black	93	7	CIA-11
14	Belarus	Belarusian/Russian	93	7	CIA-11; FW-06
15	Belgium	Fleming	58	42	CIA-11; FW-06

	Country	Largest ethnic group	%	EH	Main sources
16	Belize	Mestizo	49	51	CIA-11; Philip's 2000
17	Benin	Fon and related	39*	31	CIA-11; cf. WG-07
18	Bhutan	Lamaistic Buddhist	75	25	CIA-11; FW-06
19	Bolivia	Amerindian	55	45	CIA-11; FW-06
20	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Bosniak	48	52	CIA-11; FW-06
21	Botswana	Tswana	90*	5	Morrison-1972; cf. CIA-11
22	Brazil	White	54	46	CIA-11; FW-06
23	Brunei	Malay	67	33	FW-06; CIA-11
24	Bulgaria	Bulgarian	84	16	CIA-11
25	Burkina Faso	Mossi	48*	26	Philip's-2000
26	Burma (Myanmar)	Burman/Buddhist	68	32	CIA-11; FW-06
27	Burundi	Hutu (Bantu)	85	15	CIA-11; FW-06
28	Cambodia	Khmer	90	10	CIA-11; FW-06
29	Cameroon	Cameroon Highlander	31*	35	CIA-11; FW-06
30	Canada	European	66	34	CIA-11; FW-06
31	Cape Verde	Creole and African	99	1	CIA-11; FW-06
32	Central African Republic	Baya	33*	34	CIA-11; FW-06
33	Chad	Arab type	46	54	Morrison, 1972; cf. CIA-11
34	Chile	White/mestizo	92	8	EGLA
35	China	Han Chinese	92	8	CIA-11; FW-06

	Country	Largest ethnic group	%	EH	Main sources
36	Colombia	Mestizo/white	73	27	EGLA
37	Comoros	Sunni Muslim	98	2	CIA-11; FW-06
38	Congo, Dem. Rep.	Luba	18*	41	Philip's-2000; WG-07
39	Congo, Republic of	Kongo	48*	26	FW-06
40	Costa Rica	White/mestizo	97	3	EGLA
41	Cote d'Ivoire	Akan	42*	29	CIA-11; FW-06
42	Croatia	Croat	90	10	CIA-11; FW-06
43	Cuba	White/mulatto	88	12	EGLA
44	Cyprus	Greek	99	1	Held, 1994, p. 234
45	Czech Rep.	Czech and Moravian	94	6	CIA-11; FW-06
46	Denmark	Danes and Europeans	95	5	WG-07
47	Djibouti	Somali	60*	20	CIA-11; FW-06
48	Dominican Republic	Mixed and white	89	11	CIA-11; FW-06
49	East Timor	Timorese	83	17	MRG-1997
50	Ecuador	Mestizo/mulatto/white	56	44	EGLA
51	Egypt	Muslim (mostly Sunni)	90	10	CIA-11
52	El Salvador	Mestizo/white	92	8	EGLA
53	Equatorial Guinea	Fang	86*	7	CIA-11
54	Eritrea	Tigrinya	50*	25	CIA-11; FW-06

	Country	Largest ethnic group	%	EH	Main sources
55	Estonia	Estonian	68	32	CIA-11; FW-06
56	Ethiopia	Oromo	32*	34	CIA-11; cf. FW-06
57	Fiji	Fijian	57	43	CIA-11; cf. FW-06
58	Finland	Finn	93	7	CIA-11; FW-06
59	France	French/Europeans	91	9	EGE
60	Gabon	Fang-speakers	50*	25	Morrison, 1972
61	Gambia	Mandinka	42*	29	CIA-11; FW-06
62	Georgia	Georgian	84	16	EGA
63	Germany	German	91	9	EGE
64	Ghana	Akan	45*	28	CIA-11; FW-06
65	Greece	Greek	93	7	CIA-11: FW-06
66	Guatemala	Amerindian	53	47	EGLA
67	Guinea	Peuhl	40*	30	CIA-11; FW-06
68	Guinea-Bissau	Balanta	30*	35	CIA-11; FW-06
69	Guyana	East Indian	50	50	FW-06; Philip's-2000
70	Haiti	Black	95	5	CIA-11; FW-06
71	Honduras	Mestizo/white	87	13	EGLA
72	Hungary	Hungarian	92	8	CIA-11; WG-07
73	Iceland	Icelander	96	4	WG-07; cf. CIA-11
74	India	Hindi (language)	41	59	CIA-11

	Country	Largest ethnic group	%	EH	Main sources
75	Indonesia	Javanese	41	59	CIA-11; cf. FW-06
76	Iran	Persian	51	49	CIA-11; FW-06
77	Iraq	Shia Muslim	60	40	CIA-11; FW-06
78	Ireland	White	95	5	CIA-11
79	Israel	Jewish	76**	48	CIA-11; FW-06
80	Italy	Italian	94	6	Philip's-2000; WG-07
81	Jamaica	Black	91	9	CIA-11; FW-06
82	Japan	Japanese	98	2	CIA-11; FW-06
83	Jordan	Arab	98	2	CIA-11; FW-06
84	Kazakhstan	Kazakh	63	37	EGA
85	Kenya	Kikuyu	22*	39	CIA-11; FW-06
86	Korea, North	Korean	99	1	Philip's-2000
87	Korea, South	Korean	99	1	Philip's-2000
88	Kuwait	Kuwaiti and other Arab	80	20	CIA-11; FW-06
89	Kyrgyzstan	Kyrgyz	65	35	CIA-11; FW-06
90	Laos	Lao Loum (lowland)	68	32	FW-06; cf. Philip's-2000
91	Latvia	Latvian	58	42	CIA-11; FW-06
92	Lebanon	Muslim	60	40	CIA-11; FW-06
93	Lesotho	Sotho	99*	1	CIA-11: FW-06
94	Liberia	Kpelle	19*	41	MRG-1997; Philip's-2000

	Country	Largest ethnic group	%	EH	Main sources
95	Libya	Mixed Arab-Berber	90	10	MRG-2011; cf. CIA-11
96	Lithuania	Lithuanian	83	17	CIA-11; FW-06
97	Luxembourg	European	94	6	CIA-11; Philip's-2000
98	Macedonia	Macedonian	64	36	CIA-11; FW-06
99	Madagascar	Merina	27*	37	Philip's-2000; MRG-1997
100	Malawi	Marawi	58*	21	WG-07; Philip's-2000
101	Malaysia	Malay	50	50	CIA-11
102	Maldives	Mixed South Asian	100	0	CIA-11; WG-07
103	Mali	Mande	50*	25	CIA-11; FW-06
104	Malta	Maltese	96	4	WG-07; cf. CIA-11
105	Mauritania	Black and black Moor	70	30	CIA-11; FW-06
106	Mauritius	Indo-Mauritian	68	32	CIA-11; FW-06
107	Mexico	Mestizo/white	85	15	EGLA
108	Moldova	Moldovan/Romanian	78	22	CIA-11; FW-06
109	Mongolia	Mongol	95	5	CIA-11; FW-06
110	Montenegro	Montenegrin/Serb	75	25	EGE
111	Morocco	Arab-Berber	99	1	CIA-11; FW-06
112	Mozambique	Makua	47*	27	Philip's-2000; WG-07
113	Namibia	Ovambo	50*	25	CIA-11; Philip's-2000
114	Nepal	Nepalese	53	47	Philip's-2000; WG-07

	Country	Largest ethnic group	%	EH	Main sources
115	Netherlands	Dutch/other European	86	14	CIA-11
116	New Zealand	European	74	26	Philip's-2000; FW-06
117	Nicaragua	Mestizo/white	92	8	EGLA
118	Niger	Hausa	55*	23	CIA-11; FW-06
119	Nigeria	Hausa and Fulani	29*	36	CIA-11; FW-06
120	Norway	Norwegian	94	6	CIA-11; cf. WG-07
121	Oman	Omani Arab	74	26	Philip's-2000; WG-07
122	Pakistan	Punjabi	45	55	CIA-11; cf. Philip's-2000
123	Panama	Mestizo/mulatto/white	69	31	EGLA
124	Papua New Guinea	Papuan	85	15	WG-07; Philip's-2000
125	Paraguay	Mestizo	95	5	CIA-11; FW-06
126	Peru	Amerindian	46	54	EGLA
127	Philippines	Tagalog	28*	36	CIA-11; FW-06
128	Poland	Polish	97	3	CIA-11; FW-06
129	Portugal	Portuguese	92	8	EGE
130	Qatar	Arab	40	60	CIA-11; FW-06
131	Romania	Romanian	90	10	CIA-11; FW-06
132	Russia	Russian	80	20	CIA-11; FW-06
133	Rwanda	Hutu (Bantu)	84	16	CIA-11; FW-06
134	St. Lucia	Black and mixed	94	6	CIA-11; cf. FW-06

	Country	Largest ethnic group	%	EH	Main sources
135	Samoa	Samoan	93	7	CIA-11; FW-06
136	Sao Tome & Principe	Mixed Bantu	100	1	WG-07; MRG-1997
137	Saudi Arabia	Arab	90	10	CIA-11; FW-06
138	Senegal	Wolof	43*	29	CIA-11; FW-06
139	Serbia	Serb	83	17	EGE
140	Sierra Leone	Temne	30*	35	CIA-11; FW-06
141	Singapore	Chinese	77	23	CIA-11: FW-06
142	Slovakia	Slovak	86	14	CIA-11; FW-06
143	Slovenia	Slovene	83	17	CIA-11; FW-06
144	Solomon Is.	Melanesian	94	6	CIA-11; FW-06
145	Somalia	Darod (clan)	20*	40	Samatar-1991; Somalia, 2007
146	South Africa	Black African	79	21	CIA-11; FW-06
147	Spain	Castilian Spanish	74	26	CIA-11; Philip's-2000
148	Sri Lanka	Sinhalese	74**	52	CIA-11; FW-06
149	Sudan	Arab	39	61	CIA-11; FW-06
150	Suriname	East Indian	37	63	CIA-11; FW-06
151	Swaziland	African	97	3	CIA-11; FW-06
152	Sweden	Swede	88	12	EGE
153	Switzerland	Swiss	79	21	EGE
154	Syria	Arab	90	10	CIA-11; FW-06

	Country	Largest ethnic group	%	EH	Main sources
155	Taiwan	Taiwanese	84	16	CIA-11; FW-06
156	Tajikistan	Tajik	80	20	CIA-11; FW-06
157	Tanzania	Swahili (language)	88	12	Morrison 1972; cf. CIA-11
158	Thailand	Thai	75	25	CIA-11; FW-06
159	Togo	Ewe	43*	29	WG-07; Philip's-2000
160	Trinidad and Tobago	Indian (South Asian)	40	60	CIA-11; FW-06
161	Tunisia	Arab	98	2	CIA-11; FW-06
162	Turkey	Turkish	75	25	CIA-11; cf. FW-06
163	Turkmenistan	Turkmen	85	15	CIA-11; FW-06
164	Uganda	Baganda	17*	42	CIA-11; FW-06
165	Ukraine	Ukrainian	78	22	CIA-11; FW-06
166	United Arab Emirates	Arab	42	58	CIA-11; FW-06
167	United Kingdom	White British	85	15	EGE
168	United States	White	80	20	CIA-11; Philip's-2000
169	Uruguay	White and mestizo	96	4	CIA-11; FW-06
170	Uzbekistan	Uzbek	80	20	CIA-11; FW-06
171	Vanuatu	Ni-Vanuatu	98	2	CIA-11; FW-06
172	Venezuela	Mestizo/mulatto/white	93	7	EGLA
173	Vietnam	Kinh (Viet)	86	14	CIA-11; FW-06
174	Yemen	Arab	96	4	Philip's-2000; cf. WG-07

Country	Largest ethnic group	%	EH	Main sources
175 Zambia	Bemba	36*	32	Philip's-2000
176 Zimbabwe	Shona	82*	9	CIA-11; FW-06

EH = The inverse percentage of the largest ethnic group indicates the level of ethnic heterogeneity (EH).

* = The inverse percentage of the largest ethnic (tribal) group is divided by 2 in the cases of sub- Saharan African countries and the Philippines because genetic differences between tribal groups can be assumed to be much smaller than between racial and other ethnic groups.

** = The inverse percentage of the largest ethnic group is multiplied by 2 in the cases in which racial, national, linguistic, and old religious divisions coincide (Israel and Sri Lanka) because ethnic divisions can be assumed to be in such cases much deeper than usually.

Abbreviations in Appendix 2

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency, *The CIA World Factbook 2011*
FW-06	*Freedom in the World 2006*
Philip's-2000	*Philip's Encyclopedic World Atlas (2000)*
WG-07	*The World Guide: Global Reference, Country by Country (2007)*
EGLA	*Ethnic Groups in Latin America (2012).* Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
EGE	*Ethnic Groups in Europe (2012).* Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

	http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
EGA	*Ethnic Groups in Asia (2012).* Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Morrison	Morrison et al. (1972). *Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook.*
Held, 1994	Held, C.C. (1994). *Middle East Patterns, Places, Peoples and Politics.*
MRG-1997	Minority Rights Group International (1997). *World Directory of Minorities.*
MRG-2011	Minority Rights Group International (2011). *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples.* http://www.minorityrights.org
Samatar	Samatar. S. S. (1991). *Somalia: A Nation in Turmoil.*
Somalia	Somalia. Amanda Rorabacks World in a Nutshell. (2007) www.worldinanutshell.com/Somalia.htm

Abbreviations

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
EEC	The estimated scale of ethnic conflicts
EH	Ethnic heterogeneity
ELF	An ethnolinguistic fragmentation (*Atlas Narodov Mira)*
ELF	The ethnolinguistic fractionalization index
EV	A scale of violent ethnic conflict
FH-2010	Freedom House's combined rankings of political rights and civil liberties
FH	Freedom House, *Freedom in the World*
FW-06	*Freedom in the World*, Appendix 2
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index
IC	A scale of institutionalized ethnic interest conflict
ID	Index of Democratization
Keesing's	Keesing's Record of World Events
MAR	University of Maryland's *Minorities at Risk* project
MRG-1997	Minority Rights Group International, *World Directory of Minorities*
N	Number of countries
National IQ	The average intelligence of a nation
Philip's	*Philip's Encyclopedic World Atlas*
PPP/GNI	Purchasing Power Parity/Gross National Income, per capita
GNI/PPP	Gross National Income in Purchasing Power Parity per capita
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WDM	Minority Rights Group International, *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous People*
WG-07	*The World Guide: Global Reference, Country by Country*

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